MINISTER OF ISLAMIC AFFAIRS ON DIALOGUE WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000058

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER SOCI PINR MR
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF ISLAMIC AFFAIRS ON DIALOGUE WITH
SALAFISTS

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 54

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins for Reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: The Minister of Islamic Affairs expects to
see a majority of the 68 Salafists in detention publicly
renounce violence and the extremist ideology expressed by Al
Qaeda. While the renunciation of violence will not affect
the judicial process against those who have actually
committed terrorist acts, it may allow the Mauritanian
Government what it needs to reintegrate the majority of those
who are being detained for association with terrorists that
are not guilty of any terrorist act. The Minister has
engaged a broad spectrum of Islamic leaders in the dialogue
including some he recognizes have previously been established
with the more extremist lines of Islamic thought. The
Minister welcomes increased collaboration with the U.S. as
the Government advances towards establishing a
counter-extremism strategy. The Mission will establish a
counter-extremism working group with the Ministry. End
Summary


2. (C) Charge met January 24 with Minister for Islamic
Affairs and Original Teaching Ahmed Ould Neini (himself an
Imam seen as a leader of moderate teaching and head of
Mauritania's largest religious school (mahadra)) to discuss
the Government's newly opened dialogue with Salafist
prisoners. The Minister and a group of prominent Imams have
met twice with representatives of the 68 Salafists currently
being detained (some already tried and convicted) under
Mauritania's anti-terrorism laws. Neini noted that the
initiative had come out as a recommendation from a National
Conference on Religious Tolerance held January 5. The
conference, opened by President Aziz, was chaired by
prominent but controversial Imam Mohamed Ould Hacen Ould
Deddew (see para. 4) and renounced violence, fundamentalism
and terrorism. The first meeting with the Salafists was
televised and saw some of the most notorious Mauritanian
terrorists calling for a public debate of their arguments for
"jihad" against the Islamic leadership's arguments against.
In the most recent meeting, held January 23, the same
hard-liners had declined television and radio coverage
probably, according to the Minister, because many of the
detainees were prepared to publicly denounce violence and Al
Qaeda.


3. (C) The Minister stressed that his efforts to get the
detainees was not directly related to any legal proceedings
against them. He saw three groups within the population: the
largest group (over 50) who were not being detained for any
specific terrorist act but because of their close association
via friendship or family with known terrorists; a small group
of about a half dozen who had participated in terrorist acts
and sought to repent; and, the hard line core of some 10
inmates who remained virulent advocates of extremist
violence. The Minister said 57 of the 68 detainees were
prepared to repent (40 in a joint declaration and the others
individually). The Minister suggested the act of renouncing
violence would help the government in allowing the release
and reintegration of those detainees against whom there were
no specific charges. He stressed that repentance would not
affect the prosecution of those who had committed violent
acts although it might be considered in the sentencing phase.


4. (C) Charge noted that there had been some criticism
raised within Mauritanian circles concerning the role in the
dialogue of Mauritanian Imams who are generally associated
with the harder line of Islamic thought -- particularly Imam
Deddew. (Bio Note: Deddew has long been associated with an
extremist Islamic line and was jailed in the past under
President Taya as a Salafist. Opposition figures suggest
that many of the current detainees in fact studied at
Deddew's mahadra and that he is the spiritual leader of the
Salafist movement. Deddew came to prominence last month for
negotiating the release of prominent businessmen detained by
the Aziz government on corruption charges. He is said to
have close ties with Sudan and has previously issued
anti-American fatwas (calling for a boycott of American
products) related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. End
Bio Note). The Minister acknowledged that Deddew is seen as
representing the more extreme edge of Mauritania's moderate
Islamic current but said that made Deddew's call to renounce
violence and extremism all the more effective. The Minister
added that the dialogue included a broad spectrum of Imams to
provide the maximum credibility.


5. (C) In response to the Charge's question, the Minister
said he was interested in reinsertion and deradicalization
programs underway in Morocco and Saudi Arabia but had not yet
developed a strategy on how to transition convicted
terrorists back into society at the end of their sentences.

NOUAKCHOTT 00000058 002 OF 002


He said he was far enough advanced in his counter-extremism
thinking that he is now prepared to explore cooperation with
the U.S. He designated his Secretary General as his primary
point of contact with the Embassy and invited the Charge to
propose an American working group that could explore
cooperation (Mission has proposed a group headed by the
Charge (as DCM) with the Mission's Political Officer, Public
Affairs Officer, MIST OIC, and USAID Counter-extremism
officer (once the USAID position is filled)). The Minister
noted that U.S. engagement on social and religious issues was
"sensitive" and needed to be closely coordinated with his
Ministry -- apparently in reference to activities the Mission
has conducted over the past year without Ministry
involvement. The Minister stressed it was not his intent to
control our activities, but he wanted to be confident our
activities were consistent with his own ministry's
objectives. Charge responded that we were clearly aware of
the sensitivity of the U.S. dealing with questions of
religion and worked hard to make sure we were reinforcing
Mauritanian ideas and initiatives. Noting that cooperation
with central government authorities had not been possible
during the coup, Charge stressed there was an obvious
convergence between American and Mauritanian priorities in
counter-extremism, Charge welcomed to opportunity to have
greater dialogue between the Embassy and the Ministry of
Islamic Affairs.


6. (C) Comment: The dialogue is drawing quite a bit of
press and political opposition attention with some being able
to turn the tables on the Aziz Government (that cited former
president Abdallahi's perceived "softness" on terrorists as
one of the justifications for the 2008 coup) by saying Aziz
is allowing the government to look weak and willing to
negotiate with terrorists as equals. As noted in REFTEL,
even some in the government responsible for counter-terrorism
are critical of the initiative. Our own analysis of
radicalization in Mauritania has always seen the
reinforcement of the moderate strains of Islam as a key
element in any U.S. counter-extremism program -- so it is not
out of the ordinary that the government would use the Islamic
leadership to spearhead its own anti-extremism campaign. It
appears that the dialogue will not result in terrorists being
released but may help the government finesse the case of
detainees who, while suspect, have not committed a
prosecutable crime. While we have yet to see a global
counter-terrorism/extremism strategy, we are seeing its key
components. On the "hard CT" side, we see a reinforcement of
capacity with a significant increase in resources and
personnel for the military and gendarmarie as well as a
revision of the legal and legislative basis of
counter-terrorism. The Salafist dialogue serves as a
foundation of the "soft CT" strategy of addressing the causes
of extremism. The Minister of Islamic Affairs saw himself as
the focal point but recognized that other ministries (such as
the Ministry of Youth) also had counter-extremism activities.
He noted there is no central coordination of all aspects of
a strategy within the Presidency or the Prime Minister's
office. A visiting EU delegation looking at security and
counter-extremism assistance told Charge January 24 that they
also had found many elements of a good Mauritanian approach
but no comprehensive strategy -- which they saw as hindering
a comprehensive response by partners. End Comment.
HANKINS