SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) EXPANDED AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING,

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) EXPANDED AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 9, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-028.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 9, 2010

Time: 12:15 P.M. - 1:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) The Ad Hoc Working Group met in expanded format (with
experts) to discuss the U.S. proposal for definitions of deployed
and non-deployed heavy bombers. Dr. Warner laid out the proposed
framework, which elicited a series of preliminary questions from
Admiral Kuznetsov. Following a back and forth between the sides
regarding the application of the framework, the meeting concluded
with the Russian side pledging to deliver a fuller response on the
matter at the next session of the expanded Ad Hoc Group. As the
meeting concluded, Colonel Ilin also expressed interest in
discussing the conversion of ICBM launchers to launchers of
ground-based missile defense interceptors at a future meeting. End
summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Presenting the U.S. Approach on Deployed
and Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers; and Some Russian Skepticism.



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PRESENTING THE U.S. APPROACH ON DEPLOYED

AND NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS

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5. (S) Warner, after remarking that Assistant Secretary
Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov had proposed the meeting be
convened, proposed focusing on criteria for distinguishing between
deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. Warner noted the sides
had discussed the matter previously, but the substance of the
matter had shifted over the past few weeks, based on the agreement
reached in Moscow between Admiral Mullen and General Makarov to
include deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers under the limit of
800 deployed and non-deployed items.




6. (S) Warner continued that, while there were several ways to
deal with the issue, the U.S. side believed it had determined the


"most useful approach." After first emphasizing the U.S. view that
heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments would be excluded
from both the deployed and non-deployed categories, Warner
explained that, under his proposed framework, heavy bombers in a
condition such that they were "readily available for operational
use" would be considered deployed, while those heavy bombers "not
readily available for operational use" would be deemed
non-deployed. Warner elaborated that the non-deployed category
would include three different groupings. He then welcomed comments
from Ilin.




7. (S) Ilin emphasized that the situation had changed since the
agreement in Moscow on an 800 limit on deployed and non-deployed
items. Of principal import, he stated, was understanding how the
United States proposed to count its heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments. Ilin commented that his first impression of the
U.S. proposal regarding "available for operations" was that it had
a "complicating" effect. He pointed out that, if, before, all
heavy bombers were counted against the central limits, the new
framework added a temporal dimension in differentiating between
deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. In light of this, he
particularly looked forward to the U.S. list of types of
non-deployed heavy bombers. He remarked that he admired the
clarity of the previous arrangements for counting heavy bombers:
deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, test heavy
bombers, and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.




8. (S) Warner responded by laying out the three categories of
non-deployed heavy bombers under the U.S. approach. A first
category, Warner explained, would be test heavy bombers. The
agreed limit of no more than 10 would be retained for test heavy
bombers. Warner noted that test heavy bombers are usually based at
flight test centers, which for the United States would be Edwards
Air Force Base (AFB),California, and for Russia would be
Ramenskoye. He pointed out that while test heavy bombers are
generally flight-worthy; they are not in a condition to be readily
used for operational purposes.




9. (S) The second category, Warner continued, would be heavy
bombers in extended maintenance or repair. In the United States,
he detailed, this would involve B-52s at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and
B-2s at the production and repair facility at Palmdale, California.
Heavy bombers falling within this category would, likewise, not be
readily available for operational use. Warner noted that, when the
issue had arisen in the previous session of the Ad Hoc Group,
General Orlov had stated that Russia used an aviation repair
facility at Ryazan for similar purposes.




10. (S) The third and final category, Warner explained, would be
heavy bombers in storage awaiting elimination at a conversion or
elimination (C or E) facility. This category, he noted, would at
present only apply to the United States, specifically to the
B-52Gs, B-52Hs, and B-1Bs awaiting elimination at the C or E
facility at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. Warner pointed out that
Russian inspectors had visited Davis-Monthan AFB many times and
noted that the majority of the heavy bombers there had already


begun to be cannibalized for spare parts, and thus were in
disrepair and not flyable.




11. (S) Warner concluded by stating that this represented a "first
cut" at the problem of identifying the various categories of
non-deployed heavy bombers.



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SOME RUSSIAN SKEPTICISM

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12. (S) Kuznetsov queried whether the inclusion of heavy bombers
awaiting elimination at Davis-Monthan AFB would still be necessary
at the end of the 7-year reduction period, when the 800 limit on
deployed and non-deployed would apply. Would all of the bombers in
that category be eliminated by then or would some still remain?
Warner replied that he believed that most category 3 heavy bombers
would be eliminated during the 7-year period, and that the 800
limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and
deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments would help push that elimination process forward. He
noted that some small number of heavy bombers might remain and some
might be added to the elimination queue from the current
operational force of U.S. heavy bombers.




13. (S) Kuznetsov responded that he thought the three suggested
categories should be specifically included in the treaty. In the
long run, he asked, would there be individual limits for the second
and third categories as there already was for test heavy bombers?
Warner answered that the separate limit on test heavy bombers was
useful and should be retained as agreed. Regarding other possible
limits, Warner argued that additional ceilings were unnecessary
because deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers would collectively
fall under the 800 limit, which would then permit the sides more
freedom to determine composition of their forces under that cap.




14. (S) Kuznetsov asked how inspections of non-deployed heavy
bombers would be handled with respect to the three categories.
Warner replied that under the current arrangements, flight test
centers would not be subject to inspections, though test heavy
bombers would be encountered but not be subject to inspection
should they be visiting an operational base when a Type-1
inspection was held. Heavy bombers would not be subject to
inspection when located at repair or production facilities. C or E
facilities would be subject to Type-2 inspections, with the
specifics for such inspections currently under discussion in the
Inspection Protocol Working Group. Warner noted that Davis-Monthan
AFB had been subject to inspections under START.




15. (S) Kuznetsov asserted that different inspection procedures



would apply to the different categories of non-deployed heavy
bombers. He pointed out that the sides had previously agreed that
a heavy bomber would be considered deployed until it was eliminated
or converted. In that light, he asked how the U.S. proposal would
work with respect to non-operational heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan
AFB.




16. (S) Warner clarified that those agreements had been concluded
in December, before Admiral Mullen and General Makarov had
established the 800 launcher limit. In light of this limit, Warner
argued, the sides need to change some of the previously agreed
provisions. In particular, he reasoned, the agreed statement on
Davis-Monthan AFB might no longer be necessary.




17. (S) Kuznetsov commented that such changes would prove a
daunting task. He then asked why it was useful to include category

3. Warner replied that it simply reflected reality, and that
considerations of utility were not foremost. Further, it would, he
argued, provide an additional incentive to ensure the elimination
of the affected systems.




18. (S) Kuznetsov admitted that he had difficulty envisioning how
this framework would look on paper. Should the basing/attribution
model be employed? While criteria were available for flight test
centers and repair facilities, it was hard to perceive criteria for
conversion and elimination facilities.




19. (S) Mr. Elliott remarked that Kuznetsov had accurately
described the right way to implement the framework. He pointed out
that the definition of a deployed heavy bomber would encompass
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments based at an air base.
In the same fashion, test heavy bombers could be based at flight
test centers and be considered non-deployed. Regarding those heavy
bombers in storage at Davis-Monthan AFB awaiting elimination,
Elliott continued, the large number of aircraft that would not be
flyable would be considered non-deployed and would be considered to
be based at the Davis-Monthan C or E facility. Heavy bombers
visiting Davis-Monthan AFB for conversion from nuclear capable to
conventional only status would remain based at their air bases, be
subject to notification requirements upon movement and return to
their home bases following conversion. Elliott conceded that the
least clear aspect was for the heavy bombers located at repair
facilities. These, he reasoned, would probably need to remain
based at their air bases. A notification could be created to
change their status temporarily to non-deployed. They would then
return to deployed status when they returned to their home air
base. All other contingencies, he stated, would be covered by the
existing system.




20. (S) Ilin offered that the Russian side would consider the U.S.
proposal and return to the discussion at the next expanded Ad Hoc
Group meeting. He further stated the Russian side wanted to speak
about the issue of the conversion of silo launchers for ICBMs to
silo launchers for ground-based missile defense interceptors.


Warner agreed and stated the sides should report the results of the
meeting to their respective Heads of Delegation.




21. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Dr. Warner

Mr. Elliott

Amb Ries

Mr. Siemon

Mr. Trout

Mr. Colby (RO)

Lt Col Comeau

Mr. Dean

Dr. Fraley

Lt Col Litterini

Mr. Taylor

Mrs. Zdravecky

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIAN



Col Ilin

Mr. Koshelev

Mr. Luchaninov

Gen Orlov

Gen Poznikhir

Col Ryzhkov

Gen Venevtsev

Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Interpreter)



22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS