NORWEGIAN FM VISITS THE MIDDLE EAST: OSLO READOUT

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SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN FM VISITS THE MIDDLE EAST: OSLO READOUT

DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 (B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoere's meeting on the
Middle East in Brussels (January 12) and then in the region
(January 16-20) have led him to believe that Palestinian President
Abbas is not in a position to move forward in the way that European
and U.S. leaders want him to, due to internal political dynamics.
Pressure on Abbas may make him even more recalcitrant, and the
Norwegians counsel low-profile diplomacy. On the bilateral front,
the Norwegians had productive meetings with high level Israeli
government officials, including a good meeting with Foreign
Minister Lieberman who proposed a list of areas of cooperation that
both sides have agreed to work on to improve Norway-Israel
relations. End Summary.




2. (C) Deputy Chief of Mission and poloff met with MFA officials
Jorn Gjelstad and Torunn Viste, Director and Deputy Director,
respectively, of the MFA Middle East Section on February 8 for a
readout of Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoere's trip to Brussels and
then Israel. All quotations in this cable, unless otherwise
indicated, are of Gjelstad's words.



BRUSSELS CONSENSUS: IT'S ABBAS'S MOVE




3. (C) Gjelstad said that the majority opinion in Brussels, in a
meeting with Special Envoy Mitchell, French Foreign Minister
Kuchner, EU Foreign Minister Ashton, Quartet Envoy Blair, Norwegian
Foreign Minister Stoere and Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos, was
that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has moved from his initial
bargaining position ("which was zero") and is now ready for
negotiations. The general impression, Gjelstad said, was that the
U.S. has extracted what it can from the Israelis, and it is now
Palestinian President Abbas who has to move from his position of
"stubbornness." Kuchner was especially emphatic on this. At the
other end of the spectrum, Moratinos said that Abbas still needs
something from the Israelis, including, perhaps, a statement from
the U.S. that East Jerusalem should be included in negotiations.
Moratinos said that a clearer "policy of confidence" was needed
from the Israelis. All agreed that Abbas needs support from Arab
leaders if he is to take a step forward.



AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE (AHLC) ISSUES




4. (C) Gjelstad said that the main Norwegian message on the AHLC
was that public sector-led development is not sustainable.
(Comment: emboffs have been hearing this message, along with the
"donor fatigue" message, for over a year from various Norwegian
interlocutors.) Gjelstad began by saying that the work of the AHLC
faced a great challenge in establishing the framework conditions
for the Palestinian private sector's functioning. Gjelstad said
that according to Prime Minister Fayyad, there is great interest
among investors in the region to come in and look for projects in
Palestinian-controlled areas. Fayyad told the GON that there is
$1.2 billion "waiting in the Gulf states" that would be invested
over the course of about two years, should the framework conditions
improve. Gjelstad said that amount would make current donor
support seem insignificant.




5. (C) In Brussels, Tony Blair was forward looking on private
investment, and said he would redouble efforts to remove
economically strategic checkpoints that choke off trade. Gjelstad
said that development is currently totally dependent on the capital
inflows from international donors, and local value creation was key
to a sustainable Palestinian economy and political stability.




6. (C) Gjelstad warned that European donors are cutting back their

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funding, and have committed less than half of what they contributed
in 2009: $230 million in pledges so far for 2010 versus $500
million contributed last year. Gjelstad interpreted this as a
result not of the financial crisis, but of reduced faith that the
money can have real results when there is no change in Israeli
policy. Summing up, Gjelstad said that the AHLC functions as a
good preparation for capital-level political talks.




7. (C) Gjelstad said that Stoere had a very interesting discussion
in Brussels with Special Envoy Mitchell, in which the two agreed
that there was no need for a pledging conference (especially the
French proposal for one in Paris) absent a political breakthrough
on the peace process. The AHLC, they agreed, was not a pledging
mechanism at all, but a venue to move forward on how to use the
money already pledged. On that basis, the next AHLC meeting would
be in Brussels or (more likely) Madrid on the working level.
Gjelstad put in a plea for Special Envoy Mitchell to attend, and
said the Norwegian envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer will speak to Deputy
Envoy Hale on this issue.



