Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10OSLO61
2010-02-03 12:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

NORWAY OPEN TO INCREASED PRESSURE ON IRAN

Tags:  PARM PREL IR UNSC NO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNY #0061/01 0341242
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R 031242Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0011
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0001
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 000061 

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AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03
TAGS: PARM PREL IR UNSC NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY OPEN TO INCREASED PRESSURE ON IRAN

REF: 10 STATE 09124

DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 B, D

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 000061

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03
TAGS: PARM PREL IR UNSC NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY OPEN TO INCREASED PRESSURE ON IRAN

REF: 10 STATE 09124

DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 B, D


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Political Director of the Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Vegard Ellefsen, responded receptively to all of
reftel talking points, delivered by U.S. Ambassador to Norway Barry
White. Ellefsen said that Norway would gladly support and easily
adopt stricter measures at the UN Security Council (UNSC),but also
mentioned that some voices in the GON, especially at the embassy in
Tehran, believed that sanctions could be counterproductive. Any
potential "coalition of the willing" that adopts measures more
stringent than those possible to obtain in the UNSC would be more
legally tricky for the Norwegian government to sign on to. Norway
does, however, view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran with
alarm, and Ellefsen suggested that Foreign Minister Stoere might be
interested in assembling a coalition, based for example on the
Group of 7 disarmament group, to build political support in the UN.
End Summary.



TIME FOR IRAN TO STEP UP

--------------




2. (C) Ambassador Barry White met with Political Director Vegard
Ellefsen on February 2 to discuss next steps on Iran, using reftel
talking points. After Ambassador White stated the U.S. position,
Ellefsen took the opportunity to state that likeminded countries
were all aligning behind President Obama, whom he described as a
"mobilizer" on the disarmament issue. As for Iran, Ellefsen said
"we agree it's high time that Iran step up to the plate," and said
that President Obama's whole approach to the issue of dealing with
Iran has been admirable, mentioning in particular his Cairo speech.
Ambassador White brought up Foreign Minister Stoere's February 1
speech on disarmament, in which Stoere emphatically outlined the
need for a comprehensive approach to security and disarmament, and
mentioned Iran's challenge to this important agenda. (Stoere's
speech can be found at:
www.regjeringen.no/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artik ler/
utenriksministeren/2010/disarmament.html?id=5 92550)



NORWAY PREFERS TO WORK THROUGH THE UN

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3. (C) Practically speaking, Ellefsen said that the P5+1 group
could function to move the UNSC to action, but China was still the
big question mark (and he obliquely referenced recently strained
relations between China and the U.S.). Norway favors a united P5+1
in the Security Council, and believes this would send Iran the
strongest possible political signal. Ellefsen said that Russia
"looks like it's coming down the right path" on the Iran issue.



NO EASY ANSWERS

--------------




4. (C) When asked about internal GON ideas on Iran, Ellefsen said
that, although the issue has been discussed at high levels, "we
don't have a formula to suggest." He said the situation in Iran
is very complicated, with many in the opposition supporting the
nuclear program, and the probable effect of sanctions not entirely
clear-the Norwegian embassy in Tehran warns of possible backlash
against sanctions that might actually strengthen the regime.
According to Ellefsen, however, the Norwegian government would
"listen carefully" to us on any suggestion of how to increase
pressure. If stronger measures are developed by the UNSC, adoption
by the GON will be easy; if they are developed by the EU, adoption

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by the GON will be "relatively" easy; if there ends up being a
"coalition of the willing," there will be some "internal legal
work" that must be accomplished before Norway could join.



NORWAY COULD HELP MOBILIZE A COALITION

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5. (C) Regarding how Norway could potentially help, Ellefsen said
that Foreign Minister Stoere was, in many diplomatic arenas,
interested in mobilizing coalitions of countries, and might be able
to help build support for eventual UNSC or other action. Ellefsen
mentioned as an example the informal "Group of Seven" on
disarmament, which includes countries as varied as Norway,
Indonesia, and South Africa. Ellefsen offered that perhaps Norway
could use its contacts behind the scenes to help reach a meaningful
agreement.
WHITE