Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ISTANBUL12
2010-01-08 13:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

IRAN/REFUGEES: EBRAHIM SHARIFI'S U.S.

Tags:  PHUM PREF PREL PINS PGOV UNHCR TU IR 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIT #0012/01 0081326
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081326Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9424
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISTANBUL 000012 

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR MURRAY; BERLIN FOR ROSENSTOCK-STILLER; BAKU FOR
MCCRENSKY; BAGHDAD FOR POPAL AND HUBAH; ASHBAGAT FOR
YANGBORN; DUBAI FOR IRPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2030
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL PINS PGOV UNHCR TU IR
SUBJECT: IRAN/REFUGEES: EBRAHIM SHARIFI'S U.S.
RESETTLEMENT

REF: 09 ANKARA 1370

Classified By: DPO Win Dayton; Reason 1.5 (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISTANBUL 000012

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR MURRAY; BERLIN FOR ROSENSTOCK-STILLER; BAKU FOR
MCCRENSKY; BAGHDAD FOR POPAL AND HUBAH; ASHBAGAT FOR
YANGBORN; DUBAI FOR IRPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2030
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL PINS PGOV UNHCR TU IR
SUBJECT: IRAN/REFUGEES: EBRAHIM SHARIFI'S U.S.
RESETTLEMENT

REF: 09 ANKARA 1370

Classified By: DPO Win Dayton; Reason 1.5 (d).


1. (C) Summary: Ebrahim Sharifi, an Iranian opposition
supporter whose testimony to Iran's parliament that security
forces raped him in prison (and subsequent interviews with
international media outlets) made him a target for regime
death threats, and who had been a refugee in Turkey since
September, departed Istanbul for onward resettlement in the
U.S. on January 6. He told us January 5 he would be willing
talk to USG officials about his experiences, and said he
would consider further press interviews if it would keep
public attention on the plight both of detained opposition
members in Iran and on Iranians seeking political asylum in
the west. Sharifi described how an IRGC General, a friend of
his father's, had offered to guarantee his safety in Turkey
if he refrained from discussing his case with reporters or
foreign diplomats, which he declined. After that he received
almost constant threats, though he was never physically
harmed. Sharifi also claimed he was contacted in Turkey by
Los Angeles-based friends of Reza Pahlavi (the deposed Shah
of Iran's son),offering him USD 15,000 to "join their
cause", as well as by Mujahedin-e Khalk members seeking his
endorsement, but he also declined. Regarding political
developments in Iran, Sharifi assessed that the regime was
shocked by the scope of opposition to the election results,
and that the IRGC is firmly in charge of decision-making on
how to handle the opposition. Since these officials
represent "the most extreme five percent" of Iran's
population and are driven by an ideology that allows no room
for compromise, Sharifi predicted further regime repression.
But he also asserted that with each new repressive step the
Green Movement's public support expands. He said the one
western policy option the regime fears most is not sanctions,

but international recognition and legitimization of the Green
Movement.


2. (C) Summary continued: Sharifi was grateful for USG
help, acknowledging that his expedited resettlement would not
have been possible without State Department support. He
seemed pained by the fact that his circumstances allowed him
faster resettlement than most of the remaining Iranian
political refugees still in Turkey, and regretful that he did
not stay behind in Iran out of solidarity with friends in
prison or marching in the streets. After acclimating to life
in the U.S., he plans to devote himself to supporting
democracy activists in Iran, as well as Iranian refugees in
Turkey. End Summary


3. (C) As first reported in reftel, Ebrahim Sharifi is a
young, politically active, reformist-oriented student who
supported an opposition candidate (former Majlis Speaker
Mehdi Karroubi) in Iran's June Presidential elections. Like
hundreds of thousands of his contemporaries he subsequently
marched in protest of what the opposition saw as a massively
fraudulent result. Like thousands of his contemporaries, he
was arrested during one of the demonstrations and jailed.
Like a small number of detainees, Sharifi claims to have been
tortured and raped while in prison because of his political
views. After being released, he agreed to Karroubi's request
that he testify about his mistreatment by prison security
official in front of a Majles investigating committee. The
Majles committee, however, dismissed his claims. He and his
family soon became targets of harassment and threats, so he
decided to escape Iran to Turkey on August 23, with his
parents providing him funds to bribe his way over the border.



4. (C) Sharifi registered with the UNHCR in Turkey on
September 1, and established contact with ConGen Istanbul's
NEA Iran Watcher on September 16 (with help of IRPO Dubai and
a US-based NGO, the "International Campaign for Human Rights
in Iran"). Embassy Ankara met with him on September 17
(reftel),reporting his account of the torture. Sharifi
stayed with friends in Ankara while awaiting refugee
acceptance and resettlement. During his first few weeks in
Ankara, he claims he was frequently followed, and several
times was confronted by unknown people cursing at him in
Farsi.


