SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP

S E C R E T GENEVA 000097

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
MEETING, FEBRUARY 5, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 73 (SFO-GVA-VIII-011); 10 GENEVA 83 (SFO-GVA-VIII-020)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-021.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 5, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) During a meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
Working Group (WG),the U.S. and Russian chairs, joined by
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov, discussed
the specifics of the initial data exchange for the Treaty.
Additionally, the chairs discussed Sections I and II of Part Two of
the Protocol and a U.S. proposal on mobile ICBMs. The Russian side
maintained its position that the Parties would not be obligated to
provide numerical data for items by base during the initial
exchange of data 45 days after treaty signature. On the issue of
mobile ICBMs, the Russian side rejected an informal proposal to
resolve the issue of Russia providing coordinates for the
boundaries of mobile ICBM bases. They asserted that Moscow's
acceptance of unique identifiers (UIDs) was linked to the U.S.
abandoning any and all restrictions focused on mobile ICBMs. End
summary.




4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Russia Will Provide Limited Data in
Initial Data Exchange; Sections I and II; Other Database Issues;
and Russians Reject a Mobile Base Size Limitation Deal.



-------------- --------------

RUSSIA WILL PROVIDE LIMITED DATA IN INITIAL DATA EXCHANGE

-------------- --------------




5. (S) Mr. Trout stated the meeting would first focus on the
question of the initial exchange of data between the Parties. He
noted that the last meeting (Ref A) had revealed significant
differences in understanding between the sides regarding what would
be provided in the initial data exchange. He asked for
confirmation that the Russian position was to exchange from
Sections III through V of the MOU only the aggregate data, which
would not include any data by base. He pointed out that the U.S.
position was to populate all data in these sections with July 2009



MOU data with the exception of warhead, geographic coordinate and
UID data.




6. (S) Gen Orlov responded that the U.S. position at the previous
session had surprised the Russians. He remarked that the sides had
agreed to the database structure well before and that all
Russian-proposed changes had been reflected in the Joint Draft Text
(JDT). Orlov noted that while the U.S. side continually made
reference to requiring the data exchange before submitting the
treaty for ratification, the Russian side had stated during the
last negotiating session in 2009 that Russia saw no need to provide
data for individual bases (in Sections III through V) in the
initial exchange. The U.S. side, he pointed out, had expressed no
objections to this position at the time, which explained the
Russian side's surprise that the sides did not understand each
other. Orlov noted the sides had discussed the possibility of
exchanging only aggregate data for Sections III through V, but
withholding warhead data, which the U.S. side had initially
proposed. What, he queried, was the U.S. position on this?




7. (S) Trout replied that the U.S. position was to require the
exchange of data on individual bases in the initial tranche of
data. This would give the sides a full picture and would help in
preparing the treaty for ratification. The Parties would, under
this model, exchange July 2009 MOU data at signature, and then
provide current data at the entry into force (EIF) exchange. He
noted that the U.S. side had compromised by proposing that only
July 2009 START data be exchanged 45 days after signature, vice the
initial U.S. position that data current as of signature be
exchanged.




8. (S) Orlov countered that if the United States had read
carefully the Russian-proposed chapeau to Paragraph 2 of Section I,
it was clear that Russia had consistently proposed exempting data
for individual bases for the initial exchange. This, he noted, had
been the Russian position from the beginning of the negotiations.




9. (S) Trout responded that, reading the Russian text,
non-deployed systems were not listed as an exclusion. Why then,
would Russian include information on non-deployed systems but not
deployed systems? He explained that the United States had thought
that the Russian-proposed chapeau referred to overall aggregate
data, rather than detailed data.




10. (S) Orlov questioned why the United States needed any data for
Sections III through V beyond the aggregate data. Trout responded
that the United States needed it for ratification. But, by that
logic, Orlov continued, why should the Parties withhold any
information from the database? Why exclude coordinate, UID, and
warhead information? Trout replied that, when the United States
and the Soviet Union had negotiated START the sides exchanged MOU
data months before signature. That initial exchange had not
included coordinates or UIDs, which was considered sensitive
information. Thus, in following this practice, the sides would be


continuing the historical precedent set by the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) and START Treaties. Orlov countered that the
sides should focus on the START Follow-on treaty. He added that he
could not understand the U.S. ratification argument. What, he
pressed, was the logic for excluding UIDs, warheads and
coordinates, but demanding detailed base-by-base data? He reminded
Trout this information would be exchanged in any case after EIF.




