Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10GENEVA93
2010-02-18 16:52:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0093/01 0491710
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 181652Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0224
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0139
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0138
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0142
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0138
S E C R E T GENEVA 000093 

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY
15, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

REF: STATE 13111 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 005)
10 GENEVA 63 (SFO-GVA-VIII-006)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000093

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY
15, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

REF: STATE 13111 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 005)
10 GENEVA 63 (SFO-GVA-VIII-006)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-050.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 15, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr.
Siemon and General Poznikhir, the U.S. side discussed initial
written guidance from Washington that identified several
problematic issues. The Russian side claimed the United States was
proposing to change dramatically the decisions agreed in Moscow and
emphasized that its position on the issue of telemetry exchange had
not and would not change. End summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Guidance From Washington; Problematic
Issues; Russia's Position Would Not Change; Encryption and
Exchange; and SCDM Telemetry.



--------------

Guidance From Washington

--------------




5. (S) Mr. Siemon stated the U.S. delegation had received initial
written guidance from Washington (Ref A) that identified several
problematic issues, although it had not yet received a proposal for
Protocol or Annex text. Siemon anticipated receiving text from
Washington before the week was over and hoped to provide a U.S.
proposal by the end of the week. He indicated the U.S. proposal
would be along the lines of the paragraph order of the Russian
proposal, but would not include bracketed Russian-proposed Protocol
text.



--------------

PROBLEMATIC ISSUES

--------------



6. (S) Siemon indicated the problematic issues identified by

Washington involved areas that had been discussed in previous
working group meetings. The main areas of concern related to how
the exchange of telemetric data actually took place. The exchange
process was a subject for these negotiations and should continue to
be a subject for discussion during the annual telemetry reviews.
The United States believed the sides could discuss concerns and
make proposals for changes during annual telemetry reviews; but
until there was agreement by the sides on changes, the existing
telemetry exchange procedures would continue. The United States
also believed launches on which telemetry was exchanged should be
the subject for discussion during the annual reviews.




7. (S) It was the U.S. position that the sides would discuss how
to implement the concept for an exchange on a parity basis. Siemon
believed parity in this process would come into play several times
in the U.S. proposal. The concept for parity in the exchange of
telemetry involved an opportunity for the receiving Party to
indicate those flight tests where it would like to receive
telemetry with a right of refusal provision for the testing Party.
In the U.S. concept the receiving Party would indicate the launches
of the other Party for which it wanted telemetric data exchanged.
The testing Party would then have the right to deny the exchange
for an agreed number of the requested flight tests. In this way
the testing Party would have the ultimate determination on which
flights telemetric data would be exchanged. This right to refuse
exchange on a certain number of launches would permit the testing
Party the capability to protect information it believed sensitive
and allows the testing Party to determine those flight tests where
an exchange would take place.




8. (S) Siemon stated that it would be preferable to discuss the
exchange at the beginning of the year when the flight tests would
take place, but the United States could be flexible and hold these
discussions at the annual review immediately following the year in
question. In addition, the United States believed the exchange of
telemetry should include telemetry on the self-contained dispensing
mechanism (SCDM) and interpretive data on acceleration and
separation times.



--------------

Russia's Position Would Not Change

--------------




9. (S) Siemon noted there were significant differences in the
approaches of the two sides. Once he had the opportunity to review
the language Washington provided he would know how significant the
differences were. Siemon intended to provide the Russian side
language for both a U.S.-proposed Protocol and Annex. He indicated
the U.S. side would be flexible about which formulations would be
included in the Protocol and Annex, also which formulations needed


to be discussed in the annual review and within the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.




10. (S) Poznikhir stated that after listening to these points he
believed the United States wanted to retain START's telemetry
regime; if not in its entirety then the majority of its provisions.
Moreover, he believed the United States wanted to control the
exchange of telemetric information; to tell Russia on which flights
telemetry would be exchanged.




11. (S) Poznikhir reminded the U.S. side that the Russian
Federation had shown flexibility and reflected a compromise toward
the U.S. position. When negotiations began the U.S. side only
wanted a reference made to telemetry in the Articles. Now the
United States wanted telemetry in its entirety. However, Russia
would not allow this to happen. Russia's fundamental position was
that the side that conducted the launch had the exclusive right to
determine those launches where telemetric data would be exchanged.
Given this position, he could not understand how the receiving
Party could have a part in this determination.




12. (S) Siemon clarified the U.S. concept. After a Party
conducted a launch the other Party would indicate that it wanted
the telemetry from the launch. This would happen on no more than
five launches per year. The Party that conducted the launch would
then have the right to deny the request and there would be a quota
for the number of such denials.




