SPLM Presidential Advisor on Electoral Dynamics

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000099

SIPDIS
S/USSES FOR SE GRATION
NSC FOR MICHELLE GAVIN
AF FOR A/S CARSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/09
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS PREL SU
SUBJECT: SPLM Presidential Advisor on Electoral Dynamics

CLASSIFIED BY: REWhitehead, CDA, STATE, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

1.B (C) Summary.B On February 8 Charge met with
Sudanese People's Liberation Movement's (SPLM) Mansour Khalid, an
Advisor to Government of National Unity (GoNU) President BashirB to
discuss the electoral environment.B Mansour described growing
National Congress Party (NCP) anxiety as the April elections
approach, including ominous undertones of what might happen should
Bashir not prevail at the polls.B He alsoB provided interesting
insights into security concerns in the South, which he insisted are
driven by SPLM politics in Juba far more than tribal rivalries in
the outlying states.B Mansour shared his view that purported
documentary evidence indicating that the North has provided arms to
proxies in the South is in all likelihood a concoction.B End
summary.

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A Nervous NCP
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2. (C) An expansive Mansour Khalid described mounting angst in
senior NCP ranks following the nomination of Yasser Armun as the
SPLM candidate for the national presidency.B He noted that the NCP
had chosen not to run a candidate for the presidency of Southern
Sudan in the hope that the SPLM would reciprocateB in the North, or
even partner with the NCP.B The SPLM's decision to shelve Pagan
Amum (who Mansour claimed did not want the national nomination
anyway) and Malik Agar, the early front runners, and go with Yasser
Armun had taken the NCP by surprise.B A Northerner with name
recognition from his role as spokesman in Addis Ababa, Yasser was a
"clever rabble-rouser" with sufficient political acumen to
recognize the limits, Mansour said.B Suddenly faced with an unknown
quantity, the NCP had developed a case of the jitters.B Instead of
the sweeping Bashir win that the NCP had long expected, there was
the (admittedly long-shot) possibility of Yasser sweeping the
South; scoring well in the East, Darfur and other marginalized
areas; and drawing votes from disaffected elements of the riparian
tribes.B This raised the specter of Bashir being forced into a
second round, with the outcome not guaranteed.B This was the worst
case scenario for the NCP, the John Garang electoral calculus
revived.

3.B (C) Mansour said that the tenor of conversation had changed in
his recent discussions with GoNU First Vice President Ali Osman
Taha and other NCP heavyweights.B They had hinted -- although never
explicitly stated -- that in the event of Bashir's defeat at the
polls, they could not predict how the security services would
react.B Mansour took this either as a veiled warning that Yasser
should withdraw from the race or an implied threat that the
security services would not permit power to change hands, thus
leaving the NCP -- probably minus Bashir -- to pull the strings
behind the scenes in the post-election period.B He said that if
this were to occur, there was a risk of instability in the North.
He did not doubt the NCP loyalties of senior SAF officers, but
there were indications that the lower ranks did not share this view
and could not be counted on to fall automatically into line.

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The Problem is Juba Politics, not Tribes or Cattle Raids
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4.B B (C) Turning to the South, Mansour admitted that the election
could spawn violence, but noted that there was a mistaken outside
perception that such violence was tribally driven and could be
resolved on that level.B Hs said that violence surrounding cattle
raids, grazing/water issues and transhumance passage had been
present for generations, and he did not understand why outsiders
expected these to cease abruptly.B He judged local tribal chiefs
and the Government of Southern Sudan Peace Commission (supported by
various donors) as capable of dealing with such disputes as they
cropped up.B In Mansour's view, the real problem facing elections
in the South was Juba-centered and driven by SPLM political figures
whose ambitions overshadowed their loyalty of the SPLM.B He
explained that Sudanese parties in both the North and South
historically have suffered from indiscipline that led to a plethora
of "independent" candidates from the same party campaigning for the
same position, each claiming that s/he was the choice of the
people.B In some instances, the tribal affiliations of rival
candidates risked provoking violence.B In others, private militias
loyal to rival candidates posed a risk.B He said that the SPLM has
sought to sidestep such problems by insisting that all SPLM members
back the party's selected candidate on pain of exclusion from the

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party. The SPLM quickly backed off this threat when faced with
deepening inter-party schisms, and the Politburo continued to
search for a solution.B Mansour said that the NCP suffered from the
same internal pressures, although to a lesser degree.
5.B (C) Mansour reviewed various competing candidates for
governorships, the most contentious positions,, and charted out the
fault lines that these posed.B Among the illustrative examples:

Eastern Equatoria:B the incumbent governor is Aloisio Emur Ojetuk,
a Latuka from Torit County who is popular.B He was awarded Salva
Kiir's annual recognition as the best governor in the South last
year; despite this, the SPLM chose Gen. Loius Lobong Lojore, a
Toposa as its candidate.B Ojetuk has declared his intention to
contest as an independent, raising the specter of possible
inter-tribal clashes.

