INDONESIAN RESPONSE TO TEHRAN RESEARCH REACTOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000251

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, ISN/RA NEPHEW
NSC FOR D WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020
TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PARM IR ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN RESPONSE TO TEHRAN RESEARCH REACTOR
DEMARCHE

REF: STATE 15979

Classified By: A/Polcouns Darcy Fyock Zotter


1. (SBU) At a February 23 meeting with Rolliansyah (Roy)
Soemirat of the Foreign Ministry's Directorate of
International Security and Disarmament, Poloff delivered
reftel demarche regarding U.S. policy toward the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR).


2. (C) Soemirat said the issue was one of interest to FM
Natalagewa and that he would pass on the contents of the
demarche and non-papers to "higher authorities." Soemirat
said the basic position of the GOI regarding recognition of
Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear technologies remained
unchanged. However, Indonesian support for Iran's nuclear
program was not unconditional. Iran had clearly been sending
mixed signals. The GOI's preliminary assessment was that
this was a strategy to gain leverage -- in other words, that
Iran expected the dialogue with the IAEA to continue for some
time. For its part, Indonesia was awaiting Iranian response
to its request for clarification on Iran's reaction to the
latest IAEA DG's report and, via Indonesian delegations in
New York and Vienna, what Iran's true red-lines were. One
problem was that the GOI was unsure whether their Iranian
counterparts in New York and Vienna were able to speak
authoritatively.


3. (SBU) Soemirat said the GOI felt that if the IAEA were
able to address Iranian concerns regarding France as the site
of fuel fabrication and the potential third-country location
of the nuclear materials "escrow," the Iranians would lose
those issues as bargaining chips and would have virtually
"nowhere to hide."


4. (C) According to Soemirat, in a recent conversation with
UK Foreign Secretary Miliband, FM Natalegawa had said
Indonesia would do what it could to make sure Iran did not
miss the current opportunity for an agreement with the IAEA,
but that sanctions at this stage would fuel conflict and aid
hardliners within the Iranian government. Soemirat said the
GOI was working to lead the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) toward
a more balanced position on the issue (rather than simply
protecting Iran) and wanted to accommodate concerns from
outside the NAM. Soemirat pointed out that this was
reflected in Natalegawa's comments to the press on the
sidelines of an Iran National Day reception. As reported in
the February 13 Jakarta Post, Natalegawa said, "Commitment to
nuclear non-proliferation and the right to obtain nuclear
power for peaceful purposes go hand in hand. You cannot take
one and exclude the other. They are integrated
responsibilities and rights, not one at the expense of
another."
HUME