13. (S) Poznikhir concluded that the United States proposed to
change the decisions that had been made during the January Admiral
Mullen-General Makarov meetings in Moscow. According to the
arrangements decided in Moscow, the launches for which telemetric
information would be provided would be determined solely by the
conducting Party. So now the Russian side had to report back to
Moscow that the U.S. side had dramatically changed the position
that had been agreed during the Mullen-Makarov meetings.




14. (S) Siemon disagreed. He noted that the sides had agreed to
include three paragraphs in the draft Protocol on the Exchange of
Telemetry. Siemon read the text for the three paragraphs.



Begin text:



From the entry into force of the treaty, the Parties shall exchange
telemetric information, on a parity basis, on no more than five
launches per year of ICBMs and SLBMs.



The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out for an


equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted by both
sides, and in an agreed amount.



On an annual basis, the sides shall review the conditions and
method of further telemetric information exchange on launches of
ICBMs and SLBMs within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission. Additional details on the telemetry exchange are
contained in the Annex on Telemetry Exchange Procedures.



End text.




15. (S) Siemon noted that in the small group discussions held in
Moscow, the Russian side agreed to the three paragraphs and
indicated it intended to table additional language in Geneva on how
the exchange would occur in practice. The sides also discussed ten
elements from a Russian working draft of the Protocol. The U.S.
side had understood that these points would be provided in Geneva
and also understood they could be changed as a result of a Russian
interagency review by the time the sides reconvened in Geneva. The
summary prepared by the U.S. delegation at the conclusion of the
Mullen-Makarov Moscow meetings describing the ten elements of the
initial Russian draft follows:



Begin text:



The Russian side indicated it intends to table additional Telemetry
Protocol language in Geneva, and discussed the following elements
from their current working draft.



- The side conducting the test launch would determine the five
telemetric exchanges on a parity basis.



- Each Party would have the right to raise concerns about the
exchanged telemetric information.



- The exchange would be for an equal number of test launches with
an agreed volume of information. Both the volume and type of
exchanged information would be agreed in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC).



- A schedule of projected yearly test launches would be exchanged
within the first 65 days of each calendar year.



- The sides would meet in the BCC on an annual basis to review the


conditions for the exchange of telemetric information.



- A BCC agreement would be required to modify the telemetric
information exchange agreement.



- The exchange of telemetric information would include all
information broadcast during flight tests and from encapsulated
information. Data denial techniques would be banned. Recording
and broadcasting data on the functioning of the stages and self
contained dispensing mechanism from a reentry vehicle woulQalso be
banned.



- Interpretative data would be provided by the testing Party and
would include the type of ICBM or SLBM, the identification number,
the date of launch, recording frequencies, and modulation methods.



- The Party conducting the test launch would determine the method
for recording telemetric information.



- Each Party would provide the means to acquire playback equipment
to reproduce telemetric information from recorded media.



End text.




16. (S) Poznikhir remarked that Siemon failed to include in the
agreed paragraphs the paragraph that specified the exclusive right
of the Party conducting the launches to determine on which launches
telemetric data would be exchanged. He produced a paper that was
provided to the Russian side on January 23, 2010, after the Moscow
meetings with the text reported above indicating the sides had
agreed to this paragraph and therefore could not agree that the
U.S. side did not understand Russia's position on the exchange of
telemetry.




17. (S) Siemon noted that the ten elements that were shown at the
end of the paper were not agreed points but were a summary of the
points that Russia had described as drafts that might be included
in a draft proposal for exchange in Geneva.




18. (S) Poznikhir stated that the exclusive right paragraph was
the fundamental position of the Russian Federation, the position
had not changed and he had been consistent in presenting this
position to the U.S. side. Siemon believed the difference in
understanding was based on differing perceptions on what had been
agreed to during the Moscow meetings. Poznikhir disagreed and
reiterated that he believed the U.S. side was changing what had


already been decided in Moscow and had been reported to the
respective Presidents. He emphatically stated that the Russian
side would not discuss any changes to its position. The U.S. side
had to either agree to the current Russian proposal or Russia would
be required to change its approach to telemetry.




