Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10HAVANA56
2010-01-26 19:34:00
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:  

HAVANA SECURE VOICE ISSUES

Tags:  ACOA AMGT AMTC ASEC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0056 0261934
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 261934Z JAN 10 ZFF4
FM USINT HAVANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5133
S E C R E T HAVANA 000056 

SIPDIS

IRM FOR DEPUTY CIO WISECARVER
WHA/CCA FOR RICARDO ZUNIGA
WHA/EX FOR TOM CANAHUATE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020
TAGS: ACOA AMGT AMTC ASEC
SUBJECT: HAVANA SECURE VOICE ISSUES

REF: A. 09 SECSTATE 8179

B. SECSTATE 1773

C. HAVANA 14

D. 13 JANUARY 2010 CLASSIFIED EMAIL

E. 20 JANUARY 2010 CLASSIFIED LEE/CONN EMAIL

Classified By: MANAGEMENT OFFICER KARIN B.SULLIVAN FOR
REASONS 1.5 (C) AND (G)
S E C R E T HAVANA 000056

SIPDIS

IRM FOR DEPUTY CIO WISECARVER
WHA/CCA FOR RICARDO ZUNIGA
WHA/EX FOR TOM CANAHUATE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020
TAGS: ACOA AMGT AMTC ASEC
SUBJECT: HAVANA SECURE VOICE ISSUES

REF: A. 09 SECSTATE 8179

B. SECSTATE 1773

C. HAVANA 14

D. 13 JANUARY 2010 CLASSIFIED EMAIL

E. 20 JANUARY 2010 CLASSIFIED LEE/CONN EMAIL

Classified By: MANAGEMENT OFFICER KARIN B.SULLIVAN FOR
REASONS 1.5 (C) AND (G)

1.(S) Summary: Post is experiencing extreme difficulty
establishing secure voice calls following the required rekey
of STEs with the KSV-21 cards. Post has tried a variety of
solutions, including a new configuration for the STE that was
approved by both DS and IRM, but has still been unable to
establish secure voice calls since the new KSV-21 card was
installed. This has left post with no secure voice link to
Washington or other Missions. As post operates in a critical
technical threat environment, this situation is unacceptable
and post needs assistance in resolving the situation
expeditiously. End Summary.

2.(S) The main telephone switch at USINT Havana is a Mitel
SX-2000. Since the installation of the KSV-21 cards, secure
calls cannot be placed via IVG or by obtaining an outside
line through the switch. Secure calls can be placed between
STEs at post which confirms that they are properly
configured. Non-secure calls can be made using the STE, but
when the caller tries to go secure, the call drops off.

3.(S) With concurrence from the local CWIG, DS and IRM,
direct lines for the STEs have been established, which have
allowed the STEs to only intermittently go secure. The
isolators were replaced by known good devices, and new fiber
lines were run and tested. These lines are through the local
carrier. Lines are vulnerable to interruption by a third
party, and on occasion the quality of the lines appears to be
degraded. In addition, PSTN (Public Switched Telephone
Network) VIPers are being configured and shipped to post,
although they have not arrived yet. Use of IP VIPers isn,t
currently an option, as FastNET has yet to be installed. A
FastNET installation team has been identified and scheduled,
and is preparing to submit its visa applications to the Cuban
Interests Section in Washington. Although with an additional
installed component, the Nortel PBX supports the VIPer, post
is awaiting confirmation whether that possibility exists with
the Mitel PBX that is currently installed at post.

4.(S) The Secure Voice Manager is exploring the technical
capabilities of the Red Switch, including whether it is
possible to connect via a tenant agency,s green lines to
WHA/CCA, the office where the majority of secure
communication with post takes place.

5.(S) While post has received excellent support from IRM as
it works to resolve this issue, post is looking for
additional solutions. As post is unsure if the PSTN VIPer
phones will work and it is still unclear if the FastNET team
will receive visas to travel to Cuba, additional ideas on how
to resolve the secure voice connection issue would be greatly
appreciated.

6.(S) Post,s points of contact on this issue are William
Minsek, IMO and David Conn, IPO.
BARCLAY