OPERATION MOSHTARAK MOVING TO GOVERNANCE PHASE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000695

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2020
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KCOR KCRM MOPS PREL PINS UK CAN AF
SUBJECT: OPERATION MOSHTARAK MOVING TO GOVERNANCE PHASE

REF: A. REF: (A) 09 KABUL 4187

B. (B) KABUL 115

C. (C) KABUL 466

D. (D) KABUL 543

E. (E) KABUL 554

F. (F) KABUL 567

G. (G) KABUL 582

H. (H) KABUL 590

I. (I) KABUL 601

J. (J) KABUL 589

K. (K) KABUL 672

Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d
).


1. (C//Rel NATO, ISAF) Summary: Afghan and Coalition Forces
carrying out Operation Moshtarak ("Together" in Dari) in
Helmand Province are facing stiff challenges, but are on
track to bring the "clearance" phase to closure. The
Operation's success, however, will be measured in the coming
"hold" phase when the Afghan Government, through its
provincial and district leaders and key ministries, works
with local shuras to quickly establish basic government
services and introduce an effective security apparatus.
Politically, preventing malign actors like former provincial
Chief of Police Abdul Rahman Jan from establishing control of
the ANP in Nad Ali and carving out a political role for
himself in the district, will be essential to setting the
district on course to manage its own security. The District
Delivery Program (DDP) for Nad Ali is planned for roll-out
the week of February 21, but securing competent line ministry
officials to deploy there and in other key Helmand districts
will remain a major challenge. In a meeting with Ambassador
Eikenberry and UK Charge d'Affaires Cowper-Cowles, SCR-South
Ruggiero and RC-South Commander MG Carter (UK) both
encouraged keeping the DDP basic service packages simple and
sustainable. Planning for Phase III of the operation in
Kandahar is underway, with the Helmand operations already
stirring political jockeying by various Kandahar
powerbrokers. An early security briefing, yet to be
scheduled, for President Karzai on the Kandahar operation
will help develop his ownership of this politically sensitive
operation. End Summary.

Operation Moshtarak
--------------


2. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Ambassador Eikenberry, UK Charge
Sherard Cowper-Cowles, and USFOR-A MG Timothy McHale met with
RC-South Commander Major General Nick Carter (UK) and U.S.
Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) Frank Ruggiero at
RC-South headquarters at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) on February
21, to discuss the on-going Operation Moshtarak ("Together"
in Dari) in Helmand and plans for subsequent phases of the
operation in Kandahar. The Operation at this stage is
largely in Marjah, is "a war among people and therefore takes
time," Carter said. Carter emphasized the lead role of the
Afghan National Army (ANA) in the fighting, which
demonstrates its growing competence. The ISAF-Afghan
Coalition Forces are being very cautious, and since the large
civilian casualty incident on day two of the operation, there
had been almost no civilian casualties, he said. He credited
the "shaping" and "holding" phases of the "shape, clear,
hold, build and transfer" strategy as the most important.
For example, he said that the Coalition Forces had been able
to "steal" parts of Nad Ali before the operation began as a
result of the engagement by Nad Ali District Governor
Habibullah with local shuras and elders.


3. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) In those areas that have been cleared,
the population is beginning to believe there will be change,
Carter reported. Some Afghan National Civil Order Police
(ANCOP) are deploying into the cleared areas and some cash
for work projects have begun. Still, it will take two-three
months of stability for local populations to begin to trust
that these changes are real. We should expect, too, that the
Taliban will attempt to return to the area and test the
Afghan Government (GIRoA). The main fighters are now
contained to two areas, with one expected to be secured soon
by an ANA battalion, and the other to take more time. He
noted that the remaining forces include foreign fighters who
are very professional and their sophisticated bunker network
will take time to clear and secure.


4. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Even after the clearing operations are
completed, a key measure of success will be freedom of
movement between the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah and
the district. The Strykers have been deployed to support the
mission, and line of sight checkpoints by the ANP are

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anticipated for some time to ensure ease of travel. Still,
freedom of movement is not yet achieved on key routes, and
will require adequate forces, likely from Marines currently
in Northern Helmand. Carter emphasized that within six
months, there will be significant requirements for Coalition
Forces in Helmand and he does not foresee any significant
withdrawals of Coalition Forces in the near-term. Ruggiero
noted possible Iranian interest in the future Marine
deployments into Nimroz Province, closer to the Iranian
border than other U.S. bases, and away from population
centers in the South. Ambassador Eikenberry said that even
with the current limited presence of the Marines in Nimroz,
ensuring transparency with the Iranians through appropriate
channels to allay Iranian suspicions and paranoia will be
useful.

District Stabilization
--------------


5. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) The Nad Ali stabilization plan is
expected to be launched on February 24 by Governor Mangal and
IDLG Director General Jelani Popal. SCR Ruggiero said that
planning includes deployment of District Governor Habibullah
to Nad Ali. Within the month, he should have six to twelve
officials to support the basic services package. Recruitment
is on-going, although the Ambassador noted that the Director
of the Civil Service Institute told him during a recent
meeting that they are having difficulties getting the numbers
as the entire approach to hiring civil servants to support
on-going operations is novel. The first 80 new recruits by
the IDLG are being trained, he said.


6. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) The District Delivery Program (DDP)
is a key element of the district stabilization effort. SCR
Ruggiero said only about 10 districts really matter in the
South and that they would provide an "85 percent solution."
He and MG Carter agreed that DDP and other stabilization
efforts need to be focused on ensuring that Nad Ali/Marjah
and other districts have the following basic leadership and
services: 1) a competent district governor; 2) a competent
and untainted leader of the shura; 3) a representative shura
that is not dominated by nor limited to one or two tribes or
local areas; 4) a good police chief; 5) a fully manned ANP
tashkil; 6) assignment of four-five key administrative
positions; and 7) flexible fund disbursement and hiring
authorities for the district governor. They agreed with the
Ambassador that there is a risk of creating an unsustainable
"gold-plated" DDP and said they would keep an eye on
"over-investing" in the districts.


7. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) Addressing the physical structures
in Marjah will also be important. Despite early information
that the structures in Marjah would be in decent shape, the
place is "wasted" said Carter. As a first step, they will
need to build the incoming Deputy District Governor and his
team an office, he said.

Human Capacity Will Slow the Momentum into Central Helmand
-------------- --------------


8. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) MG Carter downplayed talk by some of
using the momentum from the Marjah operations to expand
governance and development quickly to the rest of the Central
Helmand Valley. The greatest challenge, he and SCR Ruggiero
said, is that government capacity is finite. While Governor
Mangal is an excellent partner, his team is not large. He
has a capable Deputy Governor in Satar, a strategic
communications official described as a great "spin doctor,"
an "enforcer" in Shamzai, and a capable NDS chief (with whom
Mangal has tense relations). Below that, they said, the
provincial team is weak and dependent on support from the
PRT. This relatively thin provincial leadership in
combination with the limited district officials and services
will impede rapid momentum to the other districts of Central
Helmand, they said.

Dealing with the "ARJ" Factor
--------------


9. (C//Rel NATO, ISAF) Carter and Ruggiero both emphasized
that ensuring strong leadership of the ANP is the most
important factor in ensuring the long-term stability of Nad
Ali/Marjah. "Getting the police right is essential to
getting out," Carter said. Of greatest concern are perceived
efforts by Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ),the former Helmand
provincial police chief, to install one of his people as
police chief and effectively control the ANP in the district.
(Note: Nad Ali district native ARJ was removed from his
position in 2006 after pressure from the UK as a result of

KABUL 00000695 003 OF 004


his corrupt practices and incompetence. As police chief, he
also used his position to promote loyal acolytes from within
his Noorzai tribe, many of whom remain in place today. End
Note.)


10. (C//Rel NATO, ISAF) ARJ is chairing a local 34-man
informal shura that is not representative of the interests of
Marjah locals, Carter said. The ARJ-led shura has been
stymied to date in its efforts to vet the ANA and Coalition
rules of engagement through the shura and to select the ANCOP
Commander, but ARJ's leadership of the shura has locals
terrified that he will be part of final political solution,
Carter said. Carter and Ruggiero requested assistance in
engaging with President Karzai and other key players in Kabul
to prevent a scenario that places the powerbrokers in control
of the ANP and other positions of leadership. Ambassador
Eikenberry agreed on the importance of preventing ARJ and
former Helmand Governor and current Senator Sher Mohammad
Akhunzada (SMA) from being empowered by the clearing
operations, because they are in part the reason we are in the
fight we are today and would undermine rather than advance
any long-term political solution in Nad Ali/Marjah.
Cowper-Cowles agreed on the need to have alternatives to SMA
and ARJ, but also said that any approach that completely
sidelines the Noorzai would be unworkable given their links
to Karzai.

A Strategy for Sidelining the Power Brokers
--------------


11. (C//Rel NATO, ISAF) Carter and Ruggiero outlined their
plan to develop a political engagement strategy for dealing
with powerbrokers. Similar to their recent efforts with Col.
Razziq in Spin Boldak (Ref J),they will develop "redlines"
relating to NATO/ISAF and U.S. interests vis-a-vis these
powerbrokers, articulate these requirements to these key
powerbrokers, and apply consequences if these lines are
crossed. Additionally, by laying out these requirements,
intelligence collectors will have a focus; Kabul-based
embassies will have better clarity on these actors when
engaging with senior GIRoA officials; and these guidelines
will provide officers with something tangible to push at the
tactical level. Ambassador Eikenberry expressed concern
about the impact of our expanded presence in inadvertently
supporting powerbrokers. As transactional relationships
build up to provide life support to our personnel, the
beneficiaries are often the powerbrokers. For example,
USFOR-A, the U.S. Embassy, and Allies often cannot easily
identify which Afghan leaders are actually benefiting from
our huge amounts of spending in the country, although serious
efforts are underway to gain clarity.

Preparing for Phase III of Operation Moshtarak: Kandahar
-------------- --------------


12. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) Preparations for future operations in
Kandahar are underway, but Ruggiero and Carter said they
expect this phase to be much trickier on the political level.
Kandahar is "everything" to Karzai and his allies, and his
buy-in will be critical. On the political level, Ruggiero
noted that "Governor Weesa is not Mangal," and it will be
more difficult to find a political partner like Mangal in
Kandahar given the role of Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK) and other
powerbrokers in the province. Carter said he expects a
security delegation led by Governor Weesa to travel to Kabul
soon to brief Karzai in a general way on the objectives of
the operation in order to get him to take more ownership.
Kandahar PRT Deputy Director Bill Harris noted that the
Helmand operations are stirring up debate in Kandahar, and
contrary to expectations that the Taliban will "contest their
hometown," there is a growing sense that many Kandaharis want
to work out a political solution.


13. (S//Rel NATO, ISAF) In a subsequent meeting with Task
Force Kandahar and the Representative of Canada in Kandahar
(RoCK) Ben Rowswell, MG Carter and SCR Ruggiero highlighted
the ANA's development, noting that all but one Kandak is
Level One and that AWOL rate is 17 percent, which is
considerably lower than many other provinces. The ANP "fill
level" is about 60 to 70 percent and its provincial
leadership is strong. Still, the role of AWK is insidious;
he stymied a recent effort to remove the corrupt Panjwa'i
district police chief, suggesting that he has alternate lines
of control over the ANP. On the governance side, SCR
Ruggiero noted that the DDP and other district stabilization
initiatives will swing quickly from Nad Ali to Kandahar City.
Harris added that districts in Kandahar are much more
permissive than Helmand and could receive basic service
delivery today, e.g. under DDP, perhaps obviating the need

KABUL 00000695 004 OF 004


for fighting altogether.


14. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) Ruggiero, Carter, and Harris
emphasized the need to support power generation to Kandahar
City. Ambassador Eikenberry pressed them to be realistic
about how they invest development resources, and told them
focus on finishing Kajaki and hooking it up to Kandahar
rather than seeking interim investments in fuel purchases and
large generator farms. Additional major investments are not
presently on the table, he said. To invest USD 200 million
to provide electricity on a temporary basis to a Kandahar
City under the grip of a quasi-crime syndicate is not
prudent, nor a good use of limited development dollars,
Ambassador Eikenberry said.

Structural Changes
--------------


15. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) To support the large-scale
operations in Helmand and Kandahar, ISAF is expected to
create a new Regional Command-Southwest, which will be led by
the two-star Marine Commander and cover Helmand and Nimroz
Provinces. Current planning is to stand this command up by
August 1. To complement this structure, Ambassador
Eikenberry told Ruggiero to continue his efforts to work with
USFOR-A to requisition a "civilian platform" and appropriate
staff to support the effort. To address UK concerns about
competing senior civilians in Helmand Province, the
Ambassador directed that the platform establish an office for
the UK PRT Director, who could travel regularly to the
platform. If the UK has the desire and capability to support
the Platform, our Senior Civilian Representative would be
prepared to serve as the UK PRT Director's deputy for
purposes of over-all civilian coordination in Helmand.


16. (SBU//Rel NATO, ISAF) In Kandahar, Kandahar PRT (KPRT)
currently reports to Task Force Kandahar, which has limited
the focus of the KPRT. To fix this problem, Canada's field
representation is prepared to have KPRT report to the SCR and
the RC-South Commander, Rowswell said. Per Ref K, Canadian
Ambassador Crosbie made a similar commitment to Ambassador
Eikenberry the previous day. Similar to the structures in
Helmand, KPRT would thereby support both Task Forces in
Kandahar ) TFK and Task Force Stryker. Rowswell said the
priority of KPRT will be to support Phase III of Operation
Moshtarak.

Comment
--------------


17. (C//Rel NATO, ISAF) Operation Moshtarak in Nad Ali/Marjah
is the first step in a longer campaign to expand security and
governance across the South. Getting the governance and
security elements right will be an important indicator of
whether the GIRoA is truly on a new path to establishing a
competent, albeit basic, presence in the wake of our military
operations or whether this is yet another clearing operation
that fails to bring real change in governance and support for
the local Afghans behind it. Our efforts to help sideline
malign actors, prevent the ANP from being co-opted by local
powerbrokers as we develop its capabilities, and support the
provision of basic but appreciable government services will
be essential elements of a successful strategy. However, our
success will ultimately depend on President Karzai's having a
similar vision, and he will be under considerable pressure to
support malign actors like SMA, ARJ, AWK, and others in
Helmand and Kandahar whose interests lie in maintaining
parallel governance structures and biased tribal ties in lieu
of a more representative GIRoA presence.
RICCIARDONE