EUR/RPM DIRECTOR DISCUSSES NATO, ARCTIC, AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000045

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS PARM KNNP KCFE PGOV SENV AF NO
SUBJECT: EUR/RPM DIRECTOR DISCUSSES NATO, ARCTIC, AND
AFGHANISTAN WITH NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS

Classified By: DCM James T. Heg for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On the margins of the January 14 NATO
Strategic Concept Seminar EUR/RPM Director Bruce Turner, DCM,
and PolOff conducted bilateral meetings January 13 to discuss
Afghanistan, NATO, Russia, and the Arctic High North. On
Afghanistan, MFA and MoD officials described increasing
Nordic Cooperation in Regional-Command (RC-North),
recommended improved coordination between the civilian effort
and ISAF, and asked for details on U.S. troop deployment in
their Area of Operation. On NATO's Strategic Concept
deliberations, MoD Deputy Director of Security Policy Jan
Olsen made the case for Norway's Core Areas Initiative (High
North) to ensure NATO remains relevant to the public and
capable of homeland defense, and outlined the GoN's views on
strategic weapons and concern over sub-strategic weapons.
MFA Director for Security Policy and North America Unni
Klovstad noted a NATO focus on energy issues should be
limited to infrastructure protection, and outlined Norway's
hope for improved efficiency as an outcome of the NATO reform
effort.


2. (C) On Russia, Olsen described a growing "convergence of
Russian rhetoric and military capability," which had the
potential for creating a "more interesting" situation with
Russia as its pursues its ambitions in the Arctic High North.
MFA Russia Expert Anne Kjersti Karlsen contrasted Russia's
continuing flights along Norway's coastline and portrayal of
NATO as Russia's worst enemy with her judgment that Russia's
true security focus was on China. Klovstad cautioned against
extensive NATO involvement in Arctic issues, saying the GoN
wanted to avoid an escalation of tensions, but noted Norway's
desire for NATO to monitor the situation. Olsen noted that
the frigate Fritdjof Nansen, part of the EU's ATALANTA
effort, would complete its mission in the Gulf of Aden in
early 2010 and would not be replaced, and that the GoN
Hospital in Chad would also shut down in 2010. Norwegian
special forces likely will return to Afghanistan o/a March
2011, following the end of the current deployment of New
Zealand special forces. End Summary.

Afghanistan
--------------


3. (C) Turner told Klovstad, Karlsen, and MFA North America
Coordinator Morten Aasland that the United Nations Assistance
Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) could not do everything and
that there was a need for a Senior Civilian Coordinator for
Afghanistan to coordinate PRT engagement. Klovstad said that
SRSG Kai Eide believed that ISAF needed to get better at
civilian coordination. Turner discussed the state of play in
France and Germany in advance of the London Conference on
Afghanistan, and said the U.S. still hoped that those nations
would do more, although the domestic situation in Germany was
complicated.


4. (C) MoD Deputy Director for Security Policy Jan Olsen
briefed on increased Nordic cooperation in Afghanistan,
driven in part by resource implications and the benefits of
sharing logistical costs. He noted that Finland may looking
to increase its boots on the ground, and Sweden was
considering an increased presence at the Norwegian PRT in
Meymaneh, Faryab Province. Olsen wondered about the FRAGO
received from NATO stating the two U.S. "brigades" would be
arriving in RC-North, given that the COMISAF report had been
quite clear that the focus of increased troops would be in
the south and east. He noted that Norway would likely extend
its medevac helicopters in Afghanistan through the end of
2011 and would need to explore cooperation with the U.S. if
U.S. helicopters deploy in RC-North. He added that in the
period between Christmas and New Year, the Norwegian troops
had engaged in ten "incidents," and that while previously
German troops provided Quick Reaction Force support, they
were now "always engaged" in Kunduz and unable to assist. In
response to a query from DCM, Oslen indicated that Norwegian
special forces likely would return to Afghanistan o/a March
2011, when the current deployment of New Zealand special
forces is due to expire.

Strategic and sub-Strategic Weapons and NATO
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5. (S) In response to a question on whether MoD and MFA

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views differed on NATO tactical nuclear weapons in Europe,
Olsen said the GoN is watching the U.S. Nuclear Posture
Review closely and is committed to NATO's current policy
until changes can be agreed upon by Allies. He further noted
that the GoN's goal is in line with President Obama's speech
in Prague, but recognizes there is a process that must be
followed. Olsen suggested that any changes should wait until
2011, but any reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in
Europe must not undermine European security. He concluded by
noting that NATO's new nuclear doctrine had to grapple with
the reality that Russia possessed 5,000 sub-strategic
weapons, while "Europe" only had two hundred, which
complicated efforts to negotiate a significant reduction in
the Russian stockpile.

