Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10GENEVA99
2010-02-18 18:02:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:
SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-004, MOBILE ICBM BASE
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #0099/01 0491807 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O R 181802Z FEB 10 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0252 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0165 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0164 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0168 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0164
S E C R E T GENEVA 000099
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-004, MOBILE ICBM BASE
AND BASING AREA SIZE LIMITATIONS AND PROVISION OF BOUNDARY
COORDINATES
REF: STATE 009672 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 002)
10 GENEVA 97 (SFO-GVA-VIII-021)
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
S E C R E T GENEVA 000099
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-004, MOBILE ICBM BASE
AND BASING AREA SIZE LIMITATIONS AND PROVISION OF BOUNDARY
COORDINATES
REF: STATE 009672 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 002)
10 GENEVA 97 (SFO-GVA-VIII-021)
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-066.
--------------
SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED
--------------
2. (S) In Ref A, paragraph 11, Washington instructed the
delegation to secure Russian agreement to four provisions related
to mobile ICBMs and their bases. The Russians have agreed to three
of the four provisions: 48-hour advance notice of the exit of a
solid-fueled missile from its production facility; the right to
decline at the point of entry to conduct an inspection of a mobile
ICBM base if 50 percent of the missiles are not present at a
designated inspection site; and the placement of unique identifiers
(UIDs) on ICBMs, SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers. The final
provision specified in Ref A, paragraph 11, sought to limit the
size of each mobile ICBM base and the individual basing areas
associated with such bases. The Russian delegation has rejected
these limitations while steadfastly arguing these limitations are
unacceptable since there are no equivalent limitations on U.S.
bases for strategic offensive arms. The Russians assert this
restriction is uniquely designed to limit their mobile ICBMs.
3. (S) Delegation now believes that U.S. negotiation objectives
would be best served by dropping our insistence on establishing
limits on the size of either the mobile ICBM base or the basing
areas for mobile ICBMs on such bases, in light of the limited
utility of such limitations (see analysis in paragraph 9, below).
4. (S) Delegation requests a change in the guidance contained in
Ref A, paragraph 11, in order to drop the requirement to seek
Russian agreement to limit the size of the mobile ICBM base, which
includes the very large area in which mobile ICBMs would be located
when deployed to the field (125,000 km2) and on the much smaller
basing areas (5 km2) within these bases where the mobile ICBMs are
normally located inside of individual fixed structures.
5. (U) Background is provided in paragraphs 6-7, analysis is
provided in paragraphs 8-10. Recommendation is in paragraph 11.
Guidance requested is in paragraph 12.
--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------
6. (S) The U.S. delegation has vigorously pursued Russian
agreement to limitations on the size of mobile ICBM bases and the
basing areas of such bases per Ref A instruction. The Russian side
has refused to discuss such area limitations on the grounds that
they will only affect one Party and that they uniquely target
Russia's mobile ICBMs. The Russian side has routinely noted that
the U.S. side would not accept analogous area restrictions on the
deployment areas for its SSBNs at sea.
7. (S) In an attempt to accomplish the same area description in a
different way, the delegation informally discussed with the Russian
delegation, the possibility of replacing the proposed limits on the
size of mobile ICBMs bases and basing areas for mobile ICBMs with a
provision that would provide a series of geographic coordinates to
define the boundary of each mobile ICBM base in the START Follow-on
database (Ref B). The Russian delegation rejected this approach as
simply another means to restrict the Russian mobile ICBM force.
--------------
ANALYSIS
--------------
8. (S) The delegation expects to face continuing deadlock on the
proposed size limitation for mobile ICBM bases and their associated
basing areas; thus, the delegation will be unable to execute the
guidance in paragraph 11 of Ref A.
9. (S) The delegation believes it is unlikely that Russia would
increase the size of the basing area on its mobile ICBM bases or
operate outside the area encompassed by the 125,000 km2 deployment
area stipulated in START, even if there were no area limitations.
The size of the relatively small basing areas is limited under
current Russian practice to maximize security for the single mobile
ICBM regiment (each with 9 mobile ICBMs and their TELs) assigned to
each basing area. The basing areas are normally surrounded by
multiple fences and cleared areas to maintain a secure perimeter;
to increase the size of these areas would require significant
additional investment and security efforts. Regarding the size of
the larger ICBM base itself, which includes the contiguous
deployment area for the deployed mobile ICBMs assigned to the base,
members of the Russian delegation have asserted their deployed
road-mobile ICBM launchers will not deploy in the field at great
distances from the small basing areas because they have a 500 km
maximum operating range. Moreover, they have argued that the
deployed mobile ICBM launchers require a large supporting group of
vehicles and personnel that would be detectable by U.S. national
technical means. U.S. observation of Russian operational practices
has been consistent with these assertions, although some would
attribute these practices to past START restrictions.
10. (S) Given these operational realities, delegation believes at
this point it would be counterproductive to further delay
completion of the treaty in pursuit of size restrictions on the
mobile ICBM base and its basing areas.
--------------
RECOMMENDATION
--------------
11. (S) Delegation recommends dropping the requirement in Ref A,
paragraph 11, to seek Russian agreement on a provision that the
size of mobile ICBM bases will not exceed 125,000 km2 and that the
basing areas for mobile ICBMs will not exceed 5 km2. The
delegation further recommends deleting proposed Treaty Article VI
which contains a variety of limits on mobile ICBMs based on
satisfactory completion of the other three provisions outlined in
Ref A, paragraph 11.
--------------
GUIDANCE REQUESTED
--------------
12. (S) Delegation requests a change in the guidance contained in
Ref A, paragraph 11, by dropping the provision that mobile ICBM
bases not exceed 125,000 km2 in area or that their basing areas not
exceed 5 km2.
13. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-004, MOBILE ICBM BASE
AND BASING AREA SIZE LIMITATIONS AND PROVISION OF BOUNDARY
COORDINATES
REF: STATE 009672 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 002)
10 GENEVA 97 (SFO-GVA-VIII-021)
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-066.
--------------
SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED
--------------
2. (S) In Ref A, paragraph 11, Washington instructed the
delegation to secure Russian agreement to four provisions related
to mobile ICBMs and their bases. The Russians have agreed to three
of the four provisions: 48-hour advance notice of the exit of a
solid-fueled missile from its production facility; the right to
decline at the point of entry to conduct an inspection of a mobile
ICBM base if 50 percent of the missiles are not present at a
designated inspection site; and the placement of unique identifiers
(UIDs) on ICBMs, SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers. The final
provision specified in Ref A, paragraph 11, sought to limit the
size of each mobile ICBM base and the individual basing areas
associated with such bases. The Russian delegation has rejected
these limitations while steadfastly arguing these limitations are
unacceptable since there are no equivalent limitations on U.S.
bases for strategic offensive arms. The Russians assert this
restriction is uniquely designed to limit their mobile ICBMs.
3. (S) Delegation now believes that U.S. negotiation objectives
would be best served by dropping our insistence on establishing
limits on the size of either the mobile ICBM base or the basing
areas for mobile ICBMs on such bases, in light of the limited
utility of such limitations (see analysis in paragraph 9, below).
4. (S) Delegation requests a change in the guidance contained in
Ref A, paragraph 11, in order to drop the requirement to seek
Russian agreement to limit the size of the mobile ICBM base, which
includes the very large area in which mobile ICBMs would be located
when deployed to the field (125,000 km2) and on the much smaller
basing areas (5 km2) within these bases where the mobile ICBMs are
normally located inside of individual fixed structures.
5. (U) Background is provided in paragraphs 6-7, analysis is
provided in paragraphs 8-10. Recommendation is in paragraph 11.
Guidance requested is in paragraph 12.
--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------
6. (S) The U.S. delegation has vigorously pursued Russian
agreement to limitations on the size of mobile ICBM bases and the
basing areas of such bases per Ref A instruction. The Russian side
has refused to discuss such area limitations on the grounds that
they will only affect one Party and that they uniquely target
Russia's mobile ICBMs. The Russian side has routinely noted that
the U.S. side would not accept analogous area restrictions on the
deployment areas for its SSBNs at sea.
7. (S) In an attempt to accomplish the same area description in a
different way, the delegation informally discussed with the Russian
delegation, the possibility of replacing the proposed limits on the
size of mobile ICBMs bases and basing areas for mobile ICBMs with a
provision that would provide a series of geographic coordinates to
define the boundary of each mobile ICBM base in the START Follow-on
database (Ref B). The Russian delegation rejected this approach as
simply another means to restrict the Russian mobile ICBM force.
--------------
ANALYSIS
--------------
8. (S) The delegation expects to face continuing deadlock on the
proposed size limitation for mobile ICBM bases and their associated
basing areas; thus, the delegation will be unable to execute the
guidance in paragraph 11 of Ref A.
9. (S) The delegation believes it is unlikely that Russia would
increase the size of the basing area on its mobile ICBM bases or
operate outside the area encompassed by the 125,000 km2 deployment
area stipulated in START, even if there were no area limitations.
The size of the relatively small basing areas is limited under
current Russian practice to maximize security for the single mobile
ICBM regiment (each with 9 mobile ICBMs and their TELs) assigned to
each basing area. The basing areas are normally surrounded by
multiple fences and cleared areas to maintain a secure perimeter;
to increase the size of these areas would require significant
additional investment and security efforts. Regarding the size of
the larger ICBM base itself, which includes the contiguous
deployment area for the deployed mobile ICBMs assigned to the base,
members of the Russian delegation have asserted their deployed
road-mobile ICBM launchers will not deploy in the field at great
distances from the small basing areas because they have a 500 km
maximum operating range. Moreover, they have argued that the
deployed mobile ICBM launchers require a large supporting group of
vehicles and personnel that would be detectable by U.S. national
technical means. U.S. observation of Russian operational practices
has been consistent with these assertions, although some would
attribute these practices to past START restrictions.
10. (S) Given these operational realities, delegation believes at
this point it would be counterproductive to further delay
completion of the treaty in pursuit of size restrictions on the
mobile ICBM base and its basing areas.
--------------
RECOMMENDATION
--------------
11. (S) Delegation recommends dropping the requirement in Ref A,
paragraph 11, to seek Russian agreement on a provision that the
size of mobile ICBM bases will not exceed 125,000 km2 and that the
basing areas for mobile ICBMs will not exceed 5 km2. The
delegation further recommends deleting proposed Treaty Article VI
which contains a variety of limits on mobile ICBMs based on
satisfactory completion of the other three provisions outlined in
Ref A, paragraph 11.
--------------
GUIDANCE REQUESTED
--------------
12. (S) Delegation requests a change in the guidance contained in
Ref A, paragraph 11, by dropping the provision that mobile ICBM
bases not exceed 125,000 km2 in area or that their basing areas not
exceed 5 km2.
13. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS