CPR ASSERTS ITS ROLE IN ASEAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000216

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/RSP AND H
H PASS TO JANNUZI AND LUSE
NSC PASS TO DWALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR AMGT ASEAN XC ID
SUBJECT: CPR ASSERTS ITS ROLE IN ASEAN

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Classified By: Political/Economic Counselor Peter Haas for reasons 1.4(
b&d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The newly-installed ASEAN Committee of
Permanent Representatives (CPR) in Jakarta is working to
define a policy and programmatic role that satisfies
member-states' capitals desire for oversight of the ASEAN
Secretariat (ASEC) while increasing ASEAN efficiency by
concentrating more decision-making authority in Jakarta. The
CPR's goal of rationalizing ASEC operations, as explained to
the U.S. Resident Representative for ASEAN Affairs (poloff),
will be critical for ASEC to cope with a mounting workload
and resolve a chronic lack of capacity. Some ASEC officials,
meanwhile, perceive the CPR as an added bureaucratic layer
that lacks authority and which will further slow
decision-making in ASEAN. How the three-way battle for
authority among the CPR, ASEC and ASEAN capitals resolves
itself will affect not just the efficiency and efficacy of
U.S. engagement with ASEAN, but also the degree to which
ASEAN can succeed in pursuing its stated objective of
preeminence in Asia's emerging regional architecture. Both
the CPR and ASEC have welcomed increased U.S. attention to
ASEAN, and both are seeking to leverage it to enhance their
own roles in ASEAN decision making. End summary.

BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (U) Article 12 of the Charter of the Association for
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),which came into force in
December, 2008, calls for each of ASEAN's 10 member-states to
appoint an Ambassador-level Permanent Representative (PR) to
be based in Jakarta, collectively called the CPR. As defined
in the Charter, the CPR's role includes supporting ASEC work,
coordinating between ASEC and the "National Secretariats"
based in each ASEAN capital, and facilitating ASEAN
cooperation with external dialogue partners such as the
United States.


3. (C) Some ASEAN countries are further along in breaking out
the PR position than others. The Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam have each assigned PRs to ASEAN with
their own staffs and separate office spaces. Smaller ASEAN
member-states such as Burma, Cambodia, and Laos are still
represented at ASEAN by their bilateral Ambassadors to
Indonesia. Indonesia, ASEAN's most populous state and home
to ASEC, has recalled its Ambassador to Cambodia, Mr. Ngurah
Swajaya, to fill its PR slot. He will start in April, and
Indonesian Foreign Ministry (KEMLU) contacts say that they
are busy looking for premises for Indonesia's Permanent
Mission.

NOT THE EU
--------------


4. (C) The ASEAN PRs with whom poloff spoke were quick to
emphasize the incremental nature of the CPR effort to
concentrate ASEAN decision-making authority in Jakarta.
Singaporean PR Ambassador TK Lim said that policy is not part
of the CPR mandate, and will still be driven by ASEAN
capitals at the Senior Officials (SOM) and Senior Economic
Officials (SEOM) levels. Thai PR Ambassador Manasvi
Sirsodapol explained that since the SOM and SEOM mechanisms
predated the CPR, they still constitute the critical
reporting layer between ASEAN and line agencies back in ASEAN
capitals. PR Manasvi hoped, however, that ASEAN-related
communication would start to be routed through the CPR.
"Otherwise the CPR will never assume full authority," he
said. Vietnamese PR Ambassador Vu Dang Dzung predicted that

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in the future the CPR would play a "critical" role in ASEAN
decision-making, but that the PRs were proceeding
"step-by-step" and learning from the EU example.


5. (C) Longtime ASEC official Dhannan Sunoto assessed that
the CPR would not evolve to acquire an EU-style mandate. He
expressed skepticism about the CPR role, asserting that it
simply added a new layer of bureaucracy to the existing
Foreign Minister-, SOM-, and Director General-level
mechanisms. He also expressed doubt that the PRs were the
"right" ambassadors, noting their relatively junior levels
and administrative backgrounds. (Comment: Singapore's PR Lim
is former Ambassador to Vietnam; Vietnam's Vu was Deputy
Chief of Mission in Washington; Thailand's PR Manasvi is a
multilateral affairs expert with experience working at the UN
in New York and Geneva, and was recently DDG of the Thai
Foreign Ministry's ASEAN Affairs Division; the Philippines'
Orly Mercado, with whom we have not yet met, is a former
Defense Secretary. End comment.)

OVERSIGHT AND OVERHAUL?
--------------


6. (C) Both the PRs and ASEC staff noted that ASEC's current
structure is not equipped to deal with the demands currently
being placed upon it. ASEC's Dhannan noted that ASEAN now
convenes approximately 800 meetings per year around the
region. Vietnam's PR Vu noted that there were plenty of
ASEAN programs in place, but that implementation was lacking,
leading to Vietnam's tagline for its current ASEAN
Chairmanship - "from Vision to Action".


7. (C) ASEC reorganized itself around the three traditional
pillars, or "communities" -- the ASEAN Economic Community
(AEC),ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC),and
ASEAN Sociocultural Community (ASSC) -- and added a fourth
pillar, the Corporate and Community Affairs Directorate, to
unify messaging across all sectors. Recruiting staff at the
middle levels has been difficult, with many key positions in
the new structure left vacant. Poloff asked Philippines
Deputy PR Tess Daza if current ASEAN member-states'
contributions were sufficient to fund new positions. She
replied that the CPR now conducts a quarterly ASEC budget
review, and the most recent review found that ASEC was only
able to execute 70% of its budget last year, with much of the
surplus left from unfilled positions. Daza assgined blame to
a bottleneck in ASEC's application review and a lack of
qualified candidates, but ASEC staff have complained that
salary offers for mid-level officials are not competitive
enough to attract good candidates.


