Identifier
Created
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10GENEVA63
2010-02-18 14:06:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 2010 --

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000063 

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
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DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 2010 --
CORRECTED COPY

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000063

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 2010 --
CORRECTED COPY

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-006.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 1, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. to 5:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) This was the first meeting to discuss telemetry provisions
for the START Follow-on Treaty (SFO) during the eighth negotiating
session. The U.S. side reviewed the purposes for exchange of
telemetric data in SFO at the request of the Russian side and
answered a number of questions from the Russian delegation. The
Russian side walked through its latest view of the way the exchange
would be structured and implemented, and committed to provide this
view in written form to the U.S. delegation. End summary.




4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Let Me Get This Right; Let Us Tell You
What You Said; and The Russian View Today.



--------------

LET ME GET THIS RIGHT

--------------




5. (S) Mr. Siemon welcomed General Poznikhir and explained that
following the meetings in Moscow on January 22-23, 2010, the U.S.
delegation had taken some time to think through what it considered
to be right and wrong about the approach to telemetry for SFO.
There had been many proposals considered and advanced. What the
U.S. delegation now wanted to do was more fully understand the
Russian position, then write a latest version of a proposal for
telemetry language for the protocol and annex.




6. (S) Poznikhir remarked that the discussions of telemetry for
SFO were not starting from zero. There was now a separate team
addressing the issues; Admiral Mullen and General Makarov had had

substantive discussions advancing the concepts, and the U.S. and
Russian Presidents supported the approach taken. The job of the
delegations was to identify the details of the approach and put
them into the telemetry protocol. The Russian delegation believed
they had replied to the U.S. questions about their views of
telemetry and now wanted to better understand the U.S. approach as


described in the proposal provided by the United States on January
23, 2010. (Begin comment: The document Poznikhir was referring to
was a U.S. summary of a January 22, 2010, small group meeting on
telemetry in Moscow that the Russians had seen. End comment.) He
suggested that the Russian delegation first ask questions about
that proposal, then have the United States describe their proposal,
and then have the Russians describe their concerns.




7. (S) Poznikhir stated the original Russian position had been
that the exchange of telemetric data was not necessary for this
treaty but the Russian delegation had moved toward the U.S.
position at our request. His first question to Siemon was a
request to understand the reason the United States wanted the
exchange. Which limits of the treaty required it and which
parameters would be verified by the exchange of telemetric data?




8. (S) Siemon stated that during START, telemetry had been
required to make the verification process work for the treaty's
counting rules. Data on launch-weight, throw-weight, and the
number of procedures for dispensing of reentry vehicles all
required telemetry data to verify compliance with the provisions of
the treaty. SFO was different - telemetry was not required for
verification. However, the exchange of telemetry data was the
accepted practice throughout the entire 15-year duration of the
START Treaty. The United States believed that since the attributed
number of warheads on the two sides' ICBMs and SLBMs would be 70
percent lower than during START, the sides would continue to want
to exchange telemetry as a transparency measure. The Senators who
would be providing advice and consent expected both sides to be
transparent about the development of ICBMs and SLBMs. Over the
life of the SFO, both sides would deploy new and modified systems -
Russia would deploy new systems before the United States but over
the 10-year period of the treaty, the United States would likely
also deploy new or modified systems. A telemetry exchange would be
a mark of the new relationship between the United States and Russia
with respect to strategic offensive arms. The United States tried
in its proposals to create an opportunity for both sides to encrypt
a number of flight tests to protect sensitive information. The
U.S. side had no intention of encrypting every test but the
original proposal allowed encryption on up to seven tests. The
United States may at some point elect to encrypt on one or two
flight tests each year. With the Russian practice of performing
about ten flight tests each year, the proposed number of seven
would provide a significant exemption. The Russian delegation
appeared surprised the United States wanted to continue the
exchange of telemetric data while the U.S. delegation was surprised
that the Russian Federation did not want to continue the exchange.




9. (S) Poznikhir stated that Russia now agreed with the basic
approach to telemetry exchange but did not believe that it should
include the same amount of information as under START. Under
START, the parameters of acceleration and time of separation were
important to verify treaty limits. The requirements would be
different now justifying a change in the approach.




10. (S) Poznikhir's second question concerned test launchers. In


the Moscow meetings, the United States spoke of exchanging data on
flights associated with launches of SLBMs and ICBMs while now the
United States also referred to test launches. Poznikhir asked
whether this was a mistake or whether something else was meant by
this reference. Siemon replied there was no difference from START
in what would be exchanged - it was telemetric information on
flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs, and, flight tests of prototype
ICBMs and SLBMs. The provisions would not apply to space launch
activities because the treaty was about strategic offensive arms
and not space activities. Poznikhir replied that any launch from a
submarine or ICBM launcher was considered an SLBM or ICBM flight
and that the draft treaty language he had seen would consider an
ICBM used to launch an item into space to be a missile covered by
the treaty.



--------------

LET US TELL YOU WHAT YOU SAID

