SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING,

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 8, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

REF: 10 MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-025.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 8, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting
co-chaired by Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the sides discussed the
proposed approaches for Type-2 inspections of converted or
eliminated strategic offensive arms (SOA). At the heart of the
matter was the percentage of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and
SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs that would be subject to
inspection. The U.S. side proposed that each year 100 percent of
such eliminated SOA be subject to selection for inspection via
quarterly accumulations or "batches" and the U.S. side would have
the right to inspect each conversion or elimination facility, where
these batches of eliminated items would be displayed in the open, a
maximum of twice each year. The Russian side proposed a
twice-yearly accumulation, with each batch containing 25 percent of
the annual elimination plan, and both batches being subject to
on-site inspection, thus making it possible for Russia to control
which 50 percent of SOA eliminated each year would be subject to
inspection. In both methods, a total of 50 percent of the
eliminated solid fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile launchers of
ICBMs would be subject to on-site inspection, with the rest being
viewed by national technical means (NTM) while displayed in the
open.




4. (S) The U.S.-proposed text also contained a broadened
formulation that provided Type-2 inspection procedures for
inspecting converted heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
into conventional-only heavy bombers, converted SLBM launchers, and
eliminated silo ICBM launchers. The Russian side noted that it
disagreed with various aspects of these approaches but said it
would study the U.S. proposal. End summary.




5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Summary of U.S.-Proposed Changes to
Sections V and VII; Main Issue: "Squaring the Circle" on Batched
Eliminations; and UIDs Still in Brackets.



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SUMMARY OF U.S.-PROPOSED CHANGES TO SECTIONS V AND VII

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6. (S) Warner gave the Russian side updated versions of the
U.S.-proposed joint draft text (JDT) of Sections V and VII of Part
Five of the Protocol. These sections included both the Russian and
U.S. concepts for monitoring the results of conversion or
elimination (CorE) as Type-2 inspections. Warner summarized three
issues that arose as the United States developed the draft text.
First, the U.S. view included a broadened formulation to include
provisions for inspection of the conversion of heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments, the conversion of SLBM launchers,
and the elimination of ICBM silo launchers. The Russian-proposed
concept had concentrated mainly on solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and
on mobile launchers of ICBMs. Second, Warner highlighted that
previously agreed text had already provided for full Type-2
inspections of the CorE facilities at the facility used to
eliminate mobile ICBM launchers and the CorE facility at Votkinsk,
where solid-fueled ICBMs are eliminated. Therefore, under both
sides' new proposals for Type-2 batched elimination inspections,
both the entire facility as depicted on the site diagram, and the
batch of eliminated items, would be inspectable. Third, Warner
noted that the U.S. side did not accept the Russian proposal to
limit the number of inspectors to a maximum of five or the
provision to reduce the duration of the CorE inspection to 12
hours. A reduction in the number of inspectors would make the
inspection team "tip its hand" concerning the inspection site to be
designated when it provided initial notice that an inspection team
would be arriving at the point of entry and make sequential
inspections, which would typically require a full 10-man inspection
team, infeasible. The shorter duration also was not consistent
with the agreed concept for Type-2 inspections.




7. (S) Ilin responded negatively to Warner's summary. Ilin
maintained that disassembled missiles would not be inspectable at
the Votkinsk CorE facility during Type-2 inspections. Mr. Smirnov
said there would never be disassembled missiles at the Votkinsk
CorE facility, but only at the adjacent Votkinsk production
facility, which would not be subject to inspection. Ilin stated
that for Type-2 inspections at CorE facilities, the only inspection
rights would be to confirm the number and type of items that had
been eliminated, and to read and record the unique identifiers
(UIDs) for these eliminated items. He asserted that the concept of
inspecting for first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs at the Votkinsk CorE
facility was something new from the U.S. side. Ilin turned to the
Inspection Activities Article of the treaty and stated that nothing
was written there to allow inspection of missiles awaiting
elimination. Warner reiterated that the right to inspect the
entire facility had long been agreed. The CorE facilities were
included on the list of Type-2 inspectable facilities as locations
where non-deployed SOA could be located and inspected and these
facilities were included in the database. In the end, Ilin agreed
to study the U.S. proposal and to respond at the next meeting of
the IPWG after consultations with the delegation and with Moscow.




8. (S) Warner reviewed the U.S. version of the JDT for Section V
of Part Five of the Protocol. Ilin inquired as to whether the


U.S.-proposed text contained any other "original ideas"; Warner
said that it did not. Both sides repeated and expanded upon
earlier arguments. The United States did not accept
Russian-proposed provisions to limit the number of inspectors and
reduce the duration for Type-2 CorE inspections. Ilin stated that
five inspectors were sufficient to view the burned-out first stage
motor cases of ICBMs and SLBMs, and that reading UIDs also was not
difficult. Concerning sequential inspections, he reminded Warner
that the Russian side had not been keen on them in the first place,
and he considered it a concession from the Russian side to agree on
inclusion of such procedures. Warner pointed out that
transportation within an ICBM base to inspect an eliminated silo
could take up to 12 hours by itself if weather conditions were
poor, so it would be practical to keep the duration of the CorE
inspection at 24 hours and allow for the standard 8-hour extension
of the inspection period, by mutual agreement. Warner noted such
disagreements over durations of inspections had occurred earlier in
the negotiations, but eventually a compromise was found. Ilin said
the Russian side would study the U.S. proposals, but noted that the
U.S. side had bracketed all of Russia's new proposals for this
section.



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MAIN ISSUE: "SQUARING THE CIRCLE" ON BATCHED ELIMINATIONS

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9. (S) Warner stated that the heart of the matter was to try to
"square the circle" regarding the sides' differing perceptions of
the results of the meeting between CJCS Adm Mullen and CHOD Gen
Makarov in Moscow on January 22, with regard to the monitoring of
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM
launchers (Reftel). The two sides agreed to accumulate or "batch"
eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM launchers
for viewing by NTM and for on-site CorE inspections. Warner
reviewed the U.S. version of the JDT for Section VII of Part Five
of the Protocol, which contained both sides' proposals for batching
such eliminated SOA and provisions for openly displaying and
inspecting them. The U.S. proposal would require quarterly
batching of such eliminated items, with each side having the right
to inspect up to two such batches each year. Every year 100
percent of the eliminated missiles and mobile launchers of ICBMs
would be subject to inspection. The United States could inspect up
to 50 percent of these eliminated missiles and mobile ICBM
launchers during up to two inspections at each facility.




10. (S) The Russian proposal, in contrast, was to require batched
eliminations in a manner so that two batches containing 50 percent
of the yearly amount of eliminated missiles and mobile launchers of
ICBMs would be made available annually for inspection. Only that
50 percent of the items eliminated in a given year would be subject
to on-site inspection and Russia would select which eliminated
missiles and mobile launchers of ICBMs fell into this group. The
remaining 50 percent of the eliminated items each year would be
displayed in the open for viewing by NTM, but would not be subject
to on-site inspection.



11. (S) Ilin said he believed there might be a more effective
approach for elimination inspections based on a 2-year cycle, but
he was unable to succinctly describe his new idea. Ilin said he
would continue to think through this approach and possibly discuss
it at the next IPWG meeting. He explained that he thought it would
be easier to batch missiles over a 2-year period and the United
States would be able to inspect a larger percentage of the
missiles. Warner said he was willing to explore the idea but
admitted it was not clear at this point how it would work.




12. (S) Ilin noted that with either the U.S. or Russian proposals,
there would be little parity in elimination inspection
opportunities made available to the Parties, as the United States
exploded its SLBM first stages in order to eliminate them and
conducted static test firings with its MMIII first stages, neither
of which readily provided opportunities to inspect the results of
elimination. Ilin inquired about the possibility of inspecting the
results of the static test firings; Warner said the U.S. side would
examine the possibility.




13. (S) Warner and Ilin agreed that provisions for the batched
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs needed to be described
in detail, but for mobile launchers of ICBMs the simple sentence
"the same quantitative parameters and procedures shall apply,"
might be sufficient. Mr. Brown stated that from a legal
standpoint, it would be better to use the same structure and full
descriptive language to outline the provisions for inspecting the
results of elimination of mobile ICBM launchers. Warner agreed the
U.S. side would adopt that approach.



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UIDS STILL IN BRACKETS

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14. (S) Ilin noted some issues with the broadened formulation that
the U.S. proposed. In paragraph 9 of Section VII, Ilin noted that
the Russian-proposed text allowed for recording of UIDs only on
eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs; the U.S.-proposed text
broadened that to allow for recording of UIDs during all Type-2
inspections. Ilin opined that such broadening of the concept
undercut the logic behind the Russian approach that justified
shortening the duration of the inspection and reducing the number
of inspectors. While Ilin agreed conceptually with the right to
read UIDs, the methods to apply and read them had not yet been
agreed, therefore the Russian side would leave all references to
UIDs in brackets. Furthermore, Ilin said he would have to check
with Amb Antonov on the results of the Heads of Delegation (HODs)
meeting which addressed this issue, as he did not want the IPWG to
get ahead of the work of the HODs.



15. (S) In closing, Warner emphasized that only three or four
major substantive issues remained to be resolved before the treaty
could be completed; batched inspections of eliminated solid-fueled
ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs was one of these
major issues and the only one within the purview of the IPWG. Ilin
noted that other such major differences had been overcome in the
past, and said he was confident that this issue, too, could be
resolved once the issue of how to treat missile defense issues in
the treaty was resolved. Warner noted that matters regarding the
treatment of missile defense issues in the treaty were being
addressed by the HODs.




16. (U) Documents provided:



- United States:



-- Section V of Part Five of the Protocol, U.S.-Proposed JDT,
dated February 5, 2010; and



-- Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, U.S.-Proposed
JDT, dated February 5, 2010.




17. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Dr. Warner

Mr. Albertson

Mr. Ahlm

Mr. Brown

Mr. Buttrick

MAJ Johnson

LTC Leyde (RO)

LTC Litterini

Mr. McConnell

Ms. Pura

Ms. Purcell

Mr. Rust


LT Sicks

Mr. Smith

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

Col Petrov

Mr. G. Shevchenko

Mr. Smirnov

Ms. Vodolopova

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS