FRANCE/GABON (SENEGAL)/RWANDA: PREVIEW OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000216

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2030
TAGS: PREL EAID SENV MOPS SG GB RW FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE/GABON (SENEGAL)/RWANDA: PREVIEW OF
PRESIDENT SARKOZY'S FEBRUARY 24-25 VISITS

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Classified By: Wallace R. Bain, Political Officer, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: French President Nicolas Sarkozy visits
Gabon (February 24) and Rwanda (February 25),spending about
24 hours in the former and about three in the latter. His
Africa advisors told us on February 23 that in Gabon, he will
sign a renegotiated defense agreement that will include a
continuing military basing arrangement in Gabon. France and
Senegal have agreed to end the basing agreement in Senegal,
with the French retaining a residual presence in Senegal.
The decision -- which our contact described as "as good an
outcome as we could have asked for" with respect to Senegal
-- about the bases will allow the rapid conclusion of a new
defense agreement with Senegal. France views relations with
Gabon entering a new phase, with the passing of Omar Bongo,
the elections of Ali Bongo, the need for Gabon to restructure
its economy because of its dwindling oil resources, and
France's interest in developing more efficient commercial and
banking arrangements, in part to respond to China's way of
doing business in Africa. Following shortly after the
renewal of France-Rwanda diplomatic relations in November,
Sarkozy will make a three hour visit to Kigali on February
25, in a visit best described as a confidence-building
exercise. Sarkozy will likely acknowledge that France, as
part of the international community, bears some
responsibility for the 1994 genocide, but cannot be singled
out for blame. He will press the idea that France and Rwanda
must remember the past, but now look to the future. END
SUMMARY.

Overview
--------------

2. (U) According to an official Presidential announcement,
Sarkozy will arrive in Mvengue-Franceville, Gabon, at 0800 on
February 24, where he will be greeted by President Bongo.
They will pay their respects to the late President Bongo at
his mausoleum, hold discussions, and then visit the Centre
International de Recherches Medicales de Franceville. The
parties will then proceed to Libreville, where they will
visit the Rougier plywood factory. Sarkozy will then deliver
a speech at the Cite de la Democratie, followed by a
reception for the French community in Gabon, followed by a
dinner hosted by Bongo. Sarkozy will leave the next morning
(February 25),arriving in Kigali at 1315, where President
Kagame will greet him. They will hold discussions, after
which there will be a press conference, a lunch hosted by
Kagame, a visit to a memorial to genocide victims, and
finally Sarkozy's departure at 1620 on February 25.

Gabon (and Senegal)
--------------

3. (C) Presidential AF Advisor Remi Marechaux on February 23
briefed Africa Watcher and Africa Assistant on the Gabon
portion of the visit. He began by discussing the military
bases issue and how, in 2008, an intra-GOF defense review
concluded that France needed only one military base on the
Atlantic side of Africa. This suggestion coincided with
Sarkozy's policies on Africa and the need for France to
rationalize its presence there and to seek greater
efficiencies and cost effectiveness. There were once three
French military bases, in Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gabon.
The base in Cote d'Ivoire effectively closed during the
recent political turmoil there, leaving the bases in Senegal
and Gabon. Marechaux said there was much back-and-forth
within the GOF on which base to close. France, he noted, has
had a military presence in Senegal, of one sort or another,
since 1659.


4. (C) Defense Minister Morin did not make things easier by
suggesting not long ago that France would keep both bases.
Marechaux said that Morin (whom Marechaux described as a bit
gaffe-prone) was mis-interpreted in that the 2010 French
budget included provisions for both bases as the decision to
close one had not been made by the time the budget was made.
In the meantime, Senegal's President Wade had made several
statements about wanting the bases returned to Senegal, in
part because they occupy very desirable land in Senegal that
could be put to other lucrative uses.


5. (C) Marechaux said the decision almost "made itself"
because the Senegalese told the French that if France wanted
to maintain a base in Senegal, it could do so but would have

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to construct a new base in a new location, with the old bases
reverting to Senegalese control. Marechaux said the French
told the Senegalese that that would be a factor in French
decision-making. In the end, France chose Gabon. Morin went
to Senegal to assuage the Senegalese, telling Wade that
"we've done what you asked for, we are returning this
valuable land." Marechaux expressed relief, saying that Wade
took the same line, saying that France had given Senegal back
her lands. Marechaux said that the outcome was about as good
as France could have expected. Marechaux said that France
would retain a couple of hundred troops in Senegal, to man
two small bases (more like offices) near the port and airport
in Dakar. These would not be operational bases but rather
communications and logistics coordination hubs that could
facilitate French deployments in West Africa if necessary.
The details had not yet been worked out.


6. (C) The decision on the bases will allow France and
Gabon, during Sarkozy's visit, to sign a new defense
agreement, the first revision since the immediate
post-independence period. Marechaux explained that the
existing defense agreement was simply obsolete, as it
provided, among other things, for France to provide internal
security in Gabon during political unrest. The resolution of
the base issue will allow France to sign a new defense
agreement with Senegal, "within weeks," Marechaux predicted.


7. (C) Aside from these pol/mil issues, Marechaux said that
Gabon was entering a new phase, with the passing of Omar
Bongo, the election of his son, and the prospect of dwindling
oil reserves forcing Gabon to seek avenues for diversifying
its economy. Marechaux said that France wants to play a
close, cooperative, and helpful role as Gabon transitions.
Marechaux mentioned China as an impetus for change, both for
Gabon and France. He said that France, through the French
Development Agency (AFD) would establish new mechanisms for
project financing to make implementation more efficient.
French projects "sometimes take years to conclude," whereas
the Chinese projects can happen very quickly. Marechaux said
that France would still try to maintain a strong sense of
transparency, "good governance," and "virtue" (as he put it)
even if China only cared about winning project and speed.
"We will try to show them that our method will provide
ancillary benefits to Gabon," he said.