Unity State:B Brig. Gen. Taban Deng Gai, a Nuer who is the
incumbent in Unity State, faces a stiff challenge from Angelina
Teny, SPLM Federal State Minister and the wife of GoSS Vice
President Riek Machar.B Also a Nuer, Teny is backed by Paulino
Matiep; while Taban Deng is a close ally of Salva Kiir, SPLA Chief
of Staff Hoth, and powerful Nuer Energy Minister John Luk Jok.B The
prospects for outbreaks of violence are amplified in Unity because
despite their common tribal roots, Taban Deng, Machar and Matiep
all have armed supporters at their call.B Mansour feared that a
split SPLM vote could result in theirB loss ofB the governorship.

Central Equatoria State:B This contest offers another mixture of
tribal rivalry and militia muscle.B Incumbent Major Gen. Clement
Wani Konga is a Mundari tribesmen who led a powerful militia during
the war.B Formerly the NCP Governor, then independent and now SPLM
incumbent governor and candidate, he faces a challenge from GoSS
Presidential Advisor for Diplomatic Affairs Alfred Lado Gore, a
Bari from Juba County.B Political observers predict that the defeat
of the corrupt and unpopular Wani could lead to serious clashes
between the Mundari and Bari.

Unity State:B Major Gen. Paul Malong Away, the incumbent and the
official SPLM candidate, faces a challenge from the popular and
competent Dau Jortong, who is supported by former GoSS Finance
Ministers Arthur Akuin and Kuol Athian.B He is the putative
favorite, but because both are Dinka, widespread violence seems
unlikely.

Western Equatoria State: B Incumbent governor and SPLM candidate
Jemma Nunu Kumba faces popular independent candidate Joseph
Bakosoro.B Both are Zande and neither has militia support, so
little violence is anticipated.

Jongeli State:B Incumbent SPLM Governor Kuol Munyang, a Dinka in a
plurality Nuer state, is nonetheless popular and is expected to
win.B Although the level ofB tribal violence associated with cattle
raiding remains high, the election probably will not be a driver of
such conflict.

6.B (C) Mansour emphasized that Juba holds the key to reducing
political violence throughout the South during the campaign and
polling as well as in the aftermath.B The success of the SPLM or
outside players to convince the competing candidates to instruct
their supporters to eschew violence will determine the comportment
of the elections, Mansour stressed.B Increased police presence and
UNMIS deployment into the states can help, he concluded, but the
battle for a peaceful elections will be won in Juba, not outside.
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A DisruptiveB NCP Role?
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7.B (C) Asked if he believed reports that the NCP is fomenting
violence in the South, Mansour replied that it was conceivable.B He
cited Lam Akol, whom he termed "immoral," and General Gabriel Tang
as the two individuals he thought most likely to promote violence
to destabilize the elections and the GoSS.B Despite this, he
offered as an aside, his view that the SPLM would not prevent Akol
from campaigning in the South, although it was clear that some
areas would be no-go zones for security reasons.B Mansour continued
that he had seen no physical or documentary evidence linking the
NCP to violence or arms transfers to proxies in the South.B Mansour
cited documents purportedly obtained from NISS officials in
Khartoum that detailed arms transfers to at least one individual in
the South.B He said that Kiir had shown this document to Vice
President Taha during the latter's most recent visit to Juba; other

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SPLM officials had also shown it to various visiting delegations.
Mansour remarked that he would have advised Kiir not to have
presentedB the letter had he, Mansour, seen it in advance.B The NCP
was certainly capable of actions worse than this, but in Mansour's
opinion, the document was probably a forgery.B He observed that the
NISS was far too cunning to leave such obvious and incriminating
fingerprints on its handiwork.

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Comment
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8.B (S )B Comment.B Always value-added, Mansour offered some
intriguing insights.B We were especially interested by the
speculationB that the NCP might unleash the security services
should it perceive that its grip on power could be loosened by the
ballot box.B We are unable to assess the likelihood of such an
outcome, but we accept Mansour's contention that this scenario
could present a risk of instability in the North.B We have seen
reports in other channels that describe growing disaffection with
the NCP in some military circles.B We agree completely that turmoil
within SPLM leadership ranks poses a greater threat to peaceful
elections than the traditional cycle of inter-tribal rivalries in
the South.
WHITEHEAD