5. (C) Sharifi claims that around this time, his family
informed him that a friend of his father's, reportedly a
General with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
told his father that what happened to Sharifi in prison was a
mistake and that if Sharifi kept his mouth shut and refrained
from speaking to the press or foreign diplomats about it, he
would not be a target. Sharifi's response was to reach out

to the New York Times, CNN, the UK Guardian, and several
other western media outlets to tell his story. (Comment:
The New York Times wrote about Sharifi on September 24, 2009,
while CNN reported on his experiences on October 2, 2009.)
He told us that his decision to go public with his ordeal in
prison "guaranteed never being able to go back to Iran" and
also, he reasoned, provided him a higher degree of
protection, assuming that the Turkish government would not
allow Iran to harm a registered refugee in Turkey, especially
such a high-profile, politically sensitive one.


6. (C) Given the credible threats against Sharifi, the State
Department, working through PRM's regional refugee
coordinator in Amman, informed the UNHCR office in early
October 2009 that the USG would be willing to consider
Sharifi for acceptance into the US refugee resettlement
program. UNHCR agreed to expedite Sharifi's refugee status
determination, interviewing him on October 9, 2009, with a
follow-up interview on October 26, when they accepted his
refugee status and assigned him conditionally to onward
resettlement to the U.S. UNHCR also agreed to the
Department's request to expedite Sharifi's onward
resettlement processing, bumping him up to the top of the
queue, which resulted in Sharifi getting interviewed by
visiting DHS representatives in Istanbul on October 30. On
November 17, his SAO check was approved and PRM notified
UNHCR formally that the U.S. would accept Sharifi as soon as
possible for onward resettlement.

Constant Fear
--------------


7. (C) Even with active USG attention and help on his case,
Sharifi described weeks of constantly living in fear,
especially around the time of Iranian President Ahmadinejad's
November 8-9, 2009, visit to Turkey. Sharifi claimed that
his email account was hacked, with emails from his account
being sent to his friends and family that he had not written,
and emails from friends that he knew were in jail telling him
that he was going to be killed. In late November, he awoke
to find two men staring in the first floor window of his
living room, and received an email the next day saying that
"now you see what we are capable of doing." Based on those
claims, PRM reps requested that UNHCR work with Turkish
police to ensure his security, including his move to a series
of different hotels in Ankara.

Working with Other refugees but avoiding political work
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Sharifi made contacts with several other Iranians
refugees in Turkey who had faced similar conditions in
prison, such as torture and rape, including Maryam Sabri and
Ebrahim Mehtari, and two photographers for Fars News --
Hossein Salmanzadeh and Javad Moghimi -- who fled Iran after
the regime learned that they had provided news photos and
coverage of the anti-regime demonstrations to Time Magazine
and other western outlets. He says he gave them money to
help pay for food, shelter, and the Turkish Government's
monthly residency fee it charges refugees, as well as
advising them how to interacting with UNHCR (especially with
regard to the December 12 physical attack on Sabri by unknown
assailants in Kayseri) and how to contact the U.S. Embassy in
Ankara and US Consulate General in Istanbul. (Comment: Of
those four refugees, both Sabri and Mehtari have made contact
with Mission Turkey; Ankara CONS advised both on the
importance of registering with UNHCR. We are currently
working with UNHCR to expedite Sabri's case, given the
continued threats being made against her. End comment.)


9. (C) However, except for Sharifi's contacts with the
US-based "International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran",
he declined the requests of several opposition groups to
enlist his support, including from Los Angeles-based friends
of Reza Pahlavi, the son of former Shah of Iran Mohamed Reza
Pahlavi. He claims they offered him USD 15,000 to enlist his
political support, an offer he declined. He also claimed
that representatives of the Mujaheddin-e Khalk (MEK) sent
messages to him that the MEK would welcome his membership,
another offer he declined. He said that while he continues
to support Mehdi Karrubi and the Green Movement, he was
worried that engaging in overt anti-regime political activity
in Turkey could out his refugee status at risk.


A few Bumps
--------------


10. (C) Despite the effective coordination between the USG
and UNHCR resulting in a speedy approval process for his
onward resettlement, Sharifi faced several administrative
bumps in the process. First, a cousin in California who
Sharifi thought would serve as his sponsor declined to do so,
leaving Sharifi to be resettled more arbitrarily to a U.S.
location (in his case, Fort Worth, Texas) without a support
network of friends or relatives. In addition, once his
formal USG acceptance had been reported to UNHCR, they had
anticipated that Turkish authorities would allow his onward
resettlement within two weeks and thus booked Sharifi on a
December 10 flight, assuming that in the intervening time
Turkish authorities would assign him to a "satellite city"
for an obligatory minimum two-week stay there. In this case,
however, Turkish authorities did not assign Sharifi to a
satellite city, Kayseri, until December 14. Once established
in Kayseri, Sharifi claims local police told him they had
lost his file and that he would need to stay in Kayseri for
many months. On December 31, however, UNHCR informed him
that his exit permission had been granted, and that he would
depart from Istanbul to the United States on January 6.


What's Happening In Iran
--------------


11. (C) Asked his view of the near-term future of the
Iranian regime and the opposition Green Movement, Sharifi
assessed that the regime was shocked by the size and scope of
opposition to the election results, and that decision-making
on how to handle the opposition is now firmly in the hands of
IRGC hardliners. These officials represent "the most extreme
five percent" of Iran's population and are driven by an
ideology that allows no room for compromise or compassion
towards perceived enemies. As a result, Sharifi predicted
further regime repression against the Green Movement,
especially as the movement will likely take to streets again
later this month on the 40th day after Grand Ayatollah
Montazeri's death (January 29),in early February to mourn
the protesters killed by security forces on Ashura, and on
February 11 to commemorate Iran's "Victory of the Revolution"
day. Sharifi predicted that security forces will be willing
to kill up to dozens of marchers at a time, and lock up
thousands more. But he also asserted that with each new
repressive step and each increase in violence, the Green
Movement's public support expands commensurate with the
public's shock and anger at the violence against the
demonstrators.


12. (C) Sanctions will not hurt the entrenched IRGC and
regime leadership who control large sectors of the black
market economy, Sharifi assessed. Petrol sanctions, for
example, would probably enrich key IRGC Generals who control
black market smuggling routes, while making the daily lives
of Iranian citizens even more difficult. Sharifi could not
say whether the Iranian public in that case would blame the
regime first, or the west.


13. (C) Sharifi offered that the one western/USG policy
option that the regime fears most is not sanctions, but
international recognition and legitimization of the Green
Movement. If President Obama were to start referring in his
speeches to Karrubi and Mousavi "by name, as men of great
political courage", it would be a shot in the arm to the
Green Movement's rank and file. Even more helpful (though
unrealistic, as Sharifi acknowledged) would be a USG
announcement that Washington has reviewed the results of the
June election and does not accept the results as announced by
the Interior Ministry. An effort to challenge the election
results, and thus delegitimize the regime's ever-weaker
claims to a public mandate -- especially coming from a
globally admired Nobel Peace Prize laureate -- would send
shock waves through the regime establishment, Sharifi argued.
Moreover, since the engagement track has been rejected by
Iran, there is no longer any practical harm to the U.S. to
reject the regime's claims that it represents Iran's people.
"In June a slight majority of the people voted against
Ahmadinejad. Now, after the violence, it is a much bigger
majority and they want much bigger changes. The United
States should be on their side.

Comments
--------------


14. (C) The process of expediting Sharifi's refugee case and
facilitating his speedy onward resettlement to the United
States, though it had some bumps, ultimately worked well.
Sharifi was grateful for USG help, acknowledging that his

expedited departure for the U.S. would not have been possible
without the State Department's cooperation and support. He
seemed pained by the fact that his especially difficult
circumstances allowed him faster resettlement than most of
the remaining hundreds of Iranian political refugees still in
Turkey, but also regretful that he did not stay behind in
Iran out of solidarity with his friends in prison or marching
in the streets.


15. (C) After acclimating to life in the U.S., he said he
will devote himself to supporting democracy activists in
Iran, as well as Iranian refugees in Turkey, hoping his
example can help give them courage not to give up. He also
told us he would be willing talk to USG officials about his
experiences in Iran and Turkey, and said he would consider
further press interviews if such coverage will help keep
public attention on the plight both of detained opposition
members in Iran and on Iranian political refugees seeking
asylum in the west.


16. (C) Meanwhile, we will continue to try to identify and
engage other at-risk, vulnerable, politically significant
refugees in Turkey. As appropriate, with Department
concurrence and within PRM and UNHCR resource constraints, we
will also continue to consult closely with the Department to
consider whether the template successfully used in Sharifi's
might contribute, in the most sensitive cases, to expediting
the onward resettlement. End comment.
WIENER