8. (C) Marechaux also explained that AFD is also going to
pilot a new project of guaranteeing bank bonds as a way to
generate investment funds for local enterprise. He mentioned
efforts to develop Gabon's mining sector, in which the French
government, via its involvement with an AREVA subsidiary, is
working with Gabon on manganese extraction. France hopes
that Gabon will exploit other mineral wealth, in an
environmentally friendly way, as its oil supply is exhausted.


9. (C) Sarkozy will try to advance France's dialogue with
Gabon on global issues, such as the Copenhagen process on the
environment, the MICOPAX arrangement in C.A.R, and Gabon's
role on the UN Security Council (noting in particular that
Gabon will hold the Chair in March, which will likely be a
critical time for decisions on Iran sanctions). Sarkozy will
also visit the Rougier plywood operation, which, Marechaux
said, uses wood from a French-supported sustainable forestry
project. Rougier is also a model company in terms of its
labor policies. Marechaux said that Sarkozy wants to use
Rougier as a model of a modern company with true "green"
credentials that could be emulated in Gabon and elsewhere.


10. (C) Marechaux said that Sarkozy was willing to meet with
Gabon's political opposition group. He said that the
opposition was being very sly, expressing an interest in
meeting with Sarkozy but wanting Sarkozy to ask for the
meeting. He said that after much to-an-fro, the meeting had
been arranged but that the opposition was still trying to
make it appear that it would take place at Sarkozy's request.



11. (C) FM Kouchner, Secstate for Cooperation and
Francophonie Joyandet, the Presidency's Africa cell, and a
host of business leaders and members of the press will
accompany Sarkozy to both Gabon and Rwanda. Marechaux,
expressing a bit of disdain, noted that businessman and
lawyer Robert Bourgi, was in the official party. Marechaux

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(PROTECT) described Bourgi as a "mercenary" interested only
in his own well-being. But he will nonetheless be on
Sarkozy's plane, to Marechaux's apparent displeasure.

RWANDA
--------------

12. (C) Sarkozy's short visit to Rwanda is both simpler and
more complex, as described by the Elysee's junior AF Advisor,
Clement LeClerc. The underlying goal is to reinforce the
recently renewed (November 29, 2009) diplomatic relations
between France and Rwanda, and, more importantly, turn the
page away from the 1994 genocide and towards a new era of
cooperation. LeClerc stated that Sarkozy will again
acknowledge that France, along with the entire international
community, must recognize some responsibility for mistakes
made before and during the genocide, but that France was
neither the cause nor the enabler. During his January visit
to Kigali, FM Kouchner did not face any significant criticism
from the local press or politicians asserting France's
culpability, and therefore LeClerc did not expect Sarkozy
would have to address these old accusations. Interestingly,
LeClerc digressed to assert that most of the French NGOs and
other voices that continue to claim French culpability in the
genocide are aligned politically with parties on the left,
and therefore they are trying to keep this a pertinent issue
to be addressed by Sarkozy's center-right government.
Sarkozy's core message is "don't forget the past, but
likewise, don't be paralyzed by it -- don't let the past
become a barrier to progress on our relations."


13. (C) A French President has not visited Rwanda in 25
years, but Sarkozy has pursued this trip as a foreign policy
goal since 2007. Sarkozy's 3-hour visit to Kigali is
expected to be almost exclusively an engagement with
President Kagame, including a short meeting, a joint press
conference, and a lunch. Finally, and most symbolically,
Sarkozy will lay a wreath at the genocide memorial. The trip
will be short on "deliverables," in part because France's
foreign assistance budget for the coming year was calculated
before the restoration of relations took place and therefore
did not assign additional funds for Rwanda-related projects.
LeClerc expects that France will be able to offer
significantly more assistance in the future. One goal of the
visit is to speed the resumption of cultural ties, including
setting in motion the reestablishment of a French Cultural
Center and a French school, and allowing Radio France
International to recreate its Rwandan bureau.


14. (C) According to LeClerc, Sarkozy is unlikely to raise
delicate national or regional political issues on order to
focus the visit towards enhancing the bilateral relationship.
At the same time, France continues to search for a role in
helping bring peace to the broader Great Lakes region, mostly
via the efforts of Special Envoy Christian Connan, by
creating cross-boarder economic projects with some financial
and technical support from the French Development Agency.


15. (C) We asked LeClerc about press reports stating that
France was going to try to organize a two-part Great Lakes
donor's conference in May/June 2010. While LeClerc said that
that remained an objective, he acknowledged that there were
many unresolved obstacles that had to be overcome. The
conference would not be a certainty until such issues as
venue, participants, format, agenda, and other such matters
were resolved. LeClerc noted that Kabila, Kagame, and the
other leaders of the broader Great Lakes community all had
their preferences, and they all were suspicious of each other
and were wary about ending up with the short end of the
stick. Leclerc repeated that organizing such a conference
could be difficult and he could not state with certainty that
it would come about. (COMMENT: Our own take, after speaking
with LeClerc, is that the article in Le Parisen, which we
circulated to the Department and to posts in the region, may
have been excessively optimistic and presumptive. However,
the French clearly would like to see the conference take
place, and we will continue to monitor their thinking. END
COMMENT.)
PEKALA