WEST DARFUR WALI PESSIMISTIC ON ELECTIONS, SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000091

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SUBJECT: WEST DARFUR WALI PESSIMISTIC ON ELECTIONS, SECURITY

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Whitehead, Charge d'Affaires; REASON: 1.4(B),
(D)


1. (C) Summary: Abulgasim Imam Al-Haj, the Wali of West Darfur,
will leave office in April embittered that the Government of Sudan
(GOS) has done little to honor its commitments under the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006 and the Declaration of Commitment to
the DPA of 2007, to which he was a signatory. The former leader of
the Fur rebel group Sudanese Liberation Army(SLA)/Mother said that
along with most Fur in West Darfur, he will not participate in the
elections, and admitted he did not even register to vote in 2009.
He expressed his disdain for the most recent agreement between Chad
and Sudan, predicting it would follow the example of
previously-unsuccessful Chad-Sudan agreements and the DPA.
Similarly, he doubted that the Doha talks would result in a
cease-fire among the remaining non-signatories. As governor for
West Darfur, he admitted that insecurity in this region was out of
control. However, he blamed the Government of Sudan (GOS) for
military escalation with Chad, and also for encouraging local
tribes to kidnap international Non-Government Organization (INGO)
workers for ransom. End summary.


2. (C) Speaking with poloff at the Khartoum home of a Darfuri
lawyer on January 31, former rebel leader and Declaration of
Commitment (DOC) signatory Abugasim Imam Al-Haj said that he will
not participate in the April elections. He said he was certain
that if he ran for any office, the ruling National Congress Party
(NCP) would find a way to derail his campaign. "Darfur is a
political problem that needs a political solution," he grumbled,
"But the NCP does not want a solution." He warned that the upcoming
elections could aggravate the political situation by decisively
tilting the fragile balances of power in each Darfur state towards
the NCP, marginalizing the politically-active Fur and opposition
voices. Imam accused the Khartoum regime of engaging in "peace
talking," but not actively searching out political solutions in
Darfur, alleging that the NCP believed political reconciliation to
be a threat to its hegemony in Sudan's western region.


3. (C) Imam said he holds out little hope for the most recent peace
initiative between Chad and Sudan, pointing to the long history of
agreements covering the restive border region, signed by the GOS
and Government of Chad but not subsequently honored. "They're very
clever," Imam said of the NCP, and added, "They want to make Chad
think they'll actually change things without changing at all." Of
the Chadian Armed Opposition Groups (CAOGs),Imam confirmed his
view that on the whole, the CAOGs had retreated from West Darfur to
North Darfur, but the GOS would prefer to keep them in reserve, and
would not disarm them. Imam accompanied Presidential Advisor Dr.
Ghazi Salahuddin on his trip to the Chadian capital in November
2009, but claimed t he was not brought along to engage Chadian
officials in substantive discussions. "They used me as a cover. He
(Ghazi) froze me out of meetings, and I did not travel with him
again."


4. (C) In West Darfur, Imam sees the NCP as so narrowly focused on
funding its security services that priority issues such as health
and education are "completely ignored." Funding for the security
forces of the Ministry of Defense, National Intelligence and
Security Services (NISS),and the Ministry of the Interior is
divided in Khartoum, giving Imam administrative control of little
more than the El Geneina traffic police. Imam criticized the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its stance towards Chad, saying SAF
frequently relies on uncorroborated intelligence on Chadian
military and rebel positions, leading the Ministry of Defense in
Khartoum to order preemptive bombings of border areas with little
regard for civilian casualties or actual Chadian positions. Imam
alleged that the wave of kidnappings and hostage-taking attempts in
West Darfur in 2009 was directly linked to the heavy presence of
NISS in the region. He asserted that NISS has encouraged local Arab
tribes to become involved in kidnapping INGO workers as a way to
scare the INGOs out of West Darfur, and added that the releases
were theatrics organized by NISS in Khartoum.


5. (C) Imam was skeptical that the current talks in Doha would
result in any of the non-signatory Darfuri rebel movements signing
a peace deal with the government. The absence of Abdul Wahid and
any credible Fur representation at the talks has doomed them from
the start, and Imam predicted that the Doha talks would end soon.
With Khalil Ibrahim and his Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
unable to take and hold any significant territory in Darfur, JEM
has become deeper entwined in the political system of Chad while
becoming less relevant in Darfur. Imam sees JEM as "Deby's
problem," because the multidimensional Zaghawa alliances in Chad

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that provided support for JEM have in turn made Khalil Ibrahim a
relevant political figure in N'Djamena. Following recent
internecine clashes within SLA/Abdul Wahid, Imam said that leaders
in Nertiti reported that up to 80,000 IDPs have fled from Jebel
Marra to the Nertiti IDP camp. (Note: These numbers are most likely
highly-inflated, and the UN has been unable to ascertain the number
of IDPs following the recent clashes. End note.) The collapse of
command and control within SLA/Abdul Wahid will most likely spread
into West Darfur, Imam added, further muddying the waters with
rebel signatories, non-signatories, and ragtag bands of rebels
intent on carrying out local vendettas similar to the January 5
killing of SLA/Abdul Wahid commander Abdalla Bakr.


6. (C) Comment: Weak, marginalized and unpopular, Imam took office
in 2007 as an NCP ploy to attract Fur supporters away from Abdul
Wahid, but the NCP's move proved disastrous. West Darfur remains
Sudan's most lawless state, with little of the central
administrative control present in restive North and South Darfur,
and none of the stable political equilibrium seen in the
underdeveloped states of the east. Departing from office following
the elections in April, Imam will leave behind him no significant
legacy, and will join the ranks of former Fur officials in Darfur
who were no match for Khartoum's powerful security apparatus and
political guile. From his vantage point of three years in El
Geneina, Imam sees no signs that would motivate him or other
leading Fur in West Darfur to participate in this year's elections
and the subsequent political process. We do not discount that
there are some sour grapes behind his bitter remarks. End comment.
WHITEHEAD