8. (C) Singaporean ASEAN Mission First Secretary Winston Goh
admitted that the establishment of the CPR was putting more
demands on ASEC, but he said that ASEAN member-states had a
duty to ensure that ASEAN and ASEC are "rules-based"
organizations. He said that the CPR's oversight efforts
aimed to put systems in place to ensure ASEC efficiency and
accountability, including by instituting CPR working groups
such as the "Budget Subcommittee" and "Development
Cooperation Subcommittee" to conduct periodic meetings with
relevant ASEC divisions. This year ASEC would undergo its
first-ever "Tier One External Audit", Goh added. Poloff
asked whether some might perceive these CPR efforts as aiming
to constrict ASEC activity, especially in light of ASEAN
member-states' hesitancy to commit greater funding to ASEAN.
Goh replied that on the contrary the goal was to rationalize
the organization to lay a better foundation for an expanded
role. PR Vu from Vietnam echoed this sentiment, saying that
the CPR was trying to make ASEC both more efficient and more

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effective.


9. (C) The CPR has evinced particular interest in inserting
itself into ASEAN dialogue with its donors and dialogue
partners. Deputy PR Daza of the Philippines, the U.S.' ASEAN
"country coordinator" this year, asserted that the CPR would
assume the Director General-level function in coordinating
with ASEAN dialogue partners, and said that ASEAN workplans
with all dialogue partners now required CPR approval.
(Comment: If ASEC and the CPR no longer needed to consult
ASEAN capitals on workplans with dialogue partners, this
would successfully concentrate an important ASEAN
programmatic component in Jakarta. The Philippines will
convene a DG-level "working group" between the CPR and the
USG in Jakarta on March 17. End comment.)


10. (C) Australian Embassy Political and Economic Minister
Counselor Michael Bliss and AusAID's Jennifer Hoverman
commented to poloff that CPR and ASEC were both trying to
define their authorities, and that ASEC was feeling chastened
by the CPR's placement. According to Hoverman, ASEC was
receiving mixed messages from member-states on whether it was
supposed to engage in policy and analysis or just to be a
facilitating body. She commented that the CPR's increased
level of interest in ASEC's work could prove crippling to an
organization already debilitated by an excessive focus on
process. Moreover, according to Hoverman, some ASEAN
member-states were more supportive of ASEC than others, with
Singapore and Malaysia in the former camp, and the
Philippines being an outspoken critic. The Australians
believed that Indonesia's role would be critical to how the
CPR-ASEC dynamic played out, and were eagerly awaiting the
arrival of Indonesia's PR-designate.

COMMENT: WELCOMING THE U.S.
--------------


11. (C) Both the CPR and ASEC have welcomed our intention to
open a Permanent Mission and send a resident Ambassador to
ASEAN. ASEC's Dhannan opined that U.S. and ASEAN strategic
interests with ASEAN "overlap 85%" and that every ASEAN
member, including Burma, are pleased with what they perceive
as a renewal in U.S. interest in ASEAN. Having an Ambassador
to ASEAN would "give a face" to U.S.-ASEAN cooperation,
according to Dhannan, and would get us away from a
"hit-and-run" relationship managed primarily by consultants
and based on money. Vietnam's PR Vu called the United States
"ASEAN's most important partner" and said he saw increased
U.S. engagement as not just an opportunity for AEAN but also
for Vietnamm as it holds ASEAN's rotting chair this year.


12. (C) Both the CPR and SEC will seek to leverage the
presence of dialogu partners' Jakarta-based representatives
to ASEA to gain the upper hand in the ongoing struggle fo
authority. We have beeen impressed by the apparnt

seriousness of purpose of the ASEAN PRs here, and agree with
their basic assessment that ASEC would benefit from more
organizational guidance. A strengthening of CPR
decision-making authority would dovetail with our own efforts
to push ASEAN-specific work out to the region.


13. (C) Based on comments we have heard from ASEC staff,
morale is flagging as the workload is increasing, and the CPR
is adding to that. The question is to what end: if the CPR
pursues its oversight role without formulating a concomitant
growth plan, including consideration of changing ASEAN's
rigid funding structure, then suspicions will grow that the
CPR has been put in place to stymie ASEC rather than to
foster it. We and other like-minded dialogue partners also

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suspect that increased CPR attention also has something to do
with reservations about the dynamic leadership of ASEAN
Secretary-General, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, who has been an
energetic champion of both ASEC centrality and the "ASEAN
brand".


14. (C) If U.S. policy is to support ASEAN integration and
community-building efforts, then our ASEAN programs and
policies need both to support Dr. Surin's efforts and bolster
CPR authority vis-a-vis the ASEAN capitals. The rapid
nomination and confirmation of a resident U.S. Ambassador to
ASEAN will help. For the time being, we should give the CPR
the benefit of the doubt and utilize it as a key ASEAN
interlocutor and channel. End Comment.


15. (C) This message was sent by the Resident Representative
of the Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs.

HUME