NATO Reform
--------------


6. (C) Klovstad asked what the U.S. expected out of the
Strategic Concept update, noting that capabilities, Article
5, Missile Defense, new security threats, and the
Comprehensive Approach topped the GoN's list. Turner asked
if the GoN saw a role in increased consultations with
partners that share our values in the spirit of Article 4,
for example in dealing with cyber-security incidents.
Klovstad responded that Norway was unclear on the
applicability of Article 5 in a cyber-attack and that the GoN
was looking for more clarity on what is meant by "future
challenges." The GoN was not sure if "rephrasing" new
threats, such as energy issues, would be the correct path for
NATO. Karlsen chimed in that the GoN did not think NATO
should duplicate responsibilities held by other
organizations, and a definition for "energy security" needed
to be developed. Klovstad added that NATO's role on energy
security thus far means infrastructure protection, and
concluded by advocating for overall NATO reform, potentially
including rethinking the consensus principle, for a more
efficiently run organization. Olsen noted that the Norwegian
public perceived NATO as engaged in Afghanistan only, which
pressed the GoN to focus on its Core Areas Initiative so that
NATO would remain relevant to Norwegians. He mentioned
Norway's upcoming Cold Response Invitex exercise in February,
indicating that SACEUR attendance would be very welcome.

Russia and NATO
--------------


7. (C) Karlsen said that NATO's on-going efforts with Russia
had to be at least in part about confidence building.
Klovstad continued that we needed to wait until after the
February Defense Ministerial to determine whether Russia
really would engage more actively, adding that SYG Rasmussen
had ambitions to move the relationship along, and had
scheduled several meetings over the next few weeks. arlsen
said that Russia still considered NATO "is worst enemy," but
the GoN did not feel threateed by Russia or the Zapd and
Ladoga exercises, hich took place 20 kilometers from the
Norwegian order. When Turner brought up that Russia's
revsed declaratory nuclear policy appeared to include
regional crises, Karlsen responded that th GoN wanted to
keep the NATO-Russia cooperation process moving regardless,
but realizes that the U.S. and other allies "won't be patient
forever." In her view, she said, Russia security and
military planning was very focused on China, with more than
half of its resources in the East. However, she added,
Russian flights in and around Norwegian airspace had
increased, and while not up to Cold War levels, did raise
concern among GoN officials.


8. (C) Olsen noted that Russia currently had more active
submarines and a more "declared and beefed-up military," and
described the growing "convergence of Russian rhetoric and
military capability," which could create a more "interesting"
situation with Russia as its furthers its ambitions in the
Arctic High North. Olsen mentioned that the GoN puts
forward a work plan each year with Russia for military
cooperation, and maybe half of what is proposed is actually
accomplished. When asked whether the GoN had given thought
to a potential Russian demand for the flank regime to be
removed from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty, Olsen responded that the GoN would prefer to maintain
the flank regime but would consider other arrangements if
necessary.

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NATO in the Arctic and Cooperation
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9. (C) Klovstad said that the GoN would like NATO to follow
and be aware of developments in the Arctic High North in a
way that would avoid provoking the Russians into tit-for-tat
responses and escalation. For example, NATO could play a
role in exercises for search and rescue capabilities,
including through the NATO-Russia Council. She brought up
the "Stoltenberg process," which calls for enhanced security
cooperation with Iceland, Sweden and Finland while respecting
each country's differing relationship with NATO. In response
to Turner's question on NATO Enlargement, she noted that
Finland is closer than Sweden to a decision on joining the
Alliance, adding if Finland chooses to join NATO, Sweden may
be inspired to take a new look, although it would be a hard
sell. She also added that the EU and NATO do not know each
other well enough as organizations, and suggested that the
NATO SYG consult more regularly with EU counterparts. She
concluded that the EU is now in a different "mode" under the
Lisbon treaty.

Update on Other Deployments
--------------


10. (C) Olsen said that the Norwegian frigate Fritdjof
Nansen, currently deployed as part of the EU ATALANTA
operation, would return to Norway shortly, and the GoN had no
further plans to deploy a frigate due to budgetary
restraints. He noted that staff officers instead would join
a Swedish-flagged vessel scheduled to head to the Gulf of
Aden in 2010. He also mentioned that Norway would shut down
its field hospital in Chad in 2010, noting that the Russians
now were unlikely to replace the Norwegians as previously
promised. During a recent visit to Chad by Norway's
relatively new Minister of Defense Grete Faremo, Olsen
described how she had received a dressing down by the UN
operations in Chad, which complained that Norway's hospital
was so "fancy" that the Russians refused to set up a
replacement hospital, as it would be perceived as inferior.
He added that Faremo also got an ear-full from the UN about
Norway's success in drilling for water in the hospital
environs, given the scarcity of water generally and the
potential for conflict as a result. Olsen described Faremo
as shocked by the UN responses to the Norwegian contribution.


11. (C) Comment: The pending withdrawals of the Norwegian
military hospital in Chad and the frigate from the Gulf of
Aden will constitute a de facto scaling back of Norway's
currently robust scale of global military deployments.
Mention of the budget constraints preventing continued
deployment of the Nansen highlights the overall inadequacy of
the GoN's defense spending relative to its ambitions.
WHITE