Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10PARIS192
2010-02-19 11:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
FRANCE RECOMMENDS NEGOTIATING NEW MINURCAT MANDATE
how-toVZCZCXRO2977 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHFR #0192 0501120 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 191120Z FEB 10 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8333 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2183 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7315 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6564 RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 1374
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000192
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR IO/PSC:TBROWN, AF/C:GMCKEEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2030
TAGS: PREF PREL KPKO CD CT FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE RECOMMENDS NEGOTIATING NEW MINURCAT MANDATE
IN RESPONSE TO P5 DEMARCHE TO EXTEND PRESENT MANDATE
REF: A. STATE 14164
B. PARIS 172
Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000192
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR IO/PSC:TBROWN, AF/C:GMCKEEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2030
TAGS: PREF PREL KPKO CD CT FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE RECOMMENDS NEGOTIATING NEW MINURCAT MANDATE
IN RESPONSE TO P5 DEMARCHE TO EXTEND PRESENT MANDATE
REF: A. STATE 14164
B. PARIS 172
Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: In response to Ref A request for P5 members
to demarche the Government of Chad on reconsidering its call
for MINURCAT withdrawal, French MFA officials, mostly in line
with their previous assessment, stated that the next step
should be for the UN to negotiate a new mandate focused on
the transition of MINURCAT to GOC responsibility. In
France's view, President Deby is ready to start this
negotiation and will be "flexible." END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Africa-watcher delivered REF A demarche on February
18 to MFA DAS-equivalent for Central Africa, Stephane
Gruenberg and Chad/C.A.R. Desk Officer Vincent Alexandre.
Their response was influenced by apparently having received a
readout of the February 17 P5 discussion in New York that
differed from the USG's interpretation of that meeting
regarding the MINURCAT mandate and the views of those
participating in the discussion on Deby's willingness to
accept a continued MINURCAT presence. The French MFA
representatives did not confirm a P5 agreement, at least not
from capitals, to demarche the Government of Chad in any
specific way, while noting that they remain in contact with
the GOC on this issue. As for how best to influence Chad on
this issue, Gruenberg stated that he did not see any problem
with a P5 demarche, while recommending two caveats: a
demarche should be done by embassies in Ndjamena, and rather
than requesting an extension of MINURCAT's current mandate,
the demarche should promote negotiations for a revised
mandate that would focus on the transition of MINURCAT's
responsibilities to the GOC.
3. (C) In the MFA's view, President Deby could accept this
approach. The new mandate would need to target MINURCAT's
withdrawal by March 2011, but this could be based on
achieving specific benchmarks, which, if not fulfilled, could
permit a further extension. Gruenberg and Alexandre
reiterated many of the points on the need to focus on
MINURCAT's transition shared with us previously (Ref B),but
asserted that Deby has always been open to negotiations, even
in early January when he delivered his formal request for
MINURCAT's withdraw. Alexandre stated that the biggest
problem is that the UN has not put in place a proper
negotiating counterpart. Gruenberg concurred and stated that
he believed Deby could be "flexible," but the international
community needs to be "pragmatic."
4. (C) When asked about France's efforts to date to move
Deby away from demanding MINURCAT's termination, Alexandre
responded that President Sarkozy raised the importance of
MINURCAT before January, and that FM Kouchner had tried to
change Deby's mind after Deby formally presented his request.
Gruenberg asserted the French view that the most effective
next step is for the UN to work with the GOC to negotiate a
mandate renewal.
RIVKIN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR IO/PSC:TBROWN, AF/C:GMCKEEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2030
TAGS: PREF PREL KPKO CD CT FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE RECOMMENDS NEGOTIATING NEW MINURCAT MANDATE
IN RESPONSE TO P5 DEMARCHE TO EXTEND PRESENT MANDATE
REF: A. STATE 14164
B. PARIS 172
Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: In response to Ref A request for P5 members
to demarche the Government of Chad on reconsidering its call
for MINURCAT withdrawal, French MFA officials, mostly in line
with their previous assessment, stated that the next step
should be for the UN to negotiate a new mandate focused on
the transition of MINURCAT to GOC responsibility. In
France's view, President Deby is ready to start this
negotiation and will be "flexible." END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Africa-watcher delivered REF A demarche on February
18 to MFA DAS-equivalent for Central Africa, Stephane
Gruenberg and Chad/C.A.R. Desk Officer Vincent Alexandre.
Their response was influenced by apparently having received a
readout of the February 17 P5 discussion in New York that
differed from the USG's interpretation of that meeting
regarding the MINURCAT mandate and the views of those
participating in the discussion on Deby's willingness to
accept a continued MINURCAT presence. The French MFA
representatives did not confirm a P5 agreement, at least not
from capitals, to demarche the Government of Chad in any
specific way, while noting that they remain in contact with
the GOC on this issue. As for how best to influence Chad on
this issue, Gruenberg stated that he did not see any problem
with a P5 demarche, while recommending two caveats: a
demarche should be done by embassies in Ndjamena, and rather
than requesting an extension of MINURCAT's current mandate,
the demarche should promote negotiations for a revised
mandate that would focus on the transition of MINURCAT's
responsibilities to the GOC.
3. (C) In the MFA's view, President Deby could accept this
approach. The new mandate would need to target MINURCAT's
withdrawal by March 2011, but this could be based on
achieving specific benchmarks, which, if not fulfilled, could
permit a further extension. Gruenberg and Alexandre
reiterated many of the points on the need to focus on
MINURCAT's transition shared with us previously (Ref B),but
asserted that Deby has always been open to negotiations, even
in early January when he delivered his formal request for
MINURCAT's withdraw. Alexandre stated that the biggest
problem is that the UN has not put in place a proper
negotiating counterpart. Gruenberg concurred and stated that
he believed Deby could be "flexible," but the international
community needs to be "pragmatic."
4. (C) When asked about France's efforts to date to move
Deby away from demanding MINURCAT's termination, Alexandre
responded that President Sarkozy raised the importance of
MINURCAT before January, and that FM Kouchner had tried to
change Deby's mind after Deby formally presented his request.
Gruenberg asserted the French view that the most effective
next step is for the UN to work with the GOC to negotiate a
mandate renewal.
RIVKIN