Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10NDJAMENA70
2010-02-02 12:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL: NO AGREEMENT, BUT COMPROMISE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM PREF UN PKO CT CD 
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O 021201Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7653
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000070 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF UN PKO CT CD
SUBJECT: MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL: NO AGREEMENT, BUT COMPROMISE
SOLUTION STILL POSSIBLE, SAY SRSG AND GEN CAMMAERT

REF: A. NDJAMENA 063

B. NDJAMENA 049

C. NDJAMENA 048

Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

-----------
SUMMARY AND
COMMENT
-----------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000070

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF UN PKO CT CD
SUBJECT: MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL: NO AGREEMENT, BUT COMPROMISE
SOLUTION STILL POSSIBLE, SAY SRSG AND GEN CAMMAERT

REF: A. NDJAMENA 063

B. NDJAMENA 049

C. NDJAMENA 048

Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

--------------
SUMMARY AND
COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) The Cammaert Mission prepares to leave Chad Feb 2
without having definite agreement from the GOC on a plan of
withdrawal for MINURCAT that would satisfy UN goals and
security requirements. The GOC wants MINURCAT's military
component out soon but would permit its civilian component to
stay until 2011, which is unacceptable to the UN. The UN
wants an organized, phased withdrawal, with a timeline based
on "benchmarks" related to the orderly "handover" of security
and civilian responsibilities to Chadian authorities, over 12
to 18 months. The SRSG continues to see the possibility of a
compromise solution to permit enough MINURCAT military to
protect MINURCAT's civilians over an adequate withdrawal
period because the Chadians wish to avoid an abrupt departure
of MINURCAT.


2. (C) The compromise solution that Cammaert outlined and
that the SRSG believes possible for the Chadians to accept
would satisfy in principle both elements of the GOC's request
for MINURCAT's withdrawal -- an actual drawdown, especially
of MINURCAT's military strength, that conforms to UNSC 1861.
As the action shifts to New York, it remains to be seen if
the GOC have the political maturity and geopolitical prudence
to grasp this "win-win" solution and justify SRSG Angelo's
public optimism about its "flexibility." END SUMMARY AND
COMMENT.

--------------
MINURCAT
WITHDRAWAL
--------------


3. (C) SRSG Angelo and GEN Cammaert told Perm Five
ambassadors February 1 that they have discussed three options
for MINURCAT withdrawal with the GOC over the past few days.

--------------
GOC OPTIONS
--------------



4. (C) Cammaert said that CONAFIT head GEN Dagache, speaking
for the GOC, had offered up two options. Option One would be
for MINURCAT military component to depart Chad NLT 31 May
2010, while MINURCAT civilian components stay in Chad until
March 2011 or beyond. (This was the GOC's preferred option,
Cammaert said.) Option Two would be "immediate withdrawal"
of all MINURCAT components from Chad NLT 31 July 2010.


5. (C) GEN Cammaert countered that Option One was impossible
for the UN, because the civilian components could not stay
after the military components departed, for security reasons
and that Option Two was undesirable and did not conform to
UNSC 1861, because it did not permit MINURCAT to "hand off"
its security responsibilities to Chad security forces in any
organized, structured manner: Option Two would result in
effect in a security deficit in eastern Chad.

--------------
A THIRD WAY
--------------


6. (C) GEN Cammaert explained that the best way to proceed
was either an Option Three or a modification of the GOC's
Option Two. Cammaert said that MINURCAT could stage an
organized, phased withdrawal, with a timeline based not on
fixed dates but on "benchmarks" related to the orderly
"handover" of security responsibilities to Chadian security
forces and of civilian responsibilities to Chad civil

NDJAMENA 00000070 002 OF 002


authorities, both based on careful analysis of the GOC's
security and other capQities. Such an organized, phased
withdrawal, with a bench-mark-based timeline could be
accomplished within 12 to 18 months, according to Cammaert.

--------------
SRSG SEES GOC
"FLEXIBILITY"
--------------


7. (C) SRSG said that he believed that the GOC understood
that its preferred option was not possible and that the GOC
was showing some flexibility in finding a way to maintaining
MINURCAT's civilian activities while its military component
drew down. The trick, Angelo surmised, would be in some
compromise on how many MINURCAT military would remain in Chad
to provide security for MINURCAT's civilian components as the
organized, phased withdrawal proceeded. The GOC would have
to accept a continued MINURCAT military presence if it wanted
to retain the PKO's civilian presence over the withdrawal
period. SRSG said he thought that the GOC was
"uncomfortable" with a very abrupt departure of MINURCAT and
wanted to avoid that.

--------------
CAMMAERT TEAM
DEPARTS FEB 2
--------------


8. (C) GEN Cammaert said that his team would depart the
night of February 2, but that he remained open to talking to
the GOC until then. He said that he would report his
mission's findings to the UNSYG as soon as possible.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) The compromise solution that Cammaert outlined and
that the SRSG believes possible for the Chadians to accept
would satisfy in principle both elements of the GOC's request
for MINURCAT's withdrawal -- an actual drawdown, especially
of MINURCAT's military strength, that conforms to UNSC 1861.
As the action shifts to New York, it remains to be seen if
the GOC have the political maturity to grasp this "win-win"
solution and justify SRSG Angelo's public optimism about its
"flexibility." END COMMENT.


10. (U) Minimize considered.
NIGRO