SCENESETTER FOR NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUSAKA 000053

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/S LAYLWARD AND JNAMDE
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND EHUIE
ADDIS PLEASE PASS NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GAVIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2020
TAGS: PREL ECON EAID KCOR ZA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN
AFFAIRS MICHELLE GAVIN'S VISIT

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Koplovsky for reasons 1.4(d)


1. (SBU) Summary and Introduction: The U.S. Mission to
Zambia welcomes the visit of Michelle Gavin, Senior Director
for African Affairs at the National Security Council and
Senior Adviser to the President. Your visit comes at a time
when President Rupiah Banda's administration has changed
course on a number of issues important to the United States.
Your interventions can help set Zambia on a corrected course,
bolstering progress on democracy and promoting transparency
and accountability. You should also press for enhanced
cooperation in multilateral fora and a larger peacekeeping
role. In 2009, the GRZ pivoted away from anti-corruption,
good governance, and regional stability, issues that had been
a focus of the Mwanawasa government. Banda is struggling to
consolidate control within the ruling Movement for Multiparty
Democracy party while maintaining national support in the
lead up to 2011 general elections -- an election that could
see a significant percentage of young voters disenfranchised
if voter registration efforts do not begin in earnest soon.
Banda has also changed course on Zimbabwe, deferring to
President Mugabe as an elder liberation struggle hero.
Despite significant financial U.S. assistance to Zambia, the
GRZ is an inconsistent partner on regional and multilateral
issues and has generally toed the African Union/Non-Aligned
Movement line in international fora. Zambia weathered the
economic downturn relatively well but still struggles to
reduce poverty through economic growth or to attract
significant foreign investment. End Summary and
Introduction.

Relationship Stressed But Improving
--------------


2. (C) After the late President Mwanawasa's death in 2008,
Banda was a consensus choice to replace him -- an older,
not-so-ambitious candidate to serve out Mwanawasa's term and
make way for new leadership in 2011. His campaign was based
on a "Mwanawasa legacy" platform, but Banda quickly tacked
away from the previous government's agenda. Mwanawasa's
death left a weakened and fractured MMD. Banda has pursued a
more ambitious personal political agenda, exacerbating the
rifts. He now must work to consolidate control over the MMD
while maintaining his support nationally. Banda has removed
or reshuffled competent cabinet members and national party
executive committee officials considered Mwanawasa's people
and replaced them with his own loyalists in a bid to
consolidate control over the party (and government resources)
in the lead up to an MMD party congress in 2010.


3. (C) Since the 2008 by-election, Banda and his
administration have demonstrated increasing intolerance of
public criticism. The GRZ has attempted to restrain the
independent media through intimidation, such as the
unsuccessful criminal case against "Post" editor Chansa
Kabwela on charges of distributing pornography, and through
restrictive media regulation legislation. In August 2009,
the government passed an NGO bill that could be used to
silence organizations that are deemed not be operating in the
"national interest." These and other actions demonstrate the
GRZ's lack of commitment to freedom of speech and expression
when it does not serve the GRZ's purposes. On many
occasions, GRZ representatives have told the Ambassador and
Emboffs that Zambia's young, fragile democracy cannot be
exposed to unfettered freedoms that countries like the United
States enjoy.


4. (C) The Banda administration has lacked Mwanawasa's
commitment to fight corruption. In August 2009, former
President Frederick Chiluba was acquitted of corruption
charges by a Zambian court. In the lead up to the acquittal,
Banda treated Chiluba as an honored former head of state,
speaking positively about him in the press and seating
Chiluba and his wife at the head table at government events.
After the acquittal, the GRZ removed Max Nkole, lead
prosecutor of the Task Force on Corruption, which prosecuted
all Chiluba-era corruption cases, for attempting to submit a
request to appeal the decision. The GRZ announced that the
government would not appeal the decision and disbanded the
Task Force, moving its remaining cases to the Anti-Corruption
Commission (ACC),which is headed by a Banda loyalist. The
GRZ has yet to register the approximately USD 45 million UK
civil court decision against Chiluba in a Zambian court. In
October 2009, at the nadir of its relationship with the
international community, the GRZ publicly accused "foreign

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diplomats" of interfering in its sovereignty and "inciting
people" against the government after a memo describing a
conversation between Banda and donor representatives,
including the Ambassador, about the Chiluba case was leaked
to the press. The GRZ backed off after a number of European
Ambassadors and Charge registered their concern with the
Foreign Minister.


5. (C) In December 2009, the Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) board re-selected Zambia for Millennium Challenge
Account (MCA) Compact eligibility. In making its decision,
the board expressed concerns about the GRZ's commitment to
good governance, anti-corruption efforts, and freedom of
speech and expression, essential to Zambia's continued
qualification for a compact. While the GRZ touts Zambia's
FY10 MCA indicator scores as proof that its commitment to
transparency and good governance remains strong, the lagging
indicators are based on information from 2008 or earlier.

6. (C) In a series of recent meetings, GRZ officials have
touted the government's new anti-corruption policy as proof
that Banda is serious about fighting corruption. The policy,
announced in August 2009, would strengthen the ACC, pass and
implement new anti-corruption legislation, and create a
financial intelligence unit that meets international
standards. The GRZ has also committed to engage with NGOs on
an implementation framework for the NGO law and has, for now,
shelved its restrictive media regulation bill in favor of
re-engagement with media organizations to develop a less
restrictive self-regulatory mechanism. While the GRZ's words
are encouraging, Post has yet to see concrete action.

