SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000079

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
FEBRUARY 3, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

REF: 10 MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-015.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 3, 2010

Time: 03:30 P.M. - 05:45 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) At the combined Inspection Protocol (IP) Working Group and
Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group meeting chaired by
Dr. Warner, Mr. Elliott, Colonel Ilin, and Colonel Ryzhkov, the
sides discussed in detail the possible options associated with
conducting elimination inspections. The sides discussed the U.S.
proposal for conducting elimination inspections of ICBM silos and
conversion inspections of SLBM launchers in conjunction with Type-1
inspections. Inspections of eliminated solid-fueled ICBM and SLBM
first stages and eliminated mobile launchers would be Type-2
inspections. After discussion, the Russians presented a draft text
that outlined their concept for conducting all conversion and
elimination inspections as Type-2 inspections. End summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: One Meeting, Two Points of View;
Confirming Conversions and Eliminations; The U.S. Approach; and The
Russian Proposal.



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ONE MEETING, TWO POINTS OF VIEW

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5. (S) Warner re-stated the U.S. understanding of the agreement
made in Moscow between General Jones (ret.) and Admiral Mullen on
the U.S. side and General Makarov on the Russian side that 100
percent of the solid-fueled first stage rocket motors and mobile
launchers of ICBMs eliminated in a given year would be inspected
during two batch inspections (Reftel). Ilin claimed that this was
incorrect and the agreement made in Moscow was that only 50 percent
of the annual output of eliminated items would be subject to
inspection. Ilin stated that clarification would be needed in
order to create an effective process for confirmation of conversion
or elimination. Both sides agreed the annual quotas for
inspections would be ten for Type-1 and eight for Type-2.


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CONFIRMING CONVERSIONS AND ELIMINATIONS

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6. (S) Warner explained the preliminary U.S. view regarding the
conduct of conversion or elimination (CorE) inspections was to
confirm the elimination of silo launchers and converted SLBM
launchers via inspections. He proposed that eliminated
solid-fueled ICBM and SLBM first stages and eliminated mobile ICBM
launchers would be confirmed during Type-2 inspections and be
charged against the annual quota for these inspections.




7. (S) Ilin stated the Russian view was that all CorE inspections
should be carried out as Type-2 inspections.



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THE U.S. APPROACH

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8. (S) Warner addressed the batching concept for both solid-fueled
ICBMs and mobile ICBM launchers. He proposed the estimated annual
number of items to be eliminated be broken into four roughly equal
groups or lots. These lots would be subject to inspection during
each quarter of a year. When a batch was ready for inspection, the
batch would be displayed in the open so that it was available for
observation by National Technical Means (NTM) and a notification
would be sent to the potential inspecting Party. No later than 72
hours prior to the expiration of the agreed inspection window, the
inspecting Party would send the inspected Party notification
whether or not it intended to inspect the accumulated lot of
eliminated items. If the inspecting Party chose not to inspect the
items, the eliminated first stages or mobile launchers could be
removed from view of NTM at the expiration of the agreed display
period. Warner noted that agreement would be needed on the time
available for viewing by NTM. (Begin comment: The U.S. position
was that the display period in the open for eliminated items would
be 60 days; the Russians proposed 30 days. End comment.) This
process would be repeated for each batch, each quarter. This
approach would also be applicable to inspect the results of the
elimination of mobile ICBM launchers. This would mean that Part
Five of the Protocol would be changed to allow up to four Type-2
inspections per year at each CorE facility. Warner noted that, in
theory, the United States could use all eight of its annual quota
of Type-2 inspections at the two CorE facilities, if it so desired.





9. (S) Ilin drew a diagram to illustrate what he understood as the
U.S. position. He asked what would happen if unforeseen events


occurred and the number of items projected to be eliminated for the
year changed. Warner stated there was room for flexibility. Ilin
pointed out four inspections per year at one facility was two more
than the maximum number for any one facility agreed to in Part Five
of the Protocol. He also stated the U.S. approach would confirm
100 percent of the eliminated items each year while, in the Russian
view, it had been agreed in Moscow that no more than 50 percent of
the items eliminated in a year would be made available annually for
inspection. Ilin asked if some first stage motor cases would have
to spend more time on display for viewing by NTM than others.
Warner replied that this was possible, but they could be stored
indoors until the entire batch was ready for inspection and all
moved out into the open at the same time. Ilin stated that it
would be difficult to convince the Russian Delegation leadership to
allow inspection of 100 percent of the eliminated items each year
when the Mullen-Makarov meeting, in the Russian view, had concluded
that inspection of up to 50 percent of the items eliminated in a
single year would be sufficient. Warner re-emphasized that it was
the understanding of the United States that up to 100 percent was
the annual percentage of eliminated items that should be subject to
inspection that was agreed in Moscow. Ilin stated that both
working group chairs should bring the matter up to their respective
heads of delegation for clarification.




10. (S) Warner countered that another possible option would be to
limit to four the total number of inspections that might be
conducted each year at the Russian CorE facilities for solid-fueled
ICBMs and for mobile ICBM launchers respectively. An inspecting
Party could have the right to choose to go to one of the two CorE
facilities three times and the other only one time, or to inspect
both facilities up to twice a year. Regardless, even if the total
number of items inspected per year was less than 100 percent of the
total projected output, the right to select what items would be
inspected, and during which inspection period, would fall to the
inspecting Party, not the inspected Party.




11. (S) Warner then described a third alternative, where the
inspecting party would have the right to inspect no more than twice
at each of the two CorE facilities, but would still have the
opportunity to select which of the four quarterly accumulated
'lots' within the year it wanted to inspect at each facility. The
inspecting party could, of course, not choose to carry out the two
inspections at each facility, opting instead to conduct only one
inspection or none during the course of the year.




12. (S) Ilin countered that there was no parity with the United
States for inspecting eliminated first stage motor cases; the
United States would be eliminating few, if any, ICBMs and SLBMs,
while Russia would be eliminating many ICBMs each year. Warner
agreed, but noted that the United States would be converting heavy
bombers from nuclear-equipped to conventional-only configuration
and SLBM launchers, which would be available for Russian CorE
inspection, while Russia would not likely be converting any
strategic systems. Additionally, Warner pointed out that most U.S.
strategic systems were in a different life cycle stage than Russian
systems. This meant the United States would not be eliminating
solid-fueled ICBM and SLBM first stages on a large scale. Ilin
asked if the United States would provide an annual projection of


first stages to be eliminated. Warner assured him the United
States would do so, though the number would be very small.



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THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL

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13. (S) Ilin stated the U.S. proposal was logical and the Russian
Delegation would like to see the U.S. proposal in writing. He
explained that the Russian Delegation believed the U.S-proposed
process violated two red lines. First, it called for inspection of
more than 50 percent of the items eliminated annually, a number
which, in the Russian view, could not be exceeded. Second, the
Parties could not exceed two inspections per year at each CorE
facility.




14. (S) Warner asked Ilin to explain the Russian proposal. The
basic premise of the Russian proposal was to provide for two
inspections per year at the CorE facilities. During each potential
inspection opportunity the inspecting Party would be offered 25
percent of the annual output of eliminated items. Warner stated
that the United States had issues with having the opportunity to
inspect only 50 percent of the number of items eliminated in a
given year. The United States needed to have the opportunity to
inspect 100 percent of eliminated items per year, even if it chose
not to conduct an inspection for a specific batch of eliminated
items. Ilin explained that the remaining 50 percent would be
available for viewing by NTM. Elliot re-iterated the U.S.
understanding that 100 percent of items should be available for
on-site inspection.




15. (S) Ryzhkov stated that with four inspections per year at both
of the Russian CorE facilities, the United States would have to use
all eight Type-2 inspections available in a given year to confirm
the elimination of 100 percent of eliminated items. Warner stated
this was true, but if the United States chose to only inspect each
facility two times per year the United States would only be seeing
50 percent of the annual total of eliminated items of both types.
This would be acceptable since it was the inspecting Party's
prerogative to not fully exercise its inspection rights.




16. (S) Warner stated that the U.S. Delegation would review the
Russian proposed text and create a joint draft text incorporating
both U.S. and Russian concepts. At the next working group meeting
both parties would discuss it further.




17. (S) Ryzhkov suggested that it might be possible to agree to
allow for 100 percent on-site inspection of eliminated items if the
United States could agree to drop the requirement for making
eliminated items available for viewing by NTM. Warner said he


would consider this alternative.




18. (U) Documents provided:



- Russia:



-- Russian draft of Part Five, Section VII (Type-2 Inspections).




19. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Dr. Warner

Mr. Elliott

Mr. Ahlm

Mr. Albertson

Lt Col Goodman

Maj Johnson (RO)

LTC Litterini

Mr. McConnell

Ms. Purcell

Mr. Rust

LT Sicks

Mr. Smith

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

Col Ryzhkov

Mr. Malyugin

Mr. Shevchenko


Mr. Smirnov

Ms. Vodolopova

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS