Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10KAMPALA1
2010-01-04 10:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kampala
Cable title:
UGANDA: THE LIMITS OF UGANDA'S AMISOM COMMITMENT
how-toVZCZCXRO0070 RR RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHKM #0001/01 0041056 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 041056Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0065 INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE RWANDA COLLECTIVE SOMALIA COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000001
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/04
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MCAP MARR UG SO
SUBJECT: UGANDA: THE LIMITS OF UGANDA'S AMISOM COMMITMENT
REF: 09 KAMPALA 01276; 09 KAMPALA 01322
CLASSIFIED BY: Tim Manarin, Political Officer, State, Pol/Econ;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000001
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/04
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MCAP MARR UG SO
SUBJECT: UGANDA: THE LIMITS OF UGANDA'S AMISOM COMMITMENT
REF: 09 KAMPALA 01276; 09 KAMPALA 01322
CLASSIFIED BY: Tim Manarin, Political Officer, State, Pol/Econ;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (C) Summary: Uganda plans to add a fourth battalion to its
contribution to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in
February 2010, bringing the total number of Ugandan troops in
Somalia to 3,500. While President Museveni would like to expand
AMISOM's capability and mandate, Uganda's commitment to AMISOM and
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is not open-ended absent
political progress on the ground in Somalia. Moreover, the
potential for renewed hostilities between northern and southern
Sudan along Uganda's northern border, and Uganda's own general
elections in February 2011 - well before the expiration of the
TFG's mandate - could force a diversion of Ugandan troops and
resources away from AMISOM, with negative implications for the
viability of the TFG and U.S. interests in Somalia. End Summary.
-------------- ---
Uganda Ready to Do More in Somalia...
-------------- ---
2. (C) Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, Minister of Defense
Kiyonga, and other senior Ugandan leaders have repeatedly expressed
interest in sending more forces to Somalia to take offensive action
against al Shabaab (see reftels for background). The Ugandan
People's Defense Force (UPDF) currently has three battalions
totaling 2,750 peacekeepers in Mogadishu and will send another
mechanized battalion of around 750 troops in February 2010. In
August 2009, the AMISOM Force Commander Major General Nathan
Mugisha told the DATT of Ugandan plans to drive Al Shabaab out of
Mogadishu following the arrival of the UPDF's fourth battalion.
Uganda intended to deploy this battalion to Somalia in November,
but the deployment was delayed by the September 17 suicide attack
on AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu. In addition to troop
contributions, Uganda has trained approximately 600 TFG troops. A
second cohort of 661 trainees and some 30 officers will finish in
March 2010 . Uganda has also agreed to host European Union funded
training for another 2,000 TFG troops set to begin in May 2010.
According to Ugandan police, 40 TFG police officers have attended
Uganda's police training academy and the Ugandan Police are
prepared to train as many as 3,500 more TFG police officers in
2010.
--------------
...But Not Forever
--------------
4. (C) Ugandan officials also stress that the status quo in
Somalia is not sustainable, and that Uganda will contemplate
withdrawing from Mogadishu if there is no progress over the next
year. They have indicated that Uganda is looking for a longer term
policy and additional international support that will allow AMISOM
and the TFG to defeat Al Shabaab. While highlighting the weakness
and unpopularity of Al Shabaab, these officials express growing
doubts that the TFG has the capacity to capitalize on either the
AMISOM presence or any gains it could make. They caution that
Uganda is unwilling to remain in Mogadishu indefinitely, unless the
TFG develops traction as a government, can win popular support, and
stand on its own two feet.
--------------
Sudan and Domestic Politics
--------------
5. (C) Two other variables that could precipitate a Ugandan
withdrawal from Somalia are Sudan and Uganda's February 2011
KAMPALA 00000001 002 OF 002
general elections. Although Uganda regards an unstable Somalia as
a serious security threat for East Africa, Uganda's more immediate
concerns focus on the Sudan. Ugandan military leaders have told
DATT that war between northern and southern Sudan would likely
force Uganda to divert resources from Somalia to assist the
Government of Southern Sudan with logistical support. With the
recent peace in northern Uganda after 23 years of the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency, the GOU will be inclined to
increase troops in the region if it looks like a war in southern
Sudan could destabilize the area and spark more domestic unrest
there
6. (C) On the domestic front, Uganda's opposition political parties
believe President Museveni is using AMISOM as a hedge to soften
U.S. criticism of Uganda's democratic backsliding. The leading
opposition contender, Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) President
Kizza Besigye, told PolOffs on December 15 that the AMISOM
deployment is exacerbating an internal Somali political crisis, and
questioned Uganda's motives for sending forces to Mogadishu. A
December 9 editorial by a Kenya-based Ugandan journalist critical
of Museveni praised the UPDF's good conduct and selfless service in
Somalia, but said many see Uganda's peacekeeping mission as "part
of a scheme" by Museveni to placate Western donors. As the
presidential campaign proceeds, it will be difficult for Museveni
to address these criticisms barring tangible progress in Somalia
or the addition of other African troops to ease the burden on
Uganda.
7. (C) Internal election-related security, however, is perhaps the
highest priority for President Museveni. Uganda maintains one of
the largest militaries in Africa, with approximately 40,000
soldiers. Museveni uses the UPDF to augment severely
under-resourced police forces during moments of instability, such
as the deadly September 10-12 riots in Kampala. A highly
contentious and competitive 2011 presidential election campaign
will likely trigger a sustained security presence throughout
Uganda, possibly requiring the withdrawal of troops from the
UPDF's deployment against the LRA in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Central African Republic, or from AMISOM, or both.
