Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10KYIV170
2010-01-29 16:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

ONE WEEK TO ELECTION: YANUKOVYCH CAMP CONFIDENT

Tags:  PGOV PREL UP 
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O 291626Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9246
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000170 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: ONE WEEK TO ELECTION: YANUKOVYCH CAMP CONFIDENT

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000170

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: ONE WEEK TO ELECTION: YANUKOVYCH CAMP CONFIDENT

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Even allies of PM Tymoshenko concede to us that
Regions Party candidate Viktor Yanukovych is holding on to
his lead in advance of the February 7 Presidential runoff.
Tymoshenko must mobilize greater numbers of "Orange" voters
over the next week or face defeat. If Yanukovych wins,
members of the current coalition tell us he could bring down
the Tymoshenko government, form a new coalition, and install
a new PM -- without need to resort to pre-term parliamentary
elections. Party of Regions campaign advisors tell us that
the Tymoshenko campaign (if not Tymoshenko herself) knows it
can not win, and is working to discredit the election.
Behind the scenes, names are surfacing as candidates for PM
or Foreign Minister if Yanukovych is victorious. End
Summary.

Tymoshenko's Hope: Mobilizing Orange Voters
--------------


2. (C) Tymoshenko Bloc MP Andriy Shkil told us January 28
that he believes there is an 80% chance Tymoshenko will lose.
To avoid this, she must somehow rally the Orange base, many
of whom are deeply disillusioned, in the final week. Her
efforts between now and election day will be focused on that
goal. Highlighting Yanukovych's biography (criminal and
oligarchic connections) and claiming he will sell out
Ukraine's sovereignty will be her chief weapons.


3. (C) Shkil believes Tymoshenko can accept defeat and will
not try to block Yanukovych's election via court challenges
unless his victory is close -- within one percent. Shkil
believes Regions operatives will engage in fraud in Donetsk
and Luhansk but not enough to affect the overall outcome,
again, unless the election is close.

Yanukovych Victory and Prospects For A New Coalition
-------------- --------------


4. (C) We also spoke on January 28 with Kryilo Kulikov, an MP
from the pro-coalition group within Our Ukraine-People's Self
Defense (OU-PSD) faction, which is the Tymoshenko Bloc's main
coalition partner. Kulikov put Yanukovych's chances for
victory at 70%. He said he had no doubt that Yanukovych
would be able, if elected President, to break the
Tymoshenko-led coalition and install a PM of his choosing.

Party of Regions representatives are working now to build the
necessary support within the 0U-PSD faction. Serhiy Tihipko,
third place finisher in the first round, also recently told
the Ambassador that formation of such a coalition would be
"easy to do."


5. (C) Kulikov recalled that coalitions are formed on the
basis of factions. If a majority of the 72 member OU-PSD
Rada faction voted to pull out of the coalition, the
Tymoshenko coalition would fall. The margin had already been
close. Following a Yanukovych victory, inducements from the
Yanukovych camp could deliver the needed 37 votes inside
OU-PSD. Kulikov said that he expected that the fall of the
Tymoshenko-led coalition would take place within days after
the final certification of the election. He himself would
vote against joining Yanukovych.


6. (C) Shkil agreed with Kulikov's appraisal. For purposes
of coalition formation, Regions would have its own votes,
172, plus the 72 from OU-PSD. (The calculation credits the
entire faction count.) This was more than the 226 needed for
a new coalition. There would thus be no need to call early
parliamentary elections in May as Yanukovych had threatened.
Shkil and Kulikov noted to us that Regions would not have to
invite the Communists to join the coalition. This might be a
condition of OU-PSD participation. The bloc of Rada speaker
Lytvyn would also lose its king-maker status. Regions might
well move to replace Lytvyn as speaker with an ally of
Regions from within OU-PSD to cement the deal.

Role of International Observers
--------------


7. (C) Taras Chornovil, an MP who has broken with Party of
Regions, told us January 28 that he too expects a Yanukovych
victory. He stressed that international observers would play
a key role in validating the election. If, as in the first
round, international observers rate the elections generally
free and fair, Tymoshenko will not want to go against them.
She will be conscious of not ruining her reputation in the
West. Chornovil believes that only if Yanukovych's margin is
two percent or less would Tymoshenko mount a full-scale
challenge in the courts.

KYIV 00000170 002 OF 003




8. (C) Chornovil, Shkil and Kulikov agreed that a new
coalition without early elections was in Regions' interest.
New elections would bring new factions into the Rada allied
with candidates Tihipko, Yatsenyuk and Yushchenko. Regions
might lose seats, especially to Tihipko. In addition,
elections are expensive. Regions' financial backers, like
oligarch Akhmetov, would want to avoid having to fund a
costly parliamentary race.

Views from Yanukovych Campaign
--------------


9. (C) Ambassador met January 28 with senior advisors to the
Yanukovych campaign. They made the following points:

--The ten percent margin between the two is holding, albeit
at higher levels. (About 45% Yanukovych vs. 35% Tymoshenko).
--Turnout is trending lower in the West and is stable or
higher in the East. Bad for Tymoshenko.
--Overall turnout will be about 61% (versus 67% in the first
round).
--Tymoshenko is not mobilizing the broader Orange base.
Attacks from President Yushchenko have hurt her with those
who look to him.
--The Tymoshenko campaign, anticipating defeat, is seeking to
discredit the election and cast doubt on a Yanukovych
victory.
--The Tymoshenko campaign planted a false exit poll after the
first round (with a difference of only 4%) to discredit the
outcome.
--Tymoshenko activists are preparing to engage in fraud
Western Ukraine.
--Tymoshenko election commissioners may seek to subvert the
election process by not showing up at some precinct or
district electoral commissions, thus inhibiting voting or
tabulation because of a lack of quorum.
--Regions will seek a clean election. Yanukovych has given
orders to that effect. They believe they will win and don't
need to resort to falsification.
--Regions welcomes election observers, except the proposed
2,000 Georgians who are "thugs" brought in to disrupt and
intimidate voters in Donetsk.
--The negative campaign against Yanukovych is not working.
--Yanukovych will end with a positive message on Friday
February 5.
--Regions will hold large rallies outside the Central
Election Commission February 8 to signal that they want to
protect the vote (that they believe they will win).

Yanukovych Appointments
--------------


10. (C) With Yanukovych remaining in the lead, talk in
political circles is turning to possible appointments. Rada
and analyst contacts thought that Yanukovych might go with
Mikhailo Azarov, his former Deputy PM and Finance Minister,
as PM. Azarov, although well known as pro-Russian, would be
more neutral among Regions' "clans" than other candidates,
such as Borys Kolesnykov who is closely linked to the clan
led by oligarch Rinat Akhmetov.


11. (C) Opinion is divided on whether Yanukovych would offer
Sergey Tihipko the position as PM. Unlike Tymoshenko,
Yanukovych has not yet offered him the job. MP Skhil
commented to us that Yanukovych bears a grudge against
Tihipko, who was Yanukovych's campaign chairman in 2004, but
who abandoned him after the disputed second round.
Yanukovych considers Tihipko a "traitor." Other observers
contend that, with many difficult economic decisions to come,
Regions could set Tihipko up as a fall guy by appointing him
PM.


12. (C) For Foreign Minister, the name heard most often is
that of current Ambassador to Russia, Kostyantyn Gryshchenko.
Well respected, he has served as Ambassador to Russia and
the U.S. and as an advisor to Yanukovych. Gryshchenko met
the Ambassador January 27 during a visit to consult with MFA
and the Yanukovych team. He said he had not been asked to be
Foreign Minister, but indicated a readiness to take the job
should he be asked. The Regions' shadow FM is MP Leonid
Kozhara, a former Ambassador to Sweden. Contacts generally
believe he would be a weak FM and that he lacks the stature
for the post.


13. (SBU) Serhiy Lyovochkin, Yanukovych's Chief of Staff and
a Regions MP, is the favored candidate to be Head of the
Presidential Administration.

Comment
--------------


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14. (C) Tymoshenko has a week to turn things around. Many in
her camp, as noted, doubt she can do it. Yanukovych has
refused to debate, so Tymoshenko will get free, uninterrupted
air time to make her final appeal. She has traditionally
been a strong finisher. Her resort to the courts seems
probable if a Yanukovych victory were close and/or the fraud
allegations egregious and credible. Yanukovych will continue
to try and avoid mistakes and ride disenchantment with the
Orange leadership to victory.

TEFFT