11. (S) Trout responded that the Executive Branch would need to
certify to the Senate that the treaty could be verified based on
the information in the database given to the Senate. The United
States would need detailed information in order to provide this
assurance. Orlov pointed out that he could say that ratification
was an internal U.S. affair. Did Trout see Orlov talking about
problems with ratification in the Duma? Regardless, he argued,
there would be sufficient data to be shown to the Senate.




12. (S) Trout asked what, beyond the aggregate data for each base,
the Russians would be prepared to give. Orlov replied that Russia
would give all information found on the left side of the database.
He explained that this meant the Parties would not be obligated to
provide numerical data, UIDs, coordinates, and other such sensitive
data. (Begin comment: The left side of the database lists names
of bases, launcher names, and silo launcher groups. End comment.)





13. (S) General Poznikhir noted the U.S. side had posted some
Russian data on the Department of State website. He proposed that
the sides exchange after signature all the data that had been
listed on the website. Both sides would then have the treaty
aggregate limits; detailed type information; deployed and
non-deployed data on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; and some
information on facilities at which strategic offensive arms would
be located. The Russians saw no need, he continued, to indicate
the number of launchers at a given base, though the name of the
base and the types of strategic offensive arms located at the base
would be given.




14. (S) Trout asked for clarification, stating that he thought
that Orlov had said the sides would exchange individual silo and
SSBN information. Orlov, appearing to correct Poznikhir, said that
Trout was correct--the Parties would exchange individual silo and
SSBN information. He repeated that the Parties would exchange
information on the left side of the database. Trout then went
through each individual base type (silo ICBM, mobile ICBM, SLBM and
heavy bomber) and reviewed what would be exchanged. After this
review, and Orlov's acquiescence to it, Trout said he understood
Orlov's proposition.




15. (S) Antonov interjected to ask whether the U.S. side was
satisfied by the Russian explanation of their position. Were the
sides, he queried, agreed? Gottemoeller responded that her
understanding had been that the Parties would exchange July 2009
START MOU data 45 days after signature. This, she continued, would


simply involve plugging the July 2009 data fully into the
appropriate categories. She said, however, that there might not be
data to fill in every category on the right side of the database.
(Begin comment: The right side of the database contains numerical
data associated with the categories on the left side. End
comment.)




16. (S) Gottemoeller described her understanding of the Russian
position as that the Parties would exchange data on the left side
of the database and, if the other Party wished, it could fill in
the right side of the database for the other Party, using the July
2009 data. Orlov answered that each Party could do so if it
wished. Following EIF, that information could then be confirmed.
Gottemoeller warned that there might be some political risk to
Russia if the United States were to fill in its right side data for
Russia. Orlov countered that, in such an eventuality, the risk
would be borne by the United States, not Russia. Gottemoeller
argued that a baseline of data was important for ratification for
both sides. She suggested that it seemed better for Russia to
participate in the U.S. presentation to the Senate of Russian data.
Orlov responded that Russia would, of course, participate.




17. (S) Gen Poznikhir asked whether it was really important for
the Senate to know such detailed data for individual bases for its
ratification deliberations. Trout answered that the Senate would
wonder why a full exchange of data was conducted before START but
not for the START Follow-on. Trout remarked that this would
suggest that "things aren't as good as we might think." The
Parties should exchange information in today's context, he added.
Poznikhir noted the incongruity to the Russians of exchanging this
data before EIF, and Orlov added that the Russian view was that the
information they proposed to provide should be sufficient for
Senate ratification. He emphasized that this was a new treaty, and
that the previous accord had been negotiated under different
circumstances. He urged the U.S. side not to dwell on
"suspicions." Trout stated that he believed the sides understood
each other's positions now.