19. (S) Siemon stated that he believed neither side had been
intentionally deceitful during the Moscow meetings. The sides had
a different belief on what they thought had been agreed and what
they expected to see in the other side's proposal once it arrived
in Geneva. Both sides had redlines. For the Russian side it was
the exclusive right to determine flights for which telemetry would
be exchanged. For the U.S. side, it was the idea that the
receiving Party should also have a part in this determination. The
U.S. side had to justify the telemetry exchange in the ratification
process and if the exchange was one-sided then it could not be
justified as a meaningful exchange. Both sides were required to
compromise during negotiations. The U.S. side had started the
negotiations with positions it did not believe it would change, yet
it did change positions to move toward a compromise. The Russian
side had also made changes to move toward a compromise.




20. (S) Poznikhir stated that the original position of the Russian
side was that there would be no telemetry exchange in the new
treaty and it had moved from this position as a compromise.



--------------

Encryption and Exchange

--------------




21. (S) Mr. Shevchenko indicated he could not understand how
encryption was possible if a situation existed in which the
receiving Party had a part in determining the launches on which to
exchange telemetry. The Russian side had stated that it intended
to encrypt telemetry on every launch other than the five to be
exchanged. This could not be possible if the receiving Party had a
part in the determination. Siemon stated that the sides had not
agreed that all launches other than the five to be exchanged would
be encrypted. What had been agreed was the right of the Party to
encrypt as it so wished. Shevchenko reiterated the Russian
position that there would not be encryption on any of the five
launches on which data would be exchanged; however, the Russian
side planned to encrypt all other launches.




22. (S) Poznikhir noted that what the sides had agreed was that on
the launches on which telemetry would be exchanged the Parties
would not impede getting access to the data; in other words, no
encryption, encapsulation, jamming or use of narrow directional
beaming. Russia would have the right to encrypt all other
launches.


--------------

SCDM TELEMETRY

--------------




23. (S) Referencing the exchange of telemetry from the SCDM,
Poznikhir reminded the U.S. side that even Russian Prime Minister
Putin had expressed his ideas on this exchange. He stated clearly
that the Russian side would not exchange SCDM telemetry. Russia
would not exchange information the U.S side could use to build its
missile defense system when Russia was not building a missile
defense system of its own and therefore could not benefit from the
exchange. Poznikhir noted that the Russian side had proposed an
Agreed Statement that would resolve this issue. The Agreed
Statement included text in which the sides agreed that telemetric
information about ICBM and SLBM launches of the other Party,
received independently or within the framework of a bilateral
exchange, would not be used for purposes related to the
development, increase in capability, or modernization of missile
defense systems. The text of the Russian Agreed Statement proposal
on the use of telemetry for missile defense purposes follows:



Begin text:



Document of the Russian side



February 9, 2010



Agreed Statement

On the Use of Telemetric Information



Considering that the exchange of telemetric information
on missile launches of the Parties is a sensitive transparency
measure, which, under specific circumstances, is capable of
inflicting harm on the national security of a Party, the United
States of America and the Russian Federation agree that telemetric
information about ICBM and SLBM launches of the other Party,
received independently or within the framework of a bilateral
exchange, shall not be used for purposes related to the
development, increase in capability, or modernization of missile
defense systems.



End text.




24. (S) Additionally, President Medvedev offered to provide SCDM


telemetry if the United States would provide telemetry on the
homing guidance system of its ground-base interceptor (GBI)
launches; this would ensure parity. Poznikhir stated that the
Russian side was ready to discuss the exchange of SCDM telemetry if
the United States was willing to agree to exchange GBI telemetry.
Siemon did not believe the concept of exchanging SCDM telemetry for
homing guidance was in the current Russian proposal, to which
Poznikhir stated that the position on not exchanging SCDM telemetry
was the Russian position, the rest of the position was his personal
view. Siemon said he would report this back to Washington and
carefully indicate that this was Poznikhir's personal view and not
the position of the Russian side.




25. (S) Poznikhir asked Siemon to also report back to Washington
the Russian position on the exclusive right of the Party conducting
the launches to determine on which launches telemetric data would
be exchanged, that no SCDM or re-entry vehicle telemetry would be
exchanged and that no stage separation or acceleration data would
be exchanged. He again emphasized the U.S. proposal was not
acceptable to Russia. Shevchenko summarized Poznikhir's position:
Russia's position on telemetry had not changed and was not going to
change.




26. (U) Documents provided: None.




27. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Mr. Dean

Lt Col Goodman

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Ms. Pura

Dr. Ringenberg

Ms. Gross (Int)



RUSSIA



Gen Poznikhir

Ms. Fuzhenkova

Lt Col Lyzsovskiy


Col Kamenskiy

Mr. Shevchenko

Mr. Voloskov

Col Zaistev

Ms. Komshilova (Int)




28. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS