START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000135

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2035
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):
(U) PRINCIPALS MEETING, JANUARY 14, 2010

Classified By: Political M/C Susan M. Elliott. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d),a
nd (h).


1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-005.


2. (U) Meeting Date: January 14, 2010
Times: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.; 4:00 - 5:00
P.M.
Place: MFA, Moscow

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) MFA DVBR Director Antonov told A/S Gottemoeller that
he believed START Follow-On negotiations would be completed
in four weeks or fewer. He said that said that the Russian
team would return to Geneva to work no earlier than February
1, and added that the GOR might not schedule the next round
of talks if the U.S. did not compromise more. A/S
Gottemoeller said that the U.S. side would be in Geneva on
January 25 and urged Antonov to send at least technical
experts to continue conforming of the treaty and protocol
texts. Antonov agreed to treat Medvedev's December 12
statement on telemetry not as a "sacred text," but a text
that perhaps could be modified. He added that answers to
U.S. questions regarding telemetry would be passed to CJCS on
January 22. He posited that the GOR was willing to discuss
setting the limit of deployed and non-deployed SLBM and ICBM
launchers at 800, but asked about bombers also. He confirmed
that the draft of agreed statement 6 on elimination
exhibitions/demonstrations is a basis for discussion.
Antonov blamed the harsh tone of a recent nonpaper passed to
A/S Gottemoeller on the Russian Embassy in Washington, but
confirmed that the issues raised therein were valid. He said
he could not officially reply to U/S Tauscher's December 12
nonpaper on missile defense cooperation, but said the U.S.
and Russia had to cooperate on this issue. Various START
Follow-On treaty articles were discussed, and A/S
Gottemoeller passed to Antonov a redraft of Article (VIII)
(VII) and a nonpaper on rapid reload.

-------------- --
Four More Weeks Needed to Complete Negotiations
-------------- --


4. (S) MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy Antonov told A/S
Gottemoeller that his "personal view" was that START
Follow-On (SFO) negotiations could be finished in four weeks
"or fewer" if the January 22 meetings between NSA Jones and
Russian Presidential Advisor Prikhodko, as well as CJCS
Mullen and CHOD Makarov, went well. He added that both the
U.S. and Russian sides would need to come prepared for the
next round of talks.


5. (S) When A/S Gottemoeller suggested the next round of
talks begin in Geneva on January 25, Antonov said the Russian
team would return to Geneva on February 1 "or maybe later if
we need more time to work on guidance, or maybe we will not
schedule the beginning of the new round yet of the U.S. is
not willing to take steps in our direction." A/S
Gottemoeller replied that this was a bad idea and would not
advance efforts to conclude the negotiations. She reiterated
that the U.S. team would be in Geneva by January 25 and
suggested that the GOR send at least technical experts to
continue work on conforming of the treaty and protocol texts.
Antonov said he would consider this.


6. (S) Antonov said the Russian team would be ready to work
in Moscow on conforming the SFO document with the U.S. side

from January 18 to January 21. He noted that he was happy
that the Russian delegation remained together as a coherent
unit during the holidays. The negotiators from various GOR
entities had been working on the issues that remained in the
negotiations back at their own agencies, he said. He added
that everyone attended the MFA DVBR office holiday party.
(Note: For those working in MFA DVBR attendance was
required. End Note.)

--------------
Hopeful Signals On Telemetry
--------------


7. (S) A/S Gottemoeller told Antonov that the USG was using
Medvedev's December 12 proposal as the basis of its work, but
wanted to suggest some slight changes in it, consistent with
the discussion of the Presidents in Copenhagen. Implying
that Medvedev's proposal was not a "sacred text," Antonov
replied that adjustments to the text could be discussed. For
example, the review process for the telemetry exchange
program could be modified. Antonov argued that the U.S. did
not seem to understand that the GOR proposal for a review of
the telemetry exchange program, perhaps after two or three
years, did not necessarily need to result in an adjustment or
abandonment of the program. "Perhaps no changes will need to
be made," he said.


8. (S) Antonov said that the MOD had prepared answers to the
questions on telemetry that the U.S. passed to MFA DVBR
Deputy Director Sergey Koshelev on December 23. These
responses, however, were being "fine tuned" and CHOD Makarov
would likely pass them to CJCS Mullen when they meet on
January 22. Further discussion of the telemetry questions
would have to wait until then, he said. He also noted that
the U.S. side might have additional questions on telemetry,
which the Russian side would be willing to answer.