EUROPEAN VIEW OF CONFLICT "CORRECTED" BY PALESTINIANS




8. (C) Gjelstad said that when Stoere went to the region and talked
with Palestinian officials, the majority view in Brussels-that it
was now Abbas's turn to make a move-was "corrected." (Comment: the
use of this word clearly indicates Gjelstad's view that Norway and
Moratinos-not Kuchner, Ashton, and Blair-have a better
understanding of the situation). Gjelstad said that in the current
environment, moving toward the negotiation table would "break
Abbas's neck." The Palestinians look at settlements in East
Jerusalem as a policy of harassment, and Abbas wants a "silent
moratorium" on expansion of already-existing settlements to create
an atmosphere in which he can move ahead. Incursions into the "A"
areas and interference with well-functioning Palestinian security
forces are humiliating and demoralizing.




9. (C) The way forward according to the Palestinian side was
twofold: (1) there must be a greater level of sensitivity toward
creating an atmosphere conducive to negotiations, and (2) the terms
of reference for the negotiations are very important and must
include reference to the 1967 borders and the issue of East
Jerusalem.



PRESSURE ON ABBAS WON'T WORK




10. (C) After meeting with Prime Minister Fayyad, Stoere's view,
according to Gjelstad, was that the more public pressure there is
on Abbas to approach the negotiating table, the more he will
resist, as he cannot politically survive the impression of weakness
that caving to that pressure would create. In fact, resisting the
pressure actually helps his political standing. While the chasm
between the Israeli and Palestinian positions has narrowed
somewhat, the bridge offered to Abbas is neither wide nor strong
enough for him to politically cross. Gjelstad emphasized,
therefore, that the only way to work these issues is through
low-profile, quiet diplomacy. He said that Special Envoy Mitchell
agrees, and that there is a limited window of opportunity in the
coming weeks.



PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS




11. (U) While in Israel, Stoere met with Deputy Prime Minister Dan

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Meridor, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, Defense Minister Ehud
Barak, President Shimon Peres, and opposition Kadima party leader
Tzipora Livni.




12. (C) Lieberman pointedly refused to answer any questions about
whether he could support a two state solution. Other than that,
the meeting was very positive from the Norwegian side. FM
Lieberman presented FM Stoere with a list of areas of cooperation
that Norway and Israel could work upon. (Comment: Embassy Oslo has
heard both from the MFA and from the Israeli embassy multiple times
in the past year that the two countries' relations suffer from a
meager number of bilateral issues that would give substance to the
relationship.) Lieberman's list included the negotiation and
conclusion of an MOU on Research and Development cooperation, an
expansion of cultural cooperation, cooperation on the relocation of
the Israeli embassy in Oslo, and cooperation on OECD membership for
Israel.




13. (C) On the R&D MOU, which Gjelstad characterized as the most
important of the issues, there is a state-to-state and a
ministry-to-ministry option, the latter of which Gjelstad implied
was more likely to be politically possible in Norway. The MOU
would likely cover four or five areas, including renewable energy,
desalination of water, medical and biotech research, and other
environmental technologies. All of the issues have importance for
the whole Middle East region, said Gjelstad, and some areas of
cooperation could eventually pull in Jordan and other regional
players.




14. (C) On the issue of cultural exchange, Gjelstad admitted that
the bilateral nature of the discussion was something of a fig
leaf-the real issue is not of getting Norwegian cultural
representatives to Israel, as plenty go already. The real issue is
the difficulty of getting Israelis in front of Norwegian audiences
of any type. Norwegian institutions, Gjelstad said, often insist
that if an Israeli visits, a Palestinian must visit, thereby
putting every educational, artistic, or cultural exchange into a
"peace context." (Comment: Post finds this to be a telling
commentary on the narrow view many Norwegians have of Israel, and
of the politicization of the very concept of "Israel" in Norway.
Post believes that educational and cultural decision makers in
Norway are afraid of criticism or controversy if they invite an
Israeli to speak without counterbalancing his or her appearance
with a Palestinian.)




15. (C) Kadima leader Livni was clear that she wants a two state
solution, which she sees as the only option. According to
Gjelstad, she likened failing to openly pursue a two state solution
to "sitting on a volcano." Livni said that her Kadima party was
ready to fill the gap in a coalition government should there be a
shift, and said that she doesn't think the negotiation of a two
state solution is possible within the current coalition.




16. (C) In a separate meeting with Ambassador and DCM on another
subject February 8, MFA Director General for UN, Peace, and
Humanitarian Affairs Geir Pedersen, who also accompanied FM Stoere,
said that Israelis of all persuasions had expressed that Netanyahu
had genuinely shifted his position and that now was the time to
begin talks. He expressed the belief that the Israeli PM now
accepted the "two state solution." Pedersen also indicated support
for Special Envoy Mitchell's proposal to begin "proximity talks"
between the Arabs and Palestinians.
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