Charge's Meeting with UNSRSG Ashraff Qazi

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000065

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/13
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV PTER KDEM UN SU UG
SUBJECT: Charge's Meeting with UNSRSG Ashraff Qazi

CLASSIFIED BY: REWhitehead, CDA, State, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (sbu) Summary. Charge d'Affaires (CDA) Whitehead met with
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG) Ashraff Qazi, the head of the United Nations Mission to
Sudan (UNMIS),on January 11. Qazi discussed UNMIS personnel
changes, Sudan's upcoming general elections, the anticipated UNMIS
security role for both the elections in the South and Abyei, and a
reported threat to Uganda Airways. He also shared the latest UNMIS
intelligence on the location of Joseph Kony and the core force of
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The meeting shed light on a
number of topics, to include the reluctance of UNMIS to be drawn
into security areas that it perceives outside its present mandate.
End summary.



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The UN Line-up in Sudan

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2. (sbu) Qazi said Charge that he had returned home to Pakistan
for the holiday break with the intention of returning to Khartoum
for a final pack-out and late January departure. He said the UN
headquarters in New York had pressured him to stay on, however, and
over the objections of his family he had agreed to remain in
Khartoum until late April, following the conclusion of Sudan's
general elections. He said that his imminent departure was not the
only shift underway at the top level of the UN hierarchy in Sudan.
General (retired) Lidder Singh, former UNMIS military commander,
was due to return to Khartoum as Chief UN Political Officer, and in
late February a Finn named Charpentier (FNU) would arrive to
replace UN Senior Humanitarian Coordinator Ameera Haq. Qazi said
that he was uncertain if David Gressly, the most senior UN official
in Southern Sudan, intended to remain in Juba or to take up another
post.



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Singing the Elections Blues

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3. (sbu) Qazi turned to the April national elections in Sudan,
which he viewed as a serious challenge to Southern Sudan in
particular. He noted the recent proliferation of initiatives to
postpone the elections and Southern/Abyei referenda, the most
recent a call by Umma's Siddiq Al Mahdi, Umma Renewal's Mubarak al
Mahdi, and various other opposition leaders to reschedule the
elections in November 2010. Charge replied that the US view was
that the elections and referenda should go forward as now
scheduled. Qazi said that the SPLM was struggling with the
nominations of candidates; the growing number of those seeking
governorships and seats in the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly
was creating the potential for internal disputes and violence. He
continued that UNMIS Juba had forwarded reports of serious tension
between the Nuer and Dinka camps in the SPLM over an initiative by
some senior Dinka leaders to restrict SPLM candidacy to those who
had uninterrupted membership in the SPLM for the last ten years,
thus in one fell swoop eliminating Riak Machar and the other senior
Nuer leaders that had rejoined the SPLM seven years ago. UNMIS
Political Officer Muin Shreim interjected that he thought January
13 and 14 SPLM Politburo meeting would reject this notion as well
as choose (or not choose) a SPLM candidate for the national
presidency. Qazi said that the imminent resignation of GoSS
ministers and their return as the custodians of a pre-electoral
caretaker government was also likely to further complicate the
sclerotic decision making process in the South. Muin asked about
recent Sudanese newspaper reports that the US had demanded that
Sudan change its security law. Charge suggested that he avoid the
local tabloids and instead read the Secretary's remarks in which
she called on the GOS to allow freedom of speech and assembly and
other basic rights without which the April elections were likely
become a farce.



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Security, or the Lack Thereof

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4. (sbu) Qazi lamented the poor start of 2010 in terms of security
conditions in the South of Sudan. Less than two weeks into the New
Year, the body count from inter-ethnic and inter-communal violence
had already topped three-hundred and fifty. Charge concurred that
the potential for conflict was heightened by the electoral cycle
and asked about the anticipated role of UNMIS in providing security
during the elections. Qazi responded that UNMIS was training
Sudanese police and would deploy forces into the countryside during
the campaign and elections period, but he cautioned that the
primary responsibility for electoral security devolved to GoSS
security forces, and not to UNMIS.




5. (c) Charge observed that the security situation in Abyei is
also troubling and noted that some in the international community
had called on a more pro-active UNMIS stance, including the
protection of the border demarcation team that had been barred by
Misseriya tribesmen from completing its work on demarcation of the
northern boundary adjudicated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA). Qazi replied that enforcing the provisions of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and South was not
and never had been within the mandate of UNMMIS. In more practical
terms, an UNMIS attempt to force this issue would likely lead to a
confrontation with the Misseriya that would involve the Sudanese
Armed Forces. It would also roil the sensibilities of the
troop-contributing countries with forces involved and create a
backlash in New York if there were casualties on any side. He said
that there had always been a double-standard of sorts on robust
UNMIS involvement in favor of Southern concerns vis a vis the
interests of the North. He cited one of the most flagrant
violations of the CPA, the SPLA's failure to redeploy its forces
out of Blue Nile State, and noted that no one in the international
community had yet called on UNMIS to take robust action to expel
these forces, not that UNMIS would be willing to undertake such a
mission anyway.



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UNMIS Ban on the Use of Ugandan Airlines out of Juba

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6. (sbu) Charge cited press reports that on the basis of
independent information UNMIS had restricted its personnel from
using Ugandan Airlines on the Juba/ Kampala route. Qazi said that
UNMIS had acted solely on the basis of a US Embassy warden message
that referred to a reported threats by unnamed individuals to take
action a Ugandan aircraft plying this route.



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The LRA in CAR

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7. (c) Qazi gave the Charge the most recent UNMIS intelligence
report on the presence of the LRA in and along the southern and
western borders of Sudan. He said that Joseph Kony and the core
group of LRA, an estimated 150 fighters and 300-400 camp followers,
were currently thought to be located in the Central African
Republic about 50 kilometers east of Sam Oundja, near the
CAR/Chad/Sudan triangle. An estimated 2,000-2,500 troops of the
Ugandan Popular Defense Forces continued to track this force. Muin
said that the UN had no information indicating that the LRA had
attempted to enter Sudan to make common cause with the rebel
Justice and Equality Movement and noted that the small number of
LRA fighters involved would in any case do little to tip the
existing military balance.

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Comment

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8. (c) Qazi has proven an open and accessible interlocutor for the
US Embassy, and he has been supportive of most of our initiatives.
He maintains a strict constructionist interpretation of the UNMIS
mandate, however, and we do not expect him to yield ground on using
UNMIS forces to enforce the PCA decision in Abyei or take other
measures that he views outside of the UN's purview. End comment.
WHITEHEAD