NUCLEAR SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE DISCUSSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000326

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM KNNP ENRG PK IN NSC
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE DISCUSSIONS
IN MUMBAI

REF: A. NEW DELHI 02398

B. NEW DELHI 00205

Classified By: POL Minister Counselor Uzra Zeya for Reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D).


1. C) SUMMARY: U.S. and Indian interagency delegations met
on the margins of the Civil Nuclear Energy Working Group
(CNEWG) meeting in Mumbai Feb 3-4 to discuss collaboration on
a Nuclear Security Center of Excellence (COE). Continuing
discussions on proposals that had been tabled previously, the
Indians outlined an Indian Center that contained elements of
both proposals. Under the Indian proposal, U.S. involvement
in the center would be to promote best practices for
regulatory and physical security of existing nuclear
processes and materials. India's proposal focused on setting
up a research and development center dedicated to the
world-wide deployment of technologies based on a purportedly
proliferation-resistant thorium fuel cycle. It also contained
some elements related to the physical security of facilities.
The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) chair noted that the
creation of their center was an Indian initiative that would
not depend on U.S. involvement, underscoring that they
envisioned the establishment of a sustainable institution
rather than a medium-term cooperative project. DAE welcomed
U.S. and IAEA participation on an international advisory
panel, but did not further elaborate on a U.S. role. Though
the Indian proposal did not fully meet the U.S vision for a
COE, it demonstrated initiative and a welcome openness to
serious engagement with the United States on cooperative
nuclear security training and research programs. Both
delegations agreed to look for ways to work together on
elements common to both proposals. END SUMMARY.

Two Visions for a Center of Excellence
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2. (C) An interagency delegation, led by the National
Security Council, met on the margins of the Civil Nuclear
Working Group (CNWG) in Mumbai February 4 to discuss
possibilities for collaboration on a U.S.-India Center of
Excellence for Nuclear Security (COE). The Indian
delegation, led by Dr. Ravi Grover of the Department of
Atomic Energy (DAE),also included Amandeep Singh Gill,
Director of the Ministry of External Affairs' Disarmament and
International Security Affairs Division. The U.S. proposal
envisioned a focus on best practices and training on physical
security, targeting an international audience of operators,
regulators, security management, inspectors and response
force personnel. The aim was to announce the intention to
collaborate on such a center with the Indian Government at
the Nuclear Security Summit April 10-11 in Washington. The
Indian initiative, titled "Center of Excellence for Worldwide
Deployment of Nuclear Energy," represented a different vision
emphasizing instead the promotion of purportedly
proliferation-resistant thorium fuel cycles with a strong
emphasis on research and development.

India's Vision: Worldwide Deployment Center
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3. (C) The Worldwide Deployment Center described by DAE would
comprise four schools. The main school would be dedicated to
the design and analysis of nuclear energy systems to promote
the worldwide deployment of thorium-based reactors which they
claimed would be intrinsically proliferation resistant. The
focus on proliferation-proof thorium fuel plays to India's
long-term leadership aspiration regarding thorium. When
questioned on the matter, however, Dr. Grover accepted the
center could consider "other proposed systems." The
remaining three schools would have a component base for
training and research on nuclear security including
simulation, physical security, radiation measurement,
protection devices, and radiation technology applications.
These issues have some overlap with the topic areas of the
proposed U.S. COE. Discussion of engagement on these issues
was a new and welcome development, a change from India's
prior resistance to discussing collaboration on training and
research.


4. (C) Grover emphasized that sustainability was the "key" to
the Worldwide Deployment Center. He underscored the priority
DAE placed on creating a center that could attract
top-quality researchers who would not see a posting to the
center as a dead-end job. DAE had a vision of a composite

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center that could be a fertile think-tank about more than
just nuclear security. Grover underscored that the Deployment
Center would be an Indian government body, staffed by the
DAE, whose primary focus was research and development. The
Center would include visiting scientists, scholars and an
international advisory board, including U.S. and IAEA
representatives, to consult on programs and training
curricula. However, how this international participation
would work in practice was left unclear in the discussion.
Cooperation Apart from Thorium
- - -


5. (C) The U.S. delegation stressed that the United States
did not support thorium research, nor could U.S. involvement
be construed as an endorsement of the commercial promotion of
thorium-based reactors. In response, Grover implied that the
DAE already had the funding it needed to establish such a
center and was in the process of scouting land near Delhi on
which to locate the center. In a later off-line discussion,
DISA Director Gill suggested that the money for the
Deployment Center was not in place, leaving a door open for
possible collaboration. Grover seemed open to collaboration
on training conducted at the center even if the United States
was not involved in the main thorium component of the center.
The U.S. delegation promised to develop U.S. views on the
thorium focus of the center, although it was not part of the
original COE vision and the commercial deployment and
promotion aspects of the program could likely not be endorsed
by the United States.


6. (C) The U.S. delegation representative from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission noted that the Indian proposal made no
mention of the role of regulation in nuclear security.
Grover made clear that Indian regulators had not been
consulted about the COE, but offered to inquire whether
regulatory issues might be included in the curriculum. The
DAE planned to announce the construction of the center at the
Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in April and asked that the
U.S. welcome the announcement. In a sidebar discussion U.S.
delegation representatives underscored that in addition to
potential concerns about the thorium component of the
proposal, the project title "Worldwide Deployment" could be
problematic in the context of the Nuclear Security Summit.

Meeting with Rao
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7. (C) In subsequent meetings on the sidelines of the
Sous-Sherpa Summit in the Hague February 12-13, the
President's Nuclear Security Summit Sherpa Gary Samore held a
bilateral meeting with Foreign Secretary Rao in which the
Indians continued their productive and helpful partnership on
these issues. In their discussion, FS Rao helpfully
referred to the proposed center as a "National Nuclear
Center" rather than a "Worldwide Deployment" center.
Recognizing that it would be India's center, the U.S.
delegation again raised its concern about the research and
development piece of the center being too narrowly focused on
thorium, and suggested that India would attract a larger and
potentially higher caliber of scientists it were more
expansive. Rao underscored that India would like to announce
the Center during the Summit and then work with the United
States on details for the collaboration in advance of
President Obama's visit to India. In a separate conversation
at the Hague, DISA Director Gill, stated that India would
provide the U.S. with an updated proposal based on these
discussions.
ROEMER