Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10KYIV113
2010-01-25 10:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

WORLD BANK PROPOSES UKRAINE REFORM PROGRAM

Tags:  EFIN ETRD PGOV PINR PREL UP XH EREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9188
INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000113 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2020
TAGS: EFIN ETRD PGOV PINR PREL UP XH EREL
SUBJECT: WORLD BANK PROPOSES UKRAINE REFORM PROGRAM

REF: KYIV 103

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000113

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2020
TAGS: EFIN ETRD PGOV PINR PREL UP XH EREL
SUBJECT: WORLD BANK PROPOSES UKRAINE REFORM PROGRAM

REF: KYIV 103

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The World Bank's Kyiv-based country
director Martin Raiser plans to convene the donor community
to coordinate a message to Ukraine's new President on needed
economic reforms. Raiser told the Ambassador that the Bank
had grouped its reform proposals into three areas (fiscal,
investment climate, financial sector),and that the World
Bank had already outlined specific suggestions for programs
that could be immediately enacted. Raiser noted World Bank
President Zoellick had requested frequent Ukraine briefs and
would consider visiting Kyiv once it was clear that Ukraine
was making efforts at economic reform. Separately, Raiser
noted his concerns with the IMF's optimistic plans for
re-engaging Ukrainian authorities, suggesting the Fund could
face serious pressures to disburse a fourth tranche before
post-election political consolidation had been fully
completed. End summary.

WORLD BANK TO COORDINATE REFORM PUSH
--------------


2. (C) World Bank country director Martin Raiser told the
Ambassador on January 21 that the Bank would bring together
donors from the international community in the coming weeks
to frame a reform plan for Ukraine's incoming President. The
World Bank wanted to gather all multi- and bilateral
stakeholders, so that each could not only express priority
concerns but also agree on common talking points. Raiser
felt it was essential for the donor community to speak in one
voice to the new Ukrainian authorities, since vested
political and business interests might push against donor
goals. Raiser also emphasized it was essential for the Bank
to show it could make progress with the new administration to
justify continued broad engagement.

PRIORITY REFORM AREAS
--------------


3. (C) Raiser grouped needed economic reforms into three
areas: fiscal, investment climate, and financial sector. He
noted that fiscal reforms would be the foundation for

Ukraine's future economic growth. He explained that budget
disparities needed to be addressed for Ukraine to get back on
track with the IMF, which in turn would attract investment
and stimulate the financial sector. Raiser said pension
reform, energy price increases, and reductions in industrial
subsidies were key austerity measures World Bank experts had
already identified. On the issue of energy price increases,
Raiser noted that then-Acting Prime Minister Yekhanurov
raised gas prices in 2006 and there had been no public
protests against the move. In his opinion, gas prices could
again be raised without political fallout since energy bills
were a small percentage of total household expenditures.


4. (C) Among his suggestions for investment climate
improvements, Raiser indicated deregulation and tax reform as
the most essential first steps. He said Ukraine could only
increase its competitiveness if it reduced redundant
regulation and streamlined taxation. Longer term
anti-corruption work with the judiciary and administrative
organs was also necessary but would be more politically
difficult and thus needed to come later. Corruption in
public procurement was a persistent drag on Ukraine's
economy, since 20% of Ukraine's GDP is derived from state
purchasing.


5. (C) Raiser said the most pressing financial sector
problem remained inadequate capitalization levels within
Ukraine's banking system. Separately, Raiser insinuated to
Econoff that a new round of bank stress testing was needed,
especially for first and second tier domestic banks.

POSSIBLE ZOELLICK VISIT
--------------


6. (C) World Bank President Zoellick had considered coming
to Ukraine in 2009 to encourage reforms announced for
Ukraine's gas transit system. However, with the onset of the
economic crisis and growing evidence that Prime Minister
Tymoshenko was unlikely to implement her promises, the World
Bank called off the visit. World Bank management was now
mulling over a 2010 visit by Zoellick, but only after the
donor community and the GOU had built and begun to implement
a reform agenda.

KYIV 00000113 002 OF 002



WORLD BANK CONCERNED ABOUT IMF OPTIMISM
--------------


7. (C) Separately, Raiser noted to Econoff that he was
concerned about the IMF's "best and only case scenario" for
re-engaging Ukraine after the presidential election. The
Fund recognized Ukraine's fiscal situation was critical, and
that IMF lending would be necessary to prevent a damaging
budget crisis in the first quarter. Nonetheless, Raiser
agreed that the IMF seemed to have done too little planning
for possible delays, either due to court litigation or other
post-election uncertainty, that could push back the formation
of a new government and the IMF mission team's visit.


8. (C) Raiser felt that the IMF would run into serious
reputational risks if it disbursed without a clear winner in
the presidential election and a newly formed government. On
the other hand, Raiser warned that asset prices would likely
plunge in March if the IMF signaled it had to delay its
re-entry. He raised the concern that Kremlin-backed Russian
investors were watching and waiting for the opportunity to
pick up distressed assets, while Russian banks expected they
would have increased leverage over corporate borrowers and
sovereign Ukraine for which there would be no other lending
source.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) The World Bank has vacillated in its commitment to
donor coordination over the last year, mostly due to the
political paralysis that inhibited new lending programs from
being initiated. Its new drive to take charge of a reform
program is encouraging and would benefit from ongoing USG
input. A more disheartening note was struck by Raiser over
the IMF program, tracking with our concerns following a
January 20 meeting with the IMF's Kyiv-based resident
representative (reftel).


TEFFT