Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10MOSCOW148
2010-01-22 11:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

GOR PLANS FOR LONDON AND 2010 ENGAGEMENT WITH

Tags:  PGOV PREL RS AF 
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VZCZCXRO5028
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #0148/01 0221139
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221139Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6007
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0696
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2246
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4316
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6877
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000148 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS AF
SUBJECT: GOR PLANS FOR LONDON AND 2010 ENGAGEMENT WITH
AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Acting Pol Minister Counselor Eric Green for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000148

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS AF
SUBJECT: GOR PLANS FOR LONDON AND 2010 ENGAGEMENT WITH
AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Acting Pol Minister Counselor Eric Green for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: While Moscow remains interested in
bilateral and multilateral engagement to stabilize
Afghanistan, the GOR's plans for the upcoming London
Conference and 2010 offer no proposals for funding economic
development work. We are seeing signs that Russia is
attempting to work with regional partners such as the SCO,
possibly to develop consensus on Afghanistan-related issues.
Additionally, drug production in Afghanistan and trafficking
through Central Asia remain a primary concern for Russia and
offer the best possibility to encourage additional GOR
efforts in Afghanistan. End Summary

--------------
Coordination with the Neighbors
--------------


2. (C) MFA officials told us that, prior to the January 28
London Conference, the GOR would participate in two
regionally focused meetings on Afghanistan: the Istanbul
regional meeting and the SCO Deputy Ministers' meeting in
Moscow. According to Vitaly Rugalyov of the MFA's Afghan
Desk, the GOR's position in London could be influenced by
discussions at these meetings. He said that DFM Borodavkin
planned to attend the Istanbul regional meeting as well as
chair the SCO meeting. Rugalyov claimed that the GOR wanted
to hear Afghanistan's perspective and that of its neighbors
before finalizing its thoughts for the London meeting.


3. (C) Regarding the SCO meeting in Moscow January 24-25,
Igor Arzhaev of the MFA,s SCO Desk initially attempted to
bill this as a routine meeting of SCO states who "happened to
be traveling through Moscow on their way to London." They
claimed that Deputy FMs of SCO member states (Russia, China,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) were
planning to gather to discuss Afghanistan, in addition to a
slate of internal SCO issues. They confirmed that
Afghanistan, immediate neighbors Iran, Pakistan, and
Turkmenistan, as well as India, have been invited to the
meeting as observers, but that the meeting was not open to
broader participation. (Iran, Pakistan, and India, along
with Mongolia, are official SCO observer states). MFA
contacts told us the agenda would include discussion of the

action plan from the March 2009 Moscow SCO Conference and
coordination in advance of the London Conference. From other
diplomatic sources in Moscow, we learned that Moscow in fact
pushed for this meeting in order to have an opportunity to
consult with SCO partners on their plans for London. While
no formal SCO communique is expected from the Moscow meeting,
it is likely that an informal group consensus will be formed
on many issues. In contrast to what MFA officials previously
said, currently the only agenda item for this meeting is
Afghanistan and the London Conference.

--------------
Preparations for London
--------------


4. (C) Rugalyov said that Moscow had a positive reaction to
the "pillars" paper being circulated in preparation for the
London Conference; however, there were some concerns about
statements endorsing the ISAF agreement on transition.
Moscow would also like more language establishing
Afghanistan's neutrality and prohibiting interference from
"foreign powers" on Afghanistan's sovereign territory. In
spite of this, he noted that the GOR was eager to avoid a
power vacuum in Afghanistan, especially after the U.S.
"withdrawal" in 2011. Therefore, Russia was focused on
increasing the capabilities of security forces within
Afghanistan. Noting that Moscow generally supported
reintegration of "rank and file" members, he commented that
Moscow would like more clarity on plans for reintegration and
reconciliation.