The "Youth Bulge" and the 2011 Elections
--------------


7. (C) Zambia is a young country, with an estimated 55
percent of its 12.8 million people under the age of 19. The
Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) has done no voter
registration since December 2005, which means that any
Zambian citizen who has turned 18 since then is unable to
vote. The GRZ has promised to initiate a significant voter
registration drive in the lead up to the 2011 elections, but
has yet to commit the necessary resources. It is estimated
that unless issuance of voter and national registration cards
(both required to vote) begins immediately, up to 2.8 million
voters could be disenfranchised in the 2011 elections. The
GRZ has been dragging its feet on mobilizing voter
registration drives, likely because a majority of Zambia's
youth is expected to support the opposition in 2011. Initial
efforts by the Ministry of Home Affairs to issue national
registration cards have been somewhat anemic, especially in
opposition strongholds.

Retreating from Leadership on Regional Issues
--------------


8. (C) Banda has refrained from speaking critically on the
situation in Zimbabwe. Banda has said that he prefers to
pursue quiet, deferential regional diplomacy that emphasizes
patience. Soon after becoming president, Banda privately
claimed to support his predecessor's public positions on
Zimbabwe but said that, as the most junior head of state in
the region, he must defer to his elders and let SADC take the
lead on creating consensus on Zimbabwe. In public he has
been supportive of Mugabe as an elder of Africa's liberation
struggle and described him as "a brave leader" and a
"selfless nationalist who has withstood pressure from his
enemies."


9. (C) Zambia's military, totaling just over 20 thousand
personnel, deploy with paramilitary elements of the Zambia
Police Service for peacekeeping missions and are generally
considered competent peacekeepers. Zambia currently has 700
peacekeepers deployed, including on UN missions in southern
Sudan, Darfur, and Congo. Zambia has not responded to the
African Union (AU) call for peacekeepers in Somalia and is
unlikely to do so unless the AU increases pay scales and
provides equipment.


10. (C) The United States provided battalion-level military
training in 2007 under the African Contingency Operations
Training Assistance (ACOTA) program. Offers of a second
round of training have been politely rebuffed for various and
changing reasons. A major hurdle to bilateral military
cooperation is the GRZ's rejection of AFRICOM -- the GRZ
views AFRICOM as a threat to Zambia's sovereignty and

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suspects militarization of foreign policy.

An Inconsistent Partner on Multilateral Issues
-------------- -


11. (C) Although Zambia ranks 28th in the world in U.S.
assistance per capita and enjoys one of the largest Peace
Corps programs, our cooperation on many multilateral issues
is minimal. Zambia's 2008 voting coincidence on
non-consensus resolutions during the 2008 UNGA was 16 percent
(and zero percent on votes deemed important by the USG). In
the months leading up to the 2009 UNGA, Post engaged the MFA
at multiple levels to encourage the GRZ to vote its
principles rather than in lockstep with the AU/Non-Aligned
Movement positions. MFA officials expressed an interest in
changing the way it approaches votes at UNGA, saying that
they felt their voice was lost by bloc voting even on
resolutions about which they have different views. While
final tallies for 2009 UNGA voting have not been completed,
Post does not expect a significant improvement in voting
coincidence and expects a similar result on important votes.


12. (C) In other fora, while Zambia has not recognized
Kosovo's independence, the GRZ did support Kosovo's bid to
join the World Bank and IMF. Zambia supported the U.S.
candidacy for the Human Rights Council and the renewal of the
Sudan Special Rapporteur's mandate within the Council.

Zambian Economy and GRZ Focus on Investment
--------------


13. (C) A sharp rise in global copper prices and a bumper
maize harvest helped Zambia to rebound quickly from the 2008
economic downturn to an estimated five to six percent real
GDP growth in 2009. During the short-lived economic crisis,
the GRZ renewed its focus on diversifying the economy to
insulate it against volatile global copper prices.
Unfortunately, Zambia's strong economic performance could
cause the GRZ's focus on economic diversification to flounder
as it has during past periods of robust copper-fueled
economic growth.


14. (C) In your possible meeting in Addis Ababa, Banda and/or
Foreign Minister Pande will likely raise the issue of
American investment in Zambia. The USG has responded to GRZ
interest in increasing bilateral trade and investment by
working toward an Open Skies civil aviation agreement and
proposing the creation of an informal working group on
bilateral trade and investment lead by USTR on our side.
Both efforts have been delayed repeatedly by GRZ inaction.
Foreign Direct Investment is further constrained by a high
cost of doing business. Zambia has made strides to
streamline business licensing and provide incentives to
foreign investors, but high fuel costs, poor infrastructure,
restrictive labor laws and a dearth of skilled labor continue
to limit foreign investment.

Engaging the GRZ
--------------


15. (C) Your possible meeting with President Banda and/or
Foreign Minister Pande on the margins ofthe AU summit and
your subsequent visit to Lusaka will provide an opportunity
to reinforce Washington's interest in governance and
anti-corruption issues in Zambia. You may wish to stress
that commitment to good governance and fighting corruption is
essential not just for Zambia's continued qualification for
an MCA compact, but for the country's standing in the region
and the world. You can remind your Zambian interlocutors
that it is crucial that 2011 general elections are free and
fair so that the next Zambian administration be seen as
credible both domestically and abroad. You can also explain
that the United States looks to Zambia to be a partner in the
region and on the world stage. As such, we will expect
Zambia to cooperate in multilateral fora, to help solve
regional problems, and to provide peacekeeping forces, for
which we stand ready to assist with training and equipment.

KOPLOVSKY