18. (S) Trout agreed to the Russian position regarding the initial
data exchange, but at the same time proposed that the sides
exchange the data "informally" in the MOU WG before signature or,
failing that, after signature but before EIF. This way, Trout
contended, the sides could resolve questions in advance. Orlov,
somewhat puzzled, asked if the proposal was to pass data 45 days
after signature or "tomorrow?" Trout replied, "soon." Orlov
pressed whether 45 days would be the rule. Trout replied that was
correct, "formally." So what, Orlov queried, would an informal
exchange be? Trout replied that it would be one conducted within
the WG. Orlov confessed that he did not understand Trout's
"informal" proposal. He said that such a proposal was "not welcome
by the Russian Federation." Trout replied that he viewed this
process as having worked well under START and that it smoothed the
way for the formal exchange. But, he noted, it required two to
exchange the information. Orlov asked Trout not to raise this
proposal again, implying that it would cause difficulties for the
Russian side. He said that while he had not participated in the
development of the START agreement, treaty obligations should be
specified in writing. He stated definitively that he opposed


preliminary exchanges and "45 days would mean 45 days," he said.




19. (S) LT Lobner asked to clarify the agreement the sides had
reached: Section II aggregate data would include numerical data
(with the exception of warhead data),while in Sections III through
V the aggregate numerical data would be provided (again without
warhead data),as would launcher, silo group, and such information
by base, but no numerical data would be provided. Finally, the
technical data in Sections VII through IX would be completely
exchanged. Orlov confirmed this was correct.




20. (S) Gottemoeller commented that this development was
interesting. She said she had been expecting that the sides would
provide all of the July 2009 data arranged according to the new
categories and definitions of the treaty. She stated that the
United States would prepare its own version of the Russian
database. She suggested that Russia might like to reserve the
right to comment on that version, as it would be provided to the
Senate. She commented that the Duma would likely want to know what
the Senate would be looking at, especially in light of the visit to
the United States of Duma member Mikhail Margelov, Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of Russia. She
said she would be happy to discuss the proposal further or it could
be discussed in the MOU WG.




21. (S) Orlov asked for a fuller explanation for how such a
proposal would work technically. Gottemoeller responded that the
sides would populate the database with July 2009 data. Each side
would be responsible for providing the data due 45 days after
signature. Both U.S. and Russian databases would be submitted to
the Senate, and she said that she imagined the same would hold true
for the Duma. In her opinion, it would be better if each side
submitted complete data for their own database. She commented
that, if the U.S. side were to fill out some data for the Russian
database, she could envisage questions arising in the Duma as to
why the United States was filling out Russian data.




22. (S) Orlov responded that he saw parity in the relationship
here. The United States would fill out data for Russia, and the
Russians for the United States. He noted that his colleague had
told him that such an effort would take "15 minutes." He further
remarked that the sides should not abandon the arrangements they
had come to in the treaty on this score. Orlov then posed a
question why the United States was insisting on filling in the base
data. He contended that the Senate could be convinced to ratify
the treaty without such information. Gottemoeller agreed that the
United States would find a way to convince the Senate to ratify the
treaty, but she urged the Russians to think about the matter.
Orlov agreed to do so.




23. (S) Antonov sought to confirm whether the sides had reached a
solution. Would the United States have sufficient data for
presentation to the Senate? Did the United States understand what
the Russian side would provide? Did this bring to close the


necessity of he and Gottemoeller and involving themselves in this
matter? Trout replied in the affirmative. Gottemoeller and
Antonov excused themselves from the meeting.



--------------

SECTIONS I AND II

--------------




24. (S) Turning to Section I of Part Two of the Protocol, Trout
asked whether the sides were agreed on the new proposed Paragraph 3
on site diagrams and coastlines and waters diagrams.




25. (S) Begin text of Paragraph 3 on site diagrams and coastlines
and water diagrams:




3. The Parties shall provide site diagrams of facilities and
coastlines and waters diagrams, as applicable, for each facility
listed in this Part at which inspection activities may be conducted
no later than 45 days after signature of the Treaty, in accordance
with the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.



End text.




26. (S) Orlov confirmed they agreed with the paragraph, but stated
that Russia preferred to raise the prominence of the 45-day
requirement within the paragraph. He also noted the U.S.-proposed
JDT referred to the Inspection Annex, and asked when the language
for site diagrams and coastlines and waters diagrams would be
developed and whether it might be done in the Inspection Protocol
Working Group (IPWG). Trout replied that the MOU WG would be
developing this portion and that it was the portion that had fallen
under Annex J of the MOU in START. Lobner offered to specify in
the text that this reference pointed to a particular part of the
Annex. Orlov objected that the United States was asking the
Russian side to accept something that had not been defined, and
commented that he thought that this work had been assigned to the
IPWG. Trout responded he had agreed to take on the responsibility
after consulting with Dr. Warner, the U.S. Chairman of the IPWG.
Orlov remarked jokingly that he had not agreed to the assignment,
and asked what would be in the Annex. Trout stated he planned on
working on the topic the following week, and that Lobner was
preparing the text for the discussion.




27. (S) Trout agreed to move up the 45-day provision in the new
JDT of Paragraph 3. Orlov said the Russian side would place the
reference to the Inspection Annex in brackets and deliberate on the
issue within their delegation. On advice from the legal staff,
Lobner noted that the U.S. side might break up that reference into


two sentences. Orlov urged the sides to settle on language. Mr.
Dean interjected that the reference merely served as a signpost.
Orlov asked whether it was necessary then, and Dean replied that it
was not legally necessary but practically useful. Orlov then noted
the sides' agreement and suggested discussing the question with Mr.
Lobach of the Russian legal team.




28. (S) Orlov questioned whether the sides had agreed to a version
of Paragraph 2 of Section I. Trout answered that, given the
discussion and agreement just reached, it would need to be
reworked. Orlov agreed, and suggested the United States accept the
Russian-proposed text. Dean explained that Paragraph 2 was the
link to Treaty Article VIII on data releasability. He emphasized
the need to be careful to keep paragraph 2 language specific such
that it protected the release of certain sensitive data. Orlov
agreed.




29. (S) Dean asked whether the reference to "based on" July 2009
MOU data in paragraph 2 of Section I meant the entire July 2009
submission or did Russia plan to conform that data to the treaty's
database. The Russian side responded that they would adjust the
July 2009 data to the treaty categories. Orlov commented that, at
first glance, he liked the U.S. use of the term "based on," but he
would have to think more on the issue and consult with his legal
staff. He stated that subparagraphs (a),(b),and (c) of paragraph
2 were agreed. Only the chapeau of paragraph 2 and subparagraph
(d) of paragraph 2 needed to be discussed further.




30. (S) Moving to Section II, Orlov asked where the third limit on
deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers should be
placed. Trout replied that based on the Russian preference as
stated in the morning's Expanded Ad Hoc meeting (Ref B),the United
States agreed to place the third limit in the first paragraph of
Section II. Orlov agreed. Trout delivered new text addressing
Sections II, III, and IV to reflect the third limit.




31. Begin text:



Part Two - Section II




1. For each Party, the data on aggregate numbers of Strategic
Offensive Arms limited by the treaty are as follows:



Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs,

and Deployed Heavy Bombers


Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on

Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear

Warheads Counted for

Deployed Heavy Bombers



Deployed and Non-Deployed

Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed

and Non-Deployed Launchers of

SLBMs, and Deployed and

Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers

Equipped for Nuclear Armaments




2. For each Party, the data on additional aggregate numbers are as
follows:



Non-Deployed ICBMs and

SLBMs



Test Heavy Bombers



Part Two - Section III



Deployed ICBMs



Warheads on Deployed ICBMs



Deployed and Non-Deployed

Launchers of ICBMs



Deployed Launchers of

ICBMs

Non-Deployed Launchers of

ICBMs


Test Launchers



Non-Deployed ICBMs



Part Two - Section IV



Deployed SLBMs



Warheads on Deployed SLBMs



Deployed and Non-Deployed

Launchers of SLBMs



Deployed Launchers of

SLBMs



Non-Deployed Launchers of

SLBMs



Test Launchers



Non-Deployed SLBMs



End text.




32. (S) Lobner and Pischulov discussed that Article IV language
for the third limit included the words "equipped for nuclear
armaments." It was noted that since the sides had not agreed on
the definition for non-deployed heavy bombers, the text should be
bracketed. Poznikhir remarked that this issue would be handled by
the Definitions WG. Lobner said he would leave that part of the
text bracketed.



--------------


OTHER DATABASE ISSUES

--------------




33. (S) Orlov asked for the U.S. response on Russia's offer
regarding pruning some categories for heavy bomber technical data
in Section VIII. Trout said the United States had not reached a
final position.




34. (S) The sides confirmed their agreement to drop the section on
Heavy Bomber Nuclear Armaments Technical Data, the former Section
IX.




35. (S) Turning to mobiles, Orlov asked whether the United States
had altered its position on a 125,000 square kilometer limit for
deployment areas, and a 5 square kilometer limit for basing areas.
He reasserted that Russia's agreement on UIDs was linked to the
lifting of restrictions on mobiles. Trout asked to discuss this
issue later.



--------------

RUSSIANS REJECT A MOBILES DEAL

--------------




36. (S) In a side conversation among Trout and Orlov and
Poznikhir, Trout raised the possibility of a compromise that would
have Russia provide coordinates for the boundaries of ICBMs bases
for road-mobile ICBMs and have the United States, in exchange, drop
its limits on the size of ICBM bases for road-mobile ICBMs and ICBM
basing areas in Article VI. Trout indicated he was trying to find
a compromise between the Russian delegation's guidance to not
accept the limit of 125,000 square kilometers for the size of ICBM
bases for road-mobile ICBMs and 5 square kilometers for the size of
ICBM basing areas and the U.S. guidance to include those limits in
the treaty. Trout suggested that under his proposal the United
States would trust Russia to declare reasonable boundaries. The
point of having a boundary for an ICBM base for road-mobile ICBMs
is to distinguish those road-mobile launchers that were at the base
from those that were outside the base. Clearly, those outside the
base would require a movement notification within 30 days of
departure from the base, while those within the base would not. By
having boundaries identified, there would be fewer questions raised
between the United States and Russia on the movements of Russia's
road-mobile launchers.




37. (S) Poznikhir said that as an SRF officer, he would provide
their response. He said he thought the logic of Trout's argument
was very good. However, it did not take into account the
limitations of Russia's road-mobile force or its operating


practices. Poznikhir said that Russian road-mobile launchers would
never move more than 500 kilometers on their own because of the
wear on the launcher. In addition, such a movement would require a
large supporting force which would be very obvious to U.S. national
technical means (NTM). He said that Trout knew Russia always moved
their launchers and missiles separately between facilities, and
notification of those movements was provided.




38. (S) Poznikhir continued that if Russia were to provide
boundaries for their road-mobile ICBM bases then, based on parity,
the United States would have to provide boundaries for its SSBN
operating areas. He said he expected the United States would say
the North Atlantic was the operating area for their SSBNs and
Russia would respond that their road-mobile launcher operating area
was all of Russia.




39. (S) Orlov said he appreciated Trout's attempt to find a
compromise but there was no compromise possible. President
Medvedev had said that there would not be any provisions in the
treaty that dealt uniquely with Russia's mobile forces. While
Trout's offer would permit Russia to set the limits of the boundary
of the ICBM base for road-mobile launchers, it would still be a
unique limit on Russia's mobile forces. Orlov said that General
Makarov, during his meeting with Admiral Mullen in Moscow, had only
agreed to using UIDs for all strategic offensive arms with the
understanding that the United States would drop all treaty
provisions that dealt uniquely with mobile forces, and that
included ICBM base boundaries.




40. (S) Documents provided:



- U.S.:



-- U.S. Proposal for Section I, Paragraph 3; and



-- U.S. Proposal for Section II, III, and IV




41. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Trout

A/S Gottemoeller

Mr. Albertson


Mr. Colby (RO)

Mr. Dean

LT Lobner

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA:



Gen Orlov

Amb Antonov

Gen Poznikhir

Mr. Pischulov

Mr. Shevchenko

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




42. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS