SPLM Presidential Candidate Arman on Election Prospects

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000105

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SUBJECT: SPLM Presidential Candidate Arman on Election Prospects

CLASSIFIED BY: REWhiteehad, CDA, STATE, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (c) Summary. On February 11 Charge d'Affaires met with the
Sudanese Popular Liberation Movement's (SPLM) Yasir Arman, Deputy
Secretary General of the SPLM (head of Northern Sector) as well as
the SPLM candidate for national president. An ebullient Arman
charted an electoral calculus that would give him an edge over
incumbent President Bashir and commented on how he planned to
conduct the SPLM campaign in the North and South. The discussion
migrated to Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation and
post-referendum issues and the urgent need for action on both
fronts. We concur that Arman is a competitive candidate but
continue to believe that the outcome of the election will depend
largely on the probity of the voting process and on how popular or
unpopular Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) are, two
things that will remain unknown until the ballots have been
counted. We continue to think that Arman has a steep hill to
climb, but should he manage to make it to the top, there will be a
fascinating new vista for Sudanese politics ahead. End summary.



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Adding up the Numbers

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2. (c) Arman was escorting out one of the top lieutenants of
Osman Mirghani's Democratic Unionist Party when the Charge arrived,
and when Arman returned to the office he explained with a broad
smile that a large number of Mirghani's followers were unhappy with
Mirghani's overtures to the NCP and were willing to talk with the
SPLM. Arman said that his optimistic public statements about
besting Bashir in the April national elections were backed by solid
numbers. He said that the SPLM would receive more than
three-million votes from the approximately 4.3 million voters
registered in the South. He added that NCP Presidential Advisor
Salah Ghosh had confided to SPLA General Mathok that the NCP
thought that Arman and the SPLM would garner as many as
four-million more votes in the North. It this estimate were
correct, Arman said, he would be the clear favorite going into a
second round.




3. (c) Arman said that he planned to dial back the rhetoric and
run a positive campaign even if the NCP attempted to drag the SPLM
down into the mud. He admitted that there were a number of issues
at play that would affect the tenor of the campaign. First and
foremost, he did not know if the NCP would allow an unfettered
campaign, or if they would resort to bureaucratic obstruction and
the heavy hand of the security services to disrupt the opposition.
There was also a serious security deficit in the Darfur states that
the NCP could exploit. However, he concluded, the NCP was
unpopular with most of the people in Darfur, both Arab and African
tribes; with the Nubians in the North; along the Red Sea coast; in
many North/South border areas; and increasingly with young people
in the central riparian area from where the NCP draws most of its
support. Arman said that northerners who want unity realize that
electing the SPLM is the best means of ensuring it . He discounted
the argument that the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment
against Bashir had whipped up a wave of nationalism that would
sweep Bashir and the NCP back into office. To the contrary, Arman
interpreted recent public incidents in which Sudanese had thrown
shoes at or insulted Bashir in State House and at a large public
funeral as indications of a growing lack of respect for and fear of
the president.




4. (c) Charge pointed out that a credible election would bestow
increased legitimacy on whoever prevails on the national level, and
that the same will hold true in Southern Sudan. It was important
that opposition parties be allowed to campaign without obstruction
and that SPLM candidates contesting the same seats instruct their
supporters to avoid violence. Arman said that he fully concurred,
and that the SPLM understood that it too needed the legitimacy an
election would bring, especially if the North reneged on the
January 2011 self-determination referendum. At that juncture, it
would be essential to have a duly elected legislative assembly in
the South to decide on the best course of action. Arman said that
the one caveat was Lam Akol. He posed no threat to Salva Kiir's

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election as President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS),
but the SPLM would not tolerate Akol's use of militia forces to
foment disorder.



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Looking to 2011 and Beyond

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5. (c) Charge observed that the elections are only two months
away, and the referendum ten. Arman replied that the SPLM was
seized with the urgency of the situation and alarmed by the
complexity of issues that must be resolved in less than a year:
elections, referendum, a political deal in Darfur and the ICC. He
said that it was unlikely that the movements in Darfur would agree
to any political settlement until they saw what emerged from the
elections. He thought that it would be much easier to broker a
deal were the SPLM to win.




6. (c) Charge said that the P-5 Chiefs of Mission had met with
the AU Troika headed by Thabo Mbeki three weeks earlier and
reviewed the work plan that Mbeki had submitted to the SPLM and NCP
for comment. What was the SPLM reaction to this proposal? Arman
said that he had met with Mbeki two days before, and that there was
clearly a role for Mbeki, although Arman refused to be further
drawn out on the subject. Charge asked about the idea US role, to
which Arman replied that it was essential that the US remain
involved as a guarantor of any agreements that emerged from
negotiations between the two parties. He said that he did not
foresee a major role for the Assessment and Evaluation Commission
(AEC) in post-referendum issues, a view that echoed what we have
heard from the NCP. Arman concluded by stating that he expected
the NCP to resort to its usual stall tactics to impede
implementation of unresolved CPA issues, although he thought that
they might be more willing to show good faith in discussing
post-referendum issues, especially the big three of wealth-sharing,
nationality, and management of borders. He said that the NCP had
still not named its candidates for the Southern Sudanese and Abyei
Referenda Commissions; Charge reminded him that neither had the
SPLM.



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Comment

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7. (c) Arman made a good case for his prospects as a candidate,
but we still believe that he remains the underdog, albeit one with
teeth. We cannot say if the argument that Arman's election would
improve prospects for unity will resonate in the North, but we are
convinced that his triumph at the polls may be the last and only
means of making unity attractive enough for southerners to take a
second look. A Bashir win will virtually ensure the separation of
the South, and even an Arman upset would not necessarily guarantee
the reverse. It would yield, however, a radically altered
political dynamic for dealing with Darfur and engineering an
amicable separation/federation of the North and South. It would
also create an interesting shift within the SPLM, whose core
constituency and leadership would remain in the South, but whose
most influential member would suddenly be a Northerner from
Khartoum.
WHITEHEAD