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Created
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10GENEVA75
2010-02-18 15:59:00
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Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) DEFINITIONS SUBGROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 3,

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) DEFINITIONS SUBGROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 3,
2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000075

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) DEFINITIONS SUBGROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 3,
2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-014.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 3, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) At a meeting of the Definitions Subgroup co-chaired by Mr.
Siemon and Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov, the sides took stock of the
remaining definitions requiring agreement and any new terms
requiring definitions. The sides discussed the following
definitions: basing area, ICBM base; warhead; launcher of missile
defense interceptors; missile defense interceptor; ICBM for mobile
launchers of ICBMs; relocation; transit; new type; and nuclear
armaments for heavy bombers. The Russian side provided
Russian-proposed definitions for period of inspection activities,
missile defense interceptor, and sequential inspection. End
summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Definitions Discussed.



--------------

DEFINITIONS DISCUSSED

--------------




5. (S) Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov stated he believed the major issues
still to be resolved after the Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow and
the latest telephone call between the Presidents were related to
missile defense and verification of mobile launchers of ICBMs. Mr.
Siemon added the definition of non-deployed heavy bombers,
telemetry, and ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to this list.
Kuznetsov provided Russian-proposed text for the terms "sequential
inspection" and "period of inspection activities" that he hoped
could be discussed at the next meeting.

Begin text.



The term "sequential inspection" means an inspection, conducted at

facilities associated with the same point of entry, by an
inspection team which has not departed the territory of the
inspected Party following completion of the previous inspection.


The term "period of inspection activities" means the period of time
from the completion of pre-inspection procedures until the
commencement of post-inspection procedures.



End text.




6. (S) Regarding the term "ICBM base," Kuznetsov stated that the
Russian side would not accept specific restrictions for mobile
launchers of ICBMs. As such, it could not accept the size
restriction of 125,000 sq km in the definition of an "ICBM base" or
the 5 sq km size restriction in the definition of a "basing area."
Siemon understood that the sides had come out of the latest round
of discussions in Moscow with the understanding that these size
restrictions would be included in both definitions as part of the
agreement to delete Article VI from the treaty; the other parts of
this agreement included unique identifiers and the notification of
the exit of a solid-fuel ICBM or SLBM from a production facility.
Kuznetsov commented that he was unaware of the agreement and as
such the definition of an ICBM base would remain as currently
bracketed. For the same reason the definition of "basing area"
would also remain bracketed.




7. (S) Kuznetsov stated that the Russian side's definition of
"warhead" provided on December 17, 2009, was based on the limits
and counting rules outlined in Articles II and III. Siemon said he
would study the Russian definition and be prepared to discuss it at
the next meeting.



Begin text.



The term "warhead" means a unit of account used for counting toward
the aggregate limit:

a) For a deployed ICBM or a deployed SLBM, each warhead
emplaced on such an ICBM or SLBM;

b) For each deployed heavy bomber, one unit of nuclear
armaments for such a heavy bomber.



End text.




8. (S) Since the sides had agreed on an attribution rule for
counting heavy bomber warheads and the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) Working Group had subsequently removed the technical data for
long-range ALCMs from the database, the sides agreed to delete
paragraph (b) from the definition of "variant" because it dealt
with long-range nuclear ALCMS. This definition as it presently


reads is as follows.



Begin text.



The term "variant" means:



(a) for heavy bombers, a classification, declared by the inspected
Party, of airplanes of one type and one category that are
distinguishable from other airplanes of the same type and the same
category;

[and]1



(b) for ICBMs and SLBMs, a classification, declared by the
inspected Party, of ICBMs or SLBMs for the same type that are
distinguishable from other ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type. [An
ICBM or SLBM of a type, a dimension of which differs from that of
another ICBM or SLBM of the same type by more than three percent,
but by less than the appropriate new type criteria, shall be
considered to be a variant. In addition, a Party may declare an
ICBM or SLBM to be a variant if its dimensions differ by less than
three percent from those of another ICBM or SLBM of the same
type.]1



End text.




