NEXT GENERATION MACAU LEADERSHIP: THE PLAYER, THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 000277

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020
TAGS: PINR PGOV MC CH
SUBJECT: NEXT GENERATION MACAU LEADERSHIP: THE PLAYER, THE
GODFATHER, OR THE SHERIFF?

REF: (A) 09 HONG KONG 2259 (B) 09 HONG KONG 1381 (C)
09 HONG KONG 983

Classified By: Acting Consul General Christopher Marut for reasons 1.4(
b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Few of our counterparts seemed able (or
willing) to tip anyone as a future leader in Macau. In some
respects, argued one democratic politician, even Beijing was
stuck on the issue, since the small-circle election system it
devised gave Macau's establishment a veto effective against
all but a direct order from the capital. Two names have come
up sufficiently regularly to invite our analysis. One is
Executive Council (ExCo) and Research Centre for Sustainable
Development Strategies President Lionel Leong Vai-tac, and
the other is ExCo member and legislator Chan Meng-kam, who is
publicly a leader of the Fujianese community and privately
thought to have major triad connections. Their chances,
however, hinge on two factors: (a) the prospect for
democratic reforms to the Chief Executive (CE) election
process; and (b) whether incumbent CE Fernando Chui Sai-on
lasts two terms. Should Chui fail as CE, he may not get a
second term, and should he fall to corruption, it might
revive the prospects of Prosecutor General Ho Chio-meng, who
at one point was tipped as Chui's competitor in the CE race.
End summary.

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Caught in its Own Trap
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2. (C) As reported refs B and C, the Chief Executive (CE)
"election" that ultimately saw Fernando Chui Sai-on run
unopposed was almost a two-man race. In a popular contest,
the winner would almost undoubtedly have been Prosecutor
General Ho Chio-meng. Ho's undeclared but extremely popular
candidacy was widely seen as a signal from Beijing regarding
corruption in Macau. In the end, the Macau establishment, to
whom Beijing granted the majority of seats on the 300-member
CE Election Committee, appeared to have had the last word,
nominating Chui (a scion of an influential "patrotic"
business clan) with enough votes to preclue another
candidate from even running. (Note: Chui netted 286 of 300
votes; 50 are required for nomination and each elector has
one vote. End ote.)


3. (C) According to University of Macau (M) scholar Eilo Yu
Wing-yat, Chui did have some upportin Beijing, but the key
factor in his win as Chui's taking the initiative in
announcing hi candidacy and lobbying for nominations. Chui
culd not have done so over Beijing's objections, bu the
impression Yu had was that Beijing acquiescd to, rather than
endorsed, Chui's run. Proto-deocratic New Macau Association
(NMA) legislator A Kam-sam concurred, suggesting Beijing's
weightig the Election Committee in favor of Macau's econoic
elite left Beijing to some extent at their mecy. Au joked
that, if Beijing had wanted Ho to wn, they should have
supported a universal suffrae election. Most polls had Ho
trouncing Chui inan open ballot.


4. (C) Ho, 54, was seen by our ontacts as too old to stand
for CE at the end ofa second Chui administration in 2019.
Macau Polytchnic Institute scholar Larry So Man-yum
suggestd Ho might have a chance should Chui fail. In
prticular, should Chui fall to a corruption scandal -- and
So thought there might be something out there that might
eventually come to light -- Ho would be the natural successr.

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The Fair-haired Boy
--------------


5. (C) "Fresh" was a quality ur interlocutors ascribed to
Executive Council (xCo) member Lionel Leong Vai-tac,
although they meant "inexperienced" as much as "youthful."
Widely seen as a protege of former CE Edmund Ho Hau-wah,
businessman Leong, 47, kept his ExCo job under Chui (with
whom he has good relations). Leong also represents Macau in
the National People's Congress, having won the highest number
of votes in the small-circle "election" for deputies. Leong
was educated in Canada (his BA is from the University of
Waterloo) and is now educating his two sons and a daughter in
the UK.


6. (C) Leong himself was engaging in person, speaking fluent
English with the de rigeur interjections of popular
international buzzwords ("glocalisation" seemed a favorite).
Leong expounded that Macau's strategy was to seek greater
openness while drawing ever closer to Beijing. In the
initial sense, openness applied to economic engagement with

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the international community. However, Leong stressed to us
that drawing closer to Beijing also created scope for
development within Macau politics. The more comfortable
Beijing is that it knows what we're about, he said in
essence, the greater scope we have for reform.


7. (C) Even as they acknowledged his connections, however,
our interlocutors seemed to discount Leong's chances of
becoming Chief Executive. Polytechnic's So didn't rule Leong
out, noting his canny networking with new generation
academics on the issues under consideration by the Research
Centre for Sustainable Development Strategies (RCSDS - the
Macau Government's in-house think-tank, analogous to Hong
Kong's Central Policy Unit). However, UM's Yu noted that the
future of RCSDS itself was in doubt. (Note: RCSDS was
founded by former CE Ho, but the Chui administration has thus
far extended its charter by only one year, to conclude
December 19, 2010. End note.) So himself ruled out Leong
should Ho Chio-meng succeed Chui, since Leong is not of Ho's
ilk. The NMA's Au dismissed Leong out of hand as Edmund Ho's
"ma jai" (a none-too-complimentary Cantonese term for
"lackey"),and doubted Leong could win the CE-ship even from
his fellows in the establishment.

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Friend of the Friends?
--------------


8. (C) Popular Fujianese community leader Chan Meng-kam (47)
won the second highest number of votes in the September 2009
Legislative Assembly (LA) elections, behind Federation of
Trade Unions grand dame Kwan Tsui-hang but ahead of NMA
leader Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong. The Fujianese are the largest
"ethnic" minority in largely Cantonese Macau, and Chan is
thus reckoned as fronting for an influential bloc, which
earned him one of only three seats opened in Chui's ExCo.
That said, we have yet to meet anyone who does not believe
Chan is linked to the triads.


9. (C) Oddly, NMA's Au evinced a certain admiration for
Chan's political shrewdness and political "investment." That
Chan runs six ward offices means that he is putting a
considerable amount of his own money beside the modest salary
and allowances given to legislators, Au explained (NMA's
three legislators share a single ward office). If an
ordinary citizen comes in to complain of a leaking roof, Chan
sends someone to fix it -- again, out of his own pocket.


10. (C) Our contacts suspected Chan might have higher
ambitions, but doubted he could be elected CE. Although his
ExCo seat means Chan is now acknowledged as part of the
establishment, NMA's Au said Chan remains an outsider among
Macau's traditional elite. Polytechnic's So agreed,
suggesting neither Beijing nor the Macau elite would want
Chan to win. Indeed, So suggested even the triads are
seeking to keep Chan in check, with some organizations
allegedly having backed legislator Angela Leong On-kei (Mrs.
Stanley Ho number 4) and unsuccessful candidate Lai Cho-wai
in 2009. Au suggested (facetiously) that Chan should become
a democrat, since he could probably win a direct election.
So seemed to think Beijing and the establishment know -- and
fear -- the same thing.
MARUT