Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10KYIV128
2010-01-26 15:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: DISAPPOINTED CANDIDATE

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR UP 
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VZCZCXRO8322
RR RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHKV #0128/01 0261524
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261524Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9210
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000128 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR UP
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: DISAPPOINTED CANDIDATE
HRYTSENKO REFLECTS

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000128

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR UP
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: DISAPPOINTED CANDIDATE
HRYTSENKO REFLECTS

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Poorly performing Presidential candidate and head of
the Rada National Security and Defense Committee, Anatoliy
Hrytsenko, told the Ambassador January 22 that he did not see
much of a difference between PM Tymoshenko and opposition
leader Yanukovych, the two candidates for the February 7
runoff. Hrytsenko predicted neither would be able to unite
the country. Meanwhile, he warned Russian interests will
move in following the election to buy up strategic assets.
Hrytsenko believes public disillusionment could lead to early
presidential elections within 1-2 years. He was critical of
U.S. policy toward Ukraine and recommended that the U.S.
focus on tangible gestures of assistance that could earn
goodwill, such as paying for disposal of remaining stocks of
melange rocket fuel. End Summary.

Ukraine's Prospects
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador met with a disappointed Anatoliy Hrytsenko,
Chair of the Rada Security and Defense Committee, January 22.
Hrytsenko, a former Defense Minister under President
Yushchenko, amassed only 1.2% of the vote in the first round
of Presidential elections January 17. Hrytsenko observed
that, despite the personality differences between Yanukovych
and Tymoshenko, the long term consequences of either one
would be about the same for Ukraine. He saw two possible
paths for the country: split in two or consolidate.
Reminding us that he has "worked with these people,"
Hrytsenko judged that neither candidate was capable of
achieving consolidation.


3. (C) Presidential elections as early as 1-2 years from now
are not out of the question, he said, once the people become
disappointed with yet another round of no change and
worsening economic prospects. Hrytsenko mused that it might
be better if Yanukovych won, so that his inevitable failure
as president could teach Eastern and Southern Ukraine an
object lesson on the perils of clan-based voting.

Relations with Russia
--------------


4. (C) Asked where he sees Russian relations going under a
new president, Hrytsenko said he believes Russia won't

differentiate between Yanukovych or Tymoshenko; relations
will be normal and pragmatic on the surface. However, behind
the scenes, Russia will buy up strategic assets. It is
through the economy, he continued, that Russia will influence
election outcomes and the information space.

NATO
--------------


5. (C) Similarly, Hrytsenko did not foresee a major change in
Ukraine's formal relations with NATO. He predicted that
Ukraine would likely continue to participate in such
activities as peacekeeping operations. However, Hrytsenko
does not believe Ukraine's efforts would be productive on the
ground. He cited the example of the rapid reaction/disaster
response mechanism, which, for want of an enabling phrase in
the Ukrainian authorizing legislation, is unable to be
convened.


6. (C) Serious military capabilities are a problem for
Ukraine, he said. Neither Tymoshenko nor Yanukovych
understand why Ukraine needs a modern army or why it should
maintain skill levels even when the country is not a fighting
or facing a war. Hrytsenko expressed doubt that, under
either Tymoshenko or Yanukovych, the Rada would approve
multilateral military exercises in 2010.

U.S. Relations
--------------


7. (C) Hrytsenko observed that there is anti-U.S. feeling in
Ukraine, but said that it is "artificially planted."
Nevertheless, he went on to say U.S. policy toward Ukraine is
unclear, and argued that Ukraine needs real engagement on
real issues. For example, the U.S. should pay for and finish
the disposal of SS-24 fuel in Pavlograd; the U.S. could, with
a few million dollars, pay for the disposal of the (16,000
metric tons of) melange rocket fuel stored around the
country. This in particular would win the U.S. great public
favor in Ukraine. He suggested the U.S. could impact
corruption in Ukraine by helping isolate/attack the offshore
assets of oligarchs and criminal figures. Finally, Hrytsenko

KYIV 00000128 002 OF 002


said the U.S. should be working to help the Ukrainian defense
industry, or it could fail and turn to old partners.

Hrytsenko's Plans
--------------


8. (C) According to Hrytsenko, early Parliamentary Elections
could happen, but it would be a matter of financial
expediency. It would depend on whether the parties involved
determine whether it would be cheaper to buy votes in the
current Rada for a new coalition, or cheaper to run another
election.


9. (C) In the meantime, Hrytsenko plans to announce a new
party that would participate in all upcoming elections:
local, parliamentary, and presidential. The board members of
his NGO, "Citizenship," include the heads of many
micro-parties. He plans to consolidate these under the
umbrella of the NGO as a political party, and assume the
leadership.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Hrytsenko appeared disappointed and disillusioned.
Although his campaign had minimal funding and was low-key, he
had likely expected more than the 1.2 percent he got on
January 17. Tymoshenko's advisors had told us Hrytsenko was
a contender for Defense Minister if she won, but Hrytsenko's
refusal to endorse her for the second round -- combined with
his poor result -- have not helped his chances, assuming he
even wants the job. His grumblings about the U.S., despite
his pro-Euro-Atlantic orientation, were notable. Hrytsenko
may be overly pessimistic in his doubts regarding Rada
approval for multilateral military exercises in 2010.
Whether his new party will have any more traction than he had
as a presidential candidate remains to be seen. His showing
was well below the three percent needed for a party to enter
parliament. In short, Hrytsenko's attempt to market himself
as a pragmatic, uncorrupted, national interest-focused
alternative to the existing leadership essentially failed to
register.
TEFFT