Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10HONGKONG286
2010-02-18 10:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Hong Kong
Cable title:  

MACAU: HOW MUCH CHANGE FROM CHUI, HOW MUCH

Tags:  PGOV PINR MC CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHK #0286/01 0491007
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181007Z FEB 10
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9651
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 000286 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PGOV PINR MC CH
SUBJECT: MACAU: HOW MUCH CHANGE FROM CHUI, HOW MUCH
INFLUENCE FOR HO?

REF: (A) HONG KONG 277 (B) HONG KONG 268 (C) 09 HONG
KONG 2262

Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut for reasons 1.4(
b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 000286

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: PGOV PINR MC CH
SUBJECT: MACAU: HOW MUCH CHANGE FROM CHUI, HOW MUCH
INFLUENCE FOR HO?

REF: (A) HONG KONG 277 (B) HONG KONG 268 (C) 09 HONG
KONG 2262

Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut for reasons 1.4(
b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Few of our contacts expect new Macau Chief
Executive (CE) Fernando Chui Sai-on to take any significant
policy initiatives, at least for now. They point to his
coming March 16 policy address as offering the conclusive
word one way or another. Our contacts suggested different
roles former CE Edmund Ho Hau-wah might play, with estimates
ranging from his replacing the ailing Ma Man-kei as senior
patriarch to his waiting for Beijing's blessing to depart
overseas. Either way, no one seemed to expect he would
either follow former Hong Kong CE Tung Chee-hwa to a senior
Beijing sinecure or play a visible role in Macau. End
summary.

--------------
Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss?
--------------


2. (C) Our contacts suggested we could expect little
innovation from the new administration of Fernando Chui
Sai-on. University of Macau (UM) scholar Eilo Yu Wing-yat
told us that, should Chui's one hallmark initiative --
"sunshine government," meant to imply greater transparency in
operations -- go through, in the end it would probably come
down to government officials declaring their assets publicly.
(Note: Chui has also discussed -- and taken the first steps
to implement -- a government spokesman system, but it is
unclear how much impact on transparency this move will have
in Macau's tame media environment. End note.) Executive
Council (ExCo) and National People's Congress deputy Lionel
Leong Vai-tac agreed, but added a very clear "yet" to his
judgment, warning it was much too early to gauge where the
Chui administration might go. Our contacts pointed to Chui's
coming March 16 policy address as the best indicator of his
intentions in the near term.


3. (C) As reported ref A, Beijing acquiesced to Chui's
"election" despite whatever concerns it may have had (or
still has) regarding public corruption in Macau. That said,
neither UM's Yu nor Macau Polytechnic Institute's Larry So
Man-sum felt Chui was out of the woods. Yu took President Hu
Jintao's remarks at Chui's inauguration regarding "good
governance" as a signal to Chui on clean government. Only
ExCo's Leong seemed to take as granted Chui would serve a
second five-year term.


4. (C) The other problem Polytechnic's So sees on the horizon
for Chui is a leveling off of Macau's dynamic economic
growth. At such a point, which So argued could occur by
Chui's third year in office, Chui would have all the existing
social concerns (inadequate housing, unequal distribution of
economic benefits -- see ref B) without the influx of cash
previously used to make cash payments to the public to ward
off discontent.

--------------
Going Mobile?
--------------


5. (C) What role former Chief Executive (CE) Edmund Ho
Hau-wah will now play is unclear. Precedent, such as it
exists based on former Hong Kong CE Tung Chee-hwa, would be
for Ho to take up some high-ranking but non-substantive
sinecure in Beijing, like a vice chairmanship of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). However,
none of our contacts seemed to think Ho was headed north.
Speaking to us a year ago, Ho himself said he had no
particular goal in mind, but indicated that he was obligated
to obey whatever instructions came from Beijing. Ho likened
the process to religion -- "you have to have some faith that
they will give me fair treatment."


6. (C) ExCo's Leong saw Ho taking on the role of key bridge
between Macau and Beijing, replacing the ailing Ma Man-kei.
(Note: As reported ref C, three "patriotic" business clans --
the Ma's, the Ho's, and the Chui's -- rose to prominence in
postwar Macau as the key social arbiters and bridge between
Beijing and the Portuguese. End note.) Although Ma does
serve as a CPPCC vice chair, Leong did not specifically say
Ho would take up that official role.


7. (C) UM's Yu thought Ho had hoped to go abroad for an
extended period (although Yu was not certain to where) and
was waiting for Beijing's approval, which Yu thought might
take a few years to be granted. Polytechnic's So had not

heard about Ho wishing to go abroad, but also had no sense Ho
would take on a substantive role in future. Overall, our
contacts expected Ho would advise Chui, but discreetly and
only on particularly important issues.
MARUT