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Limits on Launchers
--------------


9. (S) In answer to a question from Gottemoeller, Antonov
said the GOR was ready to discuss the limit on deployed and
non deployed SLBM and ICBM launchers of 800. He asked, "What
about bombers?" When A/S Gottemoeller recalled the Russian
proposal to include non-deployed bombers as part of a
possible launcher limit, Antonov replied, "I understand that
there is no such thing as non-deployed bombers in this
treaty." A/S Gottemoeller replied that she would check on
that.

--------------
Elimination Exhibitions/Demonstrations
--------------


10. (S) Antonov acknowledged that a discussion of the issues
put forth in agreed statement six was still possible. When
A/S Gottemoeller suggested a possible trade-off involving
bomber inspections/demonstration and
exhibitions/demonstrations of eliminated items, Antonov
reacted positively, adding that this was an important issue
for the GOR.

--------------
GOR Nonpaper Discussed
--------------


11. (S) Antonov said that a GOR nonpaper sent via the Russian
Embassy in Washington to A/S Gottemoeller which called into
question the USG's commitment to reach a "balanced and

equitable agreement" on a START follow-on treaty, had been
the initiative of the Russian Embassy. "We did not give them
permission" to draft the nonpaper, Antonov said. "They were
supposed to just deliver the talking points." A/S
Gottemoeller said the tone of the nonpaper left a bad
impression among policy makers in Washington. Antonov
replied, "maybe there is a problem with the tone," but the
nonpaper reflected the GOR position. He added that, in his
view, the treaty text was ready except for the telemetry
issue.

--------------
U/S Tauscher's MD Cooperation Proposal
--------------


12. (S) In answer to a question from Gottemoeller, Antonov
said that he could not officially comment on U/S Tauscher's
December 5 proposal on missile defense (MD) cooperation, but
his personal view was that the U.S. and GOR would have to
compromise on MD eventually. If the U.S. and Russia had
agreed to a compromise on MD, then it would be easier to
agree on a START follow-on treaty, he said.

--------------
Various Treaty Articles Discussed
--------------


13. (S) A/S Gottemoeller presented some changes that had
emerged from the U.S. review of the Treaty text in
Washington. In most cases, Antonov either accepted the
change, or took it for further review. Sometimes, he
complained that the U.S. side was not moving fast enough.

Article III
--------------


14. (S) A/S Gottemoeller proposed that Article III.2(b)
should be reworded to read "For each deployed heavy bomber,
the number of nuclear warheads shall be (three)1(one)2." She
explained that this change would dispense with an undefined
term, "nuclear armaments", in favor of a defined term,
"nuclear warheads", and was closer to the original Russian
position. Antonov accepted the change without comment.

Article IV
--------------


15. (S) Antonov had no further comment on U.S. proposals to
limit deployed and non-deployed SLBM and ICBM launchers to
800 in Article IV.3, but he complained that the U.S. side had
not reciprocated when he removed brackets from the paragraphs
touching on test heavy bombers. This perceived lack of
reciprocation was a sore point.

Article V
--------------


16. (S) Antonov also complained that the U.S. side had not
removed brackets on Article V.4, but Gottemoeller reminded
him that this paragraph, which has to do with modification or
conversion of missile defense interceptors, is tied up in the
discussions on telemetry that are still ongoing. Once the
telemetry issue is decided, the brackets will be decided.
Article VI
--------------


17. (S) Antonov said the GOR would never change its position
that this article on mobile missile verification must be out
of the treaty; only Medvedev could change the GOR position.
He also said that the U.S. could not assume that substance


could simply be moved to the protocols; the Russian side
would not agree to unique treatment for mobile ICBMs. If the
U.S. side wanted to know the exact location of Russian mobile
missile launchers, then the GOR wanted to know the exact
location of U.S. nuclear submarines and not just their
general location. A/S Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that it
is easier to count and keep track of submarines than it is of
mobile missiles.

Article VIII
--------------


18. (S) A/S Gottemoeller handed over a redraft of Article
VIII, and delivered the accompanying talking points:

Paper of the U.S. side
January 13, 2010

Redraft of Article (VIII)1 (VII)2


1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this
Treaty is set forth in Part Two of its Protocol.


2. Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in
such data and shall provide other notifications provided for
in the Protocol to this Treaty, in order to ensure the
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty.


3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
to provide and receive notifications unless otherwise
provided for in this Treaty.


4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a
voluntary basis, in addition to the notifications specified
in paragraph 2 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to
ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed
under this Treaty.

(5. Each Party shall have the right to release to the public
or a third party the information that it has received in the
initial exchange of data described in paragraph 2, Section I,
Part 2 of the Protocol, which shall be listed in Part Two of
the Protocol and associated Annexes, as well as any
photographs appended thereto, except as otherwise provided in
this Article. The Parties shall hold consultations within
the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on
releasing to the public other data and information provided
or received in fulfilling the obligations provided for in
this Treaty. Such release will only be conducted subject to
the consent of the other Party.)1

(6.)1 (5)2 Geographic coordinates (relating to data
contained in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty)2,
(unique identifiers,)1 site diagrams (provided by the Parties
pursuant to this Treaty)2, and coastlines and waters diagrams
provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty shall not be
released to the public, unless otherwise agreed by the
Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.

(7. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the
aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles, as well as
the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, on
deployed SLBMs, and nuclear armaments for deployed heavy
bombers, as stated in subparagraph (1)(a) and (1)(b) of
Article II, may be released to the public. All other nuclear
warhead and strategic delivery vehicle data shall not be
released to the public or any third party unless otherwise
agreed by the Parties.)1

Talking Points:

Populating the Database:

--The U.S. approach is to populate the data base 45 days
after signature using data derived from the July 2009 START
data, which is public information.

--45 days after signature, the Parties will exchange data
derived from the July 2009 START data.

--This obligation will need to be provisionally applied in
order to have a binding legal effect.

--The timing and exchange of other data after Entry into
Force will be governed by the specific terms of the Protocol
that provide for such exchange.

--This structure means that we will not have data for all SFO
categories (e.g., warhead numbers) when the Treaty is signed
or when the Treaty is sent to the Senate for ratification.

--To assist the sides in preparing for the exchange of data
45 days after signature, the U.S. delegation in Geneva will
be prepared to provide an example of how the U.S. would
populate the database with data derived from the July 2009
START data. It would be useful if Russia would reciprocate.

Release of Data:

--Our new, compromise language sets out a three-tiered
approach.

--First. Data that is derived from the July 2009 data that
we will exchange 45 days after signature may be released to
the public, with some limited exceptions that will be
reflected in paragraph 6/5. The information to be released
is already public, which should address any concerns about
release in the SFO context. Any information exchanged in a
classified annex, such as site diagrams and geographic
coordinates, would not be releasable to the public.

--Second. The Parties may release aggregate SDV and warhead
numbers. All other warhead and SDV information shall not be
released unless the Parties otherwise agree. Under this
approach, the aggregate SDV and warhead data would be the
only categories of SFO-specific data to be released to the
public without a requirement to reach agreement in the BCC.

--Third. All other SFO information may only be released
subject to the consent of the other Party. This data
includes the majority of information received in the course
of SFO implementation. This should address Russian concerns
about certain categories of sensitive data.


19. (S) Antonov made no comment, saying he was not prepared
to do such detailed substantive work, but would immediately
send the paper for translation.

Article XII
--------------


20. (S) Antonov commented that the Russian side had not
agreed to the inspection activities the U.S. side had
proposed to confirm elimination of strategic offensive arms,
as described in Article XII.3. The Russian military would
need more time to consider this, he said.

Article XIV
--------------



21. (S) Antonov said that Article XIV, subparagraph (c)
belonged in the protocol rather than the treaty, as
notifications are a technical matter. A/S Gottemoeller said
that the U.S. side would provide a detailed response on both
Article V and Article XIV, which are related to each other,
in Geneva.

-------------- --------------
Nonpaper "Fifth Agreed Statement" On Rapid Reload Passed
-------------- --------------


22. (S/REL Russia) A/S Gottemoeller delivered the following
nonpaper to MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy Antonov, which he
accepted without comment and sent for translation:

Paper of the U.S. Side
January 13, 2010

Fifth Agreed Statement

The Parties agree that, in order to provide assurances that
nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, each
Party undertakes not to conduct rapid reload and neither
Party shall produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid
reload. For the purposes of this Agreed Statement, the term
"rapid reload" means reloading a silo launcher of ICBMs in
less than 12 hours or a mobile launcher of ICBMs in less than
four hours after a missile has been launched or removed from
such a launcher. In the event of emergence in the future of
a system that one Party considers could be a rapid reload
capability, that Party shall have the right to raise the
question of such a system for consideration by the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.


23. (U) A/S Gottemoeller cleared this cable.
Beyrle