--------------
Comment
--------------
8. (C) The international community is focused on the end of the
TFG's mandate in August 2011. Uganda, however, is focused on Sudan
and Uganda's February 2011 elections. While President Museveni and
other senior Ugandan leaders remain committed to AMISOM and
Somalia, this commitment is not open-ended. If 2010 does not bring
clear signs of progress in Somalia or additional support for AMISOM
from other African nations, Uganda's willingness to remain AMISOM's
lead participant could end before the expiration of the TFG's
mandate.
LANIER
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/04
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MCAP MARR UG SO
SUBJECT: UGANDA: THE LIMITS OF UGANDA'S AMISOM COMMITMENT
REF: 09 KAMPALA 01276; 09 KAMPALA 01322
CLASSIFIED BY: Tim Manarin, Political Officer, State, Pol/Econ;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (C) Summary: Uganda plans to add a fourth battalion to its
contribution to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in
February 2010, bringing the total number of Ugandan troops in
Somalia to 3,500. While President Museveni would like to expand
AMISOM's capability and mandate, Uganda's commitment to AMISOM and
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is not open-ended absent
political progress on the ground in Somalia. Moreover, the
potential for renewed hostilities between northern and southern
Sudan along Uganda's northern border, and Uganda's own general
elections in February 2011 - well before the expiration of the
TFG's mandate - could force a diversion of Ugandan troops and
resources away from AMISOM, with negative implications for the
viability of the TFG and U.S. interests in Somalia. End Summary.
-------------- ---
Uganda Ready to Do More in Somalia...
-------------- ---
2. (C) Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, Minister of Defense
Kiyonga, and other senior Ugandan leaders have repeatedly expressed
interest in sending more forces to Somalia to take offensive action
against al Shabaab (see reftels for background). The Ugandan
People's Defense Force (UPDF) currently has three battalions
totaling 2,750 peacekeepers in Mogadishu and will send another
mechanized battalion of around 750 troops in February 2010. In
August 2009, the AMISOM Force Commander Major General Nathan
Mugisha told the DATT of Ugandan plans to drive Al Shabaab out of
Mogadishu following the arrival of the UPDF's fourth battalion.
Uganda intended to deploy this battalion to Somalia in November,
but the deployment was delayed by the September 17 suicide attack
on AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu. In addition to troop
contributions, Uganda has trained approximately 600 TFG troops. A
second cohort of 661 trainees and some 30 officers will finish in
March 2010 . Uganda has also agreed to host European Union funded
training for another 2,000 TFG troops set to begin in May 2010.
According to Ugandan police, 40 TFG police officers have attended
Uganda's police training academy and the Ugandan Police are
prepared to train as many as 3,500 more TFG police officers in
2010.
--------------
...But Not Forever
--------------
4. (C) Ugandan officials also stress that the status quo in
Somalia is not sustainable, and that Uganda will contemplate
withdrawing from Mogadishu if there is no progress over the next
year. They have indicated that Uganda is looking for a longer term
policy and additional international support that will allow AMISOM
and the TFG to defeat Al Shabaab. While highlighting the weakness
and unpopularity of Al Shabaab, these officials express growing
doubts that the TFG has the capacity to capitalize on either the
AMISOM presence or any gains it could make. They caution that
Uganda is unwilling to remain in Mogadishu indefinitely, unless the
TFG develops traction as a government, can win popular support, and
stand on its own two feet.
--------------
Sudan and Domestic Politics
--------------
5. (C) Two other variables that could precipitate a Ugandan
withdrawal from Somalia are Sudan and Uganda's February 2011
KAMPALA 00000001 002 OF 002
general elections. Although Uganda regards an unstable Somalia as
a serious security threat for East Africa, Uganda's more immediate
concerns focus on the Sudan. Ugandan military leaders have told
DATT that war between northern and southern Sudan would likely
force Uganda to divert resources from Somalia to assist the
Government of Southern Sudan with logistical support. With the
recent peace in northern Uganda after 23 years of the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency, the GOU will be inclined to
increase troops in the region if it looks like a war in southern
Sudan could destabilize the area and spark more domestic unrest
there
6. (C) On the domestic front, Uganda's opposition political parties
believe President Museveni is using AMISOM as a hedge to soften
U.S. criticism of Uganda's democratic backsliding. The leading
opposition contender, Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) President
Kizza Besigye, told PolOffs on December 15 that the AMISOM
deployment is exacerbating an internal Somali political crisis, and
questioned Uganda's motives for sending forces to Mogadishu. A
December 9 editorial by a Kenya-based Ugandan journalist critical
of Museveni praised the UPDF's good conduct and selfless service in
Somalia, but said many see Uganda's peacekeeping mission as "part
of a scheme" by Museveni to placate Western donors. As the
presidential campaign proceeds, it will be difficult for Museveni
to address these criticisms barring tangible progress in Somalia
or the addition of other African troops to ease the burden on
Uganda.
7. (C) Internal election-related security, however, is perhaps the
highest priority for President Museveni. Uganda maintains one of
the largest militaries in Africa, with approximately 40,000
soldiers. Museveni uses the UPDF to augment severely
under-resourced police forces during moments of instability, such
as the deadly September 10-12 riots in Kampala. A highly
contentious and competitive 2011 presidential election campaign
will likely trigger a sustained security presence throughout
Uganda, possibly requiring the withdrawal of troops from the
UPDF's deployment against the LRA in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Central African Republic, or from AMISOM, or both.
--------------
Comment
--------------
8. (C) The international community is focused on the end of the
TFG's mandate in August 2011. Uganda, however, is focused on Sudan
and Uganda's February 2011 elections. While President Museveni and
other senior Ugandan leaders remain committed to AMISOM and
Somalia, this commitment is not open-ended. If 2010 does not bring
clear signs of progress in Somalia or additional support for AMISOM
from other African nations, Uganda's willingness to remain AMISOM's
lead participant could end before the expiration of the TFG's
mandate.
LANIER