5. (C) While unable to provide any specific proposals Moscow
might make in London, Rugalyov said that the GOR had a
tentative offer to expand training at the Domodedovo Center
and could make this proposal in London, via the NATO-Russia
Council or at a different venue. He also noted that the
Russian company "Vertical T" could increase their helicopter
training programs in Afghanistan, on a commercial basis. He
said that Russia remained "absolutely interested" in
counternarcotics programs either bilaterally with the U.S. or

MOSCOW 00000148 002 OF 003


in cooperation with other partners. Dismissing as "not
realistic" any suggestion for Russia to conduct security
forces training in Afghanistan, he maintained the official
MFA line that Russia supports training in Central Asia or in
Russia. In addition to the historical issues surrounding
such a venture, he commented that China would have a
difficult time seeing Russia "partnering" with ISAF in
Afghanistan. Further, he speculated that Russian forces
would not be comfortable with ISAF providing security for
them.

--------------
2010: Yes to AK-47s and Police Training
--------------


6. (C) In framing Russia's plans for 2010, Rugalyov first
recapped Moscow's assistance to Afghanistan, stating that
between 2001 and 2009, the GOR provided 300 million USD worth
of assistance to Afghanistan. This total included 70M USD in
humanitarian assistance such as food, tents, Kamaz trucks and
a 6.8M USD joint program with Germany to refurbish two
medically equipped helicopters.


7. (C) While noting that the MOD had still not given an
official response to the list of requested equipment
donations passed to them in October 2009, he indicated that
in the second half of 2010, Russia planned to provide 20,000
AK-47s to Afghanistan. He also stated that in 2010, Russia
planned to continue humanitarian aid and food donations, such
as wheat flour, via the World Food Program, although no
specifics were available. He claimed that Moscow has no
plans to provide in-kind equipment assistance such as trucks
and fire engines because the GOR was currently working to
replenish these items in their inventory.


8. (C) Rugalyov previewed a police training program he
claimed was in the final stages of planning. He said that
beginning in Summer or Fall 2010, the GOR would invite 225
Afghan police officers to a six-month study program in
Russia. Based on their performance, potential for success,
and Russian language abilities, some students would be
selected for a 5-year training program at Russian
universities. He said the MOI and MinFin were moving closer
to agreement on this program. (Note: It is likely that the
initial six-month program would be at the Domodedovo Center.
Rugalyov said that follow-on programs for those chosen to
continue would be held in Moscow, St. Petersburg and
Krasnodar. End Note)

--------------
But, No Funding for Economic Development
--------------


9. (C) Rugalyov also said that there were no plans in 2010
for Russia to fund economic development work such as the
Salang Tunnel refurbishment or irrigation projects, but, that
Moscow would be interested in such projects if donor
financing were available. Noting that MinFin would have to
allocate funds for any economic development work, Rugalyov
said it would be incumbent on individual ministries to
propose projects to MinFin and pursue financing. He remarked
that a briefing on USAID procurement rules and regulations,
planned for February 3 in Moscow, would be welcome by many
Russian companies as a way to assist to Afghanistan.

--------------
Russo-Japanese Coordination?
--------------


10. (C) Rugalyov commented that FM Lavrov and Japanese FM
Okada had discussed Afghanistan during Okada's recent trip to
Moscow and that Russia and Japan had agreed to set up a
bilateral working group to explore joint development projects
in Afghanistan. He claimed that the GOJ was interested in
learning from Russia's experience in Afghanistan. Japanese
Embassy contacts in Moscow told us that PM Hatoyama was
particularly interested in Afghanistan and had pledged 5 USD
billion in assistance over five years. They added that Japan
would consider funding joint projects with Russian companies,
but that there was still discussion in Tokyo on whether such
projects were the best way to proceed.


11. (C) Leonid Shevchuk, Principal Counselor in the MFA's
Third Asia Department, shed light on what could possibly be
holding Tokyo back from cooperation. He told us that Japan

MOSCOW 00000148 003 OF 003


wanted to focus projects in the areas of education and
culture, as well as socio-economic spheres. (Note:
Generally, the GOR has been more interested in large
infrastructure projects such as hydro-electric plant
construction and refurbishment. End note)
Beyrle