SPAIN INCREASINGLY LIKE-MINDED ON ADDITIONAL IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000069

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR P (BURNS, MULL),EUR/ERA (DEAN),EUR/WE
(MCKNIGHT, ZERDECKI),ISN (ELIOT KANG),ISN/RA (NEPHEW,
ALLEN-CLOSE, MONGIELLO),ISN/MNSA (DAVIS),NEA (CATALANO),
IO/GS (DETEMPLE)
DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC (RYU, MAGSAMEN, HOLGATE, CONNERY,
SAMORE, BRADLEY)
FOR USUNVIE/IAEA
FOR USEU (SIDHU)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL IR IAEA TRGY NPT SP EUN
UNSC

SUBJECT: SPAIN INCREASINGLY LIKE-MINDED ON ADDITIONAL IRAN
SANCTIONS

REF: A. 09 MADRID 1240

B. 09 MADRID 1196

C. 09 MADRID 1133

D. 09 MADRID 1087

E. 09 MADRID 1006

Classified By: DCM Arnold A. Chacon for Reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Ambassador Stephen Mull, Special
Advisor to P, on January 15 briefed Spanish diplomats
regarding key updates in the USG's engagement track with Iran
and the need to begin focusing on a UNSC resolution for
additional sanctions if Tehran refuses to engage. Mull
emphasized the need for the USG and Spain - as rotating EU
President during the first half of 2010 - to coordinate
closely on this issue. The Spanish reacted positively to the
USG proposals on the types of new sanctions that could be
implemented (see Septel),stated that the USG can count on
Spain's full support as EU President, and invited Mull to
return to Spain for further talks. Post has ramped up its
engagement with Spain on the Iranian nuclear issue in recent
months (see Refs) and notes the MFA's stance has evolved into
a more supportive policy for additional sanctions. Spanish
officials who just a few months ago were skeptical on the
value of additional sanctions - especially if done without
the umbrella of a new UNSC resolution - are now telling the
U.S. that they are in sync with USG contingency plans for
targeted unilateral sanctions and, as EU President, are
willing to cooperate in whatever way they can. END SUMMARY
AND COMMENT:


2. (U) Mull spoke with Carmen Bujan, Director General (DG,
A/S-level) for Strategic Affairs and Terrorism, and Fidel
Sendagorta, DG for the Mediterranean, Maghreb and Near East,
who were joined by Miguel Aguirre de Carcer, Special
Ambassador for Disarmament, and Gonzalo de Salazar, Deputy DG
for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

//Bujan: "The U.S. Can Count on Us"//


3. (C) Bujan agreed on the timing to have the UNSC begin
debating additional sanctions in February under the French
leadership of the UNSC, noting that beginning this debate
early in 2009 could help to make progress on the issue. She
indicated her preference for debating and resolving the Iran
sanctions issue by April to prevent the matter from being a
front-burner issue in May, when it could detract from efforts
to hold a successful Nuclear Non-Poliferation Treaty Review
Conference.


4. (C) Bujan suggested that the level of ambition at the UNSC
regarding a possible resolution will hinge a great deal on
how much the U.S. and Russia see eye to eye and opined that
China would be unlikely to use a veto that would put it at
odds with all other P5 members. Bujan then remarked that if
the level of ambition at the UNSC is not high, then others
such as the EU would step forward to support additional
sanctions. She stated that, with London and Paris prodding
Madrid, Spain - as EU President - "would not be shy about
matching" the USG's enhanced unilateral sanctions designed to
avoid harm to the Iranian people. Bujan said that the USG
can count on the support of Spain as EU President for
whatever we need.

//Sendagorta: Support for Various Types of Additional
Sanctions//


5. (C) Sendagorta began his remarks by stating that President
Obama's policy of engagement with Iran has been very well
received by the Zapatero Administration, which also agrees
that there has to be some kind of deadline to this outreach
if Tehran continues to choose not to engage. Describing the
Islamic Republic of Iran as an opaque regime whose specialty
is engaging in talks in bad faith just to drag out
negotiations and buy time, Sendagorta argued that the
international community cannot allow Tehran to stall any
further because the "nuclear clock is ticking."


6. (C) On the prospect of additional sanctions, Sendagorta
assessed, "Some action is better than no action at this
point, that's for sure" although he questioned whether the
sanctions would achieve their economic goal. The important
thing is that they would show the international community is
united and that the threat of sanctions is not a bluff. In
response to Mull's overview of the types of sanctions the USG
is currently considering, Sendagorta responded, "We can go
along with many of these ideas." Sendagorta asserted that
the key is how the international community can help the
Iranian people, "especially those who think like us." He
opined that additional sanctions "do not have to be very
destructive right now" and suggested that perhaps being more
demanding of Tehran on human rights issues - and keeping
these demands separate from the nuclear issue - could be an
effective strategy. He admitted that the Iranian public's
reaction to increased sanctions remains an unknown and
acknowledged that they could even backfire by awakening
popular support for the regime.


7. (C) Sendagorta appreciated word of USG efforts to convey
to Asian countries - such as China - the importance of not
seeking to profit on new market opportunities that would
arise if the US and EU implemented additional unilateral
sanctions. He also expressed concern about the Gulf
countries, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. He related a
story in which Zapatero traveled to Saudi Arabia in November

2009. According to Sendagorta, the Saudi King urged Zapatero
to be "extremely aggressive" against Iran, to which Zapatero
replied that Spain was ready to do so, but when Spain
inquired what Saudi Arabia was prepared to do eliminate
export control loopholes regarding its trade with Iran, the
King said nothing, which Sendagorta found very disturbing.


8. (C) Following a question by Bujan to Mull on how best to
engage with Israel to calm tensions in the region, Sendagorta
told Mull that Spain constantly tells Israel that it
understands the threat that Iran's nuclear program poses to
Israel and assures Israel that Spain will do its part to help
resolve the issue. Sendagorta further stated that Spain
tells Israel that there are things that Israel can do, too.
For example, Spain tells Israel that if it entered into
negotiations with the Palestinians and/or Syrians, Israel
would undermine Iran's policies. Sendagorta said that Spain
is currently telling Israel, "If you have cards to play, use
them now."


9. (U) Ambassador Mull cleared this cable.
SOLOMONT