KARASIN ON GEORGIA, NAGORNO-KARABAKH,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000327

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG UP AZ MD RS
SUBJECT: KARASIN ON GEORGIA, NAGORNO-KARABAKH,
TRANSNISTRIA, UKRAINE

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary. DFM Karasin, in a meeting with the
Ambassador February 9, praised the Geneva Talks for
contributing to the relative calm in Georgia, while
criticizing the Georgians for seeking scandal, the South
Ossetians for boycotting the Incident Response Mechanism, and
the co-chairs for hindering small-scale progress by insisting
on upholding principles. Although he called the Georgian
reintegration plan "slick", he acknowledged it showed Georgia
was willing to talk directly with its breakaway regions over
concrete proposals. He described Turkey's ratification of
the Armenia protocols as key for progress on
Nagorno-Karabakh, and said he had urged Transnistrian leader
Smirnov to engage on the basis of the March 2008 joint
declaration, despite the political turmoil in Chisinau.
Karasin worried that Yulia Tymoshenko might drag out the
election process in Ukraine by going to court. End Summary

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Georgia
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Geneva Talks
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2. (C) DFM Grigoriy Karasin told Ambassador Beyrle February
9 that the Geneva Talks had succeeded in keeping the
breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia more
or less quiet. He noted there had been no conflict-related
casualties in the regions for nine months, in part due to the
Russian troop presence. He criticized Georgia's
unwillingness to talk directly with the regions' de facto
authorities, an attitude he called a dead end, and dismissed
the Georgians' insistence on negotiating with Russia instead.


3. (C) Karasin criticized the co-chairs of the Geneva Talks
for breaking the tempo of progress. He condemned their
insistence on making the Incident Prevention and Response
Mechanisms (IPRMs) fully functional before entertaining other
proposals. Noting the EU's co-chairmanship of the process,
he said he hoped to visit Brussels before the next (March 30)
Geneva round. He wondered what role EU High Representative
Ashton might play in the process, especially regarding the
future of the EU's special representative structure.


4. (C) Karasin insisted that new security guarantees were
needed for the regions. He championed Russia's proposal that
Georgia and its regions unilaterally submit non-use of force
agreements to the UN Security Council, with Russia, the U.S.,
and the EU acting as guarantors.

IPRMs
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5. (C) Karasin acknowledged that the IPRM was not working in
South Ossetia, due to the South Ossetians' boycott, but spoke
out in favor of its continuation. The Ambassador noted that
the comparative success of the Abkhaz IPRM showed that it was
the South Ossetians, not the Georgians, who were the problem.
He asked Russia to pressure Tskhinvali to reengage in the
IPRM, and suggested no new security mechanisms or documents
were needed until the existing ones worked. Karasin
indicated Moscow was willing to increase efforts to persuade
the South Ossetians to engage, saying that any contacts
across the administrative boundary line (ABL) were useful.


6. (C) Karasin praised that Russian troops and border guards
had begun to fine and then release detained Georgians,
without handing them over to South Ossetian authorities.
Ambassador Beyrle suggested that direct talks between the
Georgians and South Ossetians about incidents would be
preferable.

Tension and CBMs
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7. (C) Karasin accused the GOG of using the Geneva Talks to
stoke discord rather than seek stability and progress. He
claimed the information he had provided the Ambassador late
last year about Georgian arms modernization had proved
accurate, and that Russia had averted a Georgian provocation
by immediately reaching out to the U.S. and EU. He doubted
the recent Georgian troop movements were to better protect
Tbilisi, saying no threat emanated from the Russian troops in

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South Ossetia.


8. (C) Karasin touted the expected March 1 opening of the
Qazbegi-Larsi border checkpoint as one confidence-building
measure (CBM),saying that only one expert meeting was needed
to approve final documents. He described the three direct
charter flights between Tbilisi and Moscow as another CBM.
He stated that border crossings along the ABLs were routine,
with hundreds per day crossing at the Akhalgori checkpoint
alone, and hundreds of thousands crossing the ABLs so far in
total.


9. (C) The Ambassador called for more transparency on
Russian troop movements, arguing that the Russian base
construction in South Ossetia not far from Tbilisi was an
understandable source of concern for Georgia.

Georgian Reintegration Plan
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10. (C) Karasin described the Georgian reintegration plan as
"slick" (khitroumniy),as it spoke of resolving the conflict
by peaceful means while using unacceptable terms such as
'occupation'. Although the Abkhaz and South Ossetians did
not even want to receive the plan, he said he saw some "small
positive notes" in it, as the plan listed concrete ideas and
documented the GOG's willingness to talk directly to
Tskhinvali and Sukhumi.

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Nagorno-Karabakh
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11. (C) Noting his and First Deputy PM Igor Shuvalov's
February 5 visit to Armenia, Karasin expressed concern that
Turkey might not ratify the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement
protocols. If Turkey did not ratify by the end of March, the
process would be thrown back, and the "use of force" voices
in Baku would ascend. The Armenians were under a lot of
internal pressure, with Sargsian threatening to withdraw his
signature from the protocols if the Turks did not ratify by
the end of March.

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Transnistria
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12. (C) Karasin said Chisinau's political disarray was no
reason to interrupt the Transnistrian conflict settlement
process. Referring to his February 8 meeting with
Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, Karasin said he had urged
Tiraspol to take the initiative on resolving the conflict,
and claimed FM Lavrov had used blunt language in advising
Smirnov to avoid separatist rhetoric at this sensitive time
in Chisinau. He singled out the March 2008 joint statement
President Medvedev had brokered as a basis for further talks.


13. (C) Karasin reiterated Moscow's position that
withdrawing Russian troops from Transnistria would make the
conflict resolution harder, and said he bluntly had told
Acting President Mihai Ghimpu in late January that his
statements about withdrawing Russian troops were
irresponsible. It was necessary first to find a political
resolution before withdrawing the peacekeepers.


14. (C) Karasin criticized Romania's alleged disregard for
Moldova's territorial integrity by seeking Moldova's
integration into Romania. He welcomed the Ambassador's
confirmation that the U.S. was advising Bucharest that such
statements were unhelpful.

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Ukraine
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15. (C) Karasin praised the free elections in Ukraine, but
worried that losing candidate Yulia Tymoshenko might choose
to go to court over the result, possibly delaying the
inauguration of the new President to the mid-March deadline.
He called Yatseniuk and Tigipko "fresh new faces" and
possible candidates for Prime Minister, but sounded less
certain that Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia, Konstantin
Hrishchenko, might become the new Foreign Minister.

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Comment
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16. (C) Karasin seemed relatively positive about the Geneva
Talks, given the ongoing lack of progress there and his
criticism of the co-chairs, Georgians, and South Ossetians.
Unlike a year ago, Moscow now appears ready to support the
format for the long term, with Karasin calling the March 30
meeting the "next of many more." In a private aside with the
Ambassador at the meeting's end, he confirmed his view that
"it is time" for the South Ossetians to end their boycott of
the IPRM.
Beyrle