9. (S) As the definition of "variant" was related to the "new
type" definition, Kuznetsov stated he believed photographs of the
external design differences would be more useful to inspectors than
utilizing measurements and the three percent rule. Inspectors
could quickly conduct the inspection and be off the inspection
site. Mrs. Zdravecky contended that size, just as differences in
external design, was an external difference that could be used to
distinguish a variant. Mr. Taylor added that definitive
measurements left no room for misunderstanding. Mr. Connell
pointed out that during inspections of exiting ICBMs at the
continuous monitoring site at Votkinsk, the external appearance of
canisters had changed since the MOU photos were first generated.
He said the Russian approach to deal with this had been to have
U.S. monitors rely on length and diameter measurements instead.
This was in contradiction to Kuznetsov's stated position that
inspectors should rely on the MOU photo for determining the type.
Kuznetsov stated he would discuss the three percent rule with the
inspectors on his delegation.




10. (S) Kuznetsov remarked that since the Russian side did not
differentiate ICBMs as a type for silo launchers or a type for
mobile launchers of ICBMs, there was no need for the definition of
"ICBM for mobile launcher of ICBMs." Siemon stated that since the
phrase only appeared once in the treaty within a draft


U.S.-proposed notification that had not been accepted, he believed
that the definition could be deleted and would confirm this with
the U.S. delegation.




11. (S) In relation to the term "new type," Siemon reiterated the
U.S. proposal that if the Russian side would accept the U.S.
proposals for 10 percent in length and 5 percent in diameter within
this definition, the U.S. side would agree to delete its proposed
text in sub-paragraphs c(i) and (ii). Kuznetsov could not agree to
this proposal, so the definition was not accepted.




12. (S) Siemon noted that the definition of "relocation" appeared
in Part Four of the Protocol of the treaty and in Article VI. For
this reason, the term required a definition. However, if Article
VI was removed from the treaty, this definition could be deleted.
Kuznetsov remarked that the definition of both "relocation" and
"transit" referred to one-sided restrictions against the Russian
side and as such should be deleted. Both definitions remained
unchanged.




13. (S) Kuznetsov then provided a revision to the Russian-proposed
definition for a missile defense interceptor. Siemon stated that
since the issue of missile defense was being handled by the Heads
of Delegation (HOD),he would refrain from any comment on the
definitions of "missile defense interceptor" and "launcher of
missile defense interceptor" that was provided by the Russian side
during the last session. The new Russian definition of "missile
defense interceptor" provided was as follows.



Begin text.



The term "missile defense interceptor" means a missile which was
developed, tested and deployed in order to intercept ICBMs, SLBMs
and their reentry vehicles.



End text.




14. (S) Siemon also recommended that both the terms "ICBM base"
and "basing area" be given to the HODs for discussion since both
dealt with mobile launchers of ICBMs. The definition of "basing
area" remained unchanged.




15. (S) After Kuznetsov introduced the term "nuclear armaments for
heavy bombers," Siemon stated the he had a proposed definition for
the term that he hoped to provide at the next subgroup meeting and
recommended the sides postpone discussion until then. Kuznetsov
agreed. The sides also agreed to defer discussion on the terms
"encryption," "flight test," and "telemetry" until the HODs had


resolved the issue of telemetry.




16. (U) Documents provided:



- Russia:



-- Russian Federation proposal on language for the term
"period of inspection activities," dated February 3, 2010.



-- Russian Federation proposal on language for the term
"sequential inspection," dated February 3, 2010.



-- Russian Federation proposal on new language for the term
"missile defense interceptor," dated February 3, 2010.




17. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Mr. Connell

Lt Col Comeau

Mr. Dean

Dr. Dreicer

Mr. Dwyer

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Mr. Taylor

Ms. Smith (Int)



RUSSIA



Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov

Ms. Fuzhenkova

Mr. Luchaninov


Ms. Komshilova (Int)




18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS