CHOD Outlines Military Reform Plans

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000025

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/28
TAGS: PGOV MCAP PREL KCRS AORC MARR PHUM PINS CG
SUBJECT: CHOD Outlines Military Reform Plans

REF: 09 KINSHASA 1033 AND PREVIOUS; 09 KINSHASA 976

DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 (B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Didier
Etumba Longila discussed plans to reform the military during a
January 26 briefing to select UNSC ambassadors and senior MONUC
officials. The FARDC plans to organize its national defense into
three geographical zones headquartered in Kinshasa, Kisangani, and
Lubumbashi. Etumba announced a revised combat chain of command
under the CHOD, not the MoD, as was the case previously. Etumba
was remarkably open about the need to reform the FARDC, including
reducing overall numbers, improving training, and providing better
opportunities to re-insert demobilized soldiers into civilian jobs.
Interestingly, Etumba announced the FARDC would deploy a contingent
of engineers and a company of military police to the small city of
Dongo, the scene of fighting in Equateur Province over the last
several months. End summary.

Kabila's zone defense


2. (C) During a January 26 briefing to select UNSC ambassadors and
MONUC leadership, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Didier
Etumba Longila confirmed plans to organize the DRC's national
defense into three zones headquartered at Kinshasa, Kisangani, and
Lubumbashi, respectively. This concept was previously discussed at
working level meetings, but the briefing was the first time that
the concept was formally unveiled in a multilateral setting,
perhaps pointing toward a coalescing of purpose and opinion within
the GDRC. Etumba explained that the defensive posture, centered on
the three largest cities, was designed around economic centers. It
is noteworthy that the geographic placement also complements
President Kabila's centers of power: the capital in Kinshasa; his
base of support in Lubumbashi; and Kisangani, gateway to the East
and purported construction site of a new presidential retreat
(report to follow septel). In addition to reducing response time
to crises, Etumba said an advantage of basing soldiers in key
locations throughout the country was to "ensure national unity
after decentralization."

Dongo - engineered peace or martial law?


3. (C) In a previously unreported development, the plan assigns
engineering and military police (MP) battalions to each defensive
zone. Etumba said deployment of MP battalions aimed to address
both broad concerns of troop discipline and specifically to counter
human rights violations. While battalion headquarters would be
collocated with the defensive zone commandants in major cities, MP
companies would be posted near military bases and strategic cities.
Interestingly, the previously unremarkable city of Dongo in
Equateur Province, site of recent inter-ethnic fighting that
escalated into a quasi-insurgency (ref A),will receive both a
contingent of engineers to work on local development projects and a
company of military police to maintain the peace. The deployment
could be seen as a troubling application of quasi-occupation or a
realistic assessment of the risks and causes of civic unrest in the
impoverished border region. On a small scale, the GDRC response to
the Equateur crisis could be an important evolution towards central
planning to counter a security threat. The decision to deploy
engineer and MP companies to Dongo, coupled with the measured
response to the uprising itself - in terms of proportionality of
response, early involvement of the international community, and
military preparation involving airlift, stocking of rations,
communications, and vehicles for command and control - is a first
for the DRC.

The president as commander-in-chief


4. (C) While stating the goal of the reform is to develop "a
professional, modern, and credible republican army ," which is a
deterrent to internal or external aggression, Etumba said it was
necessary to establish a revised chain of command to implement army
reform. He displayed an organizational chart that delineated a
parallel command structure that places recruitment, training,
logistics, and administrative matters under the Ministry of
Defense; and the combatant commands under the Chief of Staff.
While both command structures would ultimately report to the
president, the exclusion of the Minister of Defense from the combat
chain of command effectively centralizes military authority in the
presidency.

Current state of soldiers: untrained and nearing retirement age


5. (SBU) In describing the current state of the military, Etumba

KINSHASA 00000025 002 OF 002


enumerated limitations of an army that is poorly equipped,
operationally incapable of force projection and logistical
resupply, and suffering numerous personnel problems. Chief among
the latter, Etumba said, are the absence of support for military
dependents, insufficient discipline and a lack of respect for human
rights in the force itself, which he described as "a composite army
with imbalances in ethnic and geographic composition, of which 70%
are untrained and 40% aged." Establishment of a training command
under the Minister of Defense would address one problem and
retirement would deal with the other problem. Retirements offer a
means to reduce the force, replace those incapable of performing
their duties with new recruits, and demonstrate the government's
resolve in honoring soldiers' service with a severance package.


6. (SBU) Etumba outlined a short-term, three-year program
beginning in 2010 to retire over 45,000 soldiers, including 71
general officers in their early to mid-60s. All forced retirees
would receive a lump sum payment (up to $30,000 for a general
officer),a monthly pension, and some would be offered continued
government employment in the diplomatic service or in parastatals
as part of a program consisting of retirement, demobilization, and
retraining. Etumba envisaged a force over 140,000; however, he
commented that numbers should not be viewed with "close precision."
(Comment: To date, all GDRC interlocutors have quoted optimal
force levels half as large. Publicly offering this high number as
the FARDC's opening position, the GDRC might ultimately agree to
lower numbers. The reverse scenario would be diplomatically
difficult to manage. End comment.)


7. (SBU) To reach this end state, Etumba outlined three phases of
implementation identical to those Defense Minister Charles Mwando
Nsimba outlined when describing his plan for armed forces reform to
the parliament in October 2009 (ref B).


A. Phase I (2010-2011): reorganize the army, "participate" in
operations to secure the country, and prepare to relieve MONUC


B. Phase II (2011-2016): consolidate the new organization and
territorial orientation of the army


C. Phase III (2016-2025): conduct operations to assure territorial
defense and peace


8. (SBU) Mwando said he hoped to instill discipline in the armed
forces, a respect for human rights, and civic education by
reforming the military's organization, physical infrastructure,
training, and access to the resources necessary to fulfill their
defensive mission. He concluded by saying he hopes to have bi- and
multilateral partners, welcoming prospective partners who wish to
engage within the reform structure "under Congolese coordination
and leadership."


9. (C) Comment: By presenting a 15-year reform plan, the GDRC
unexpectedly exhibited an ability to realistically assess - and
publicly discuss - the many problems facing its armed forces.
While stark self-criticism of the army by President Kabila and
senior officials happens only in private, the frank review of the
current state and desired end-state of the military is a promising
development for meaningful reform of the security sector. End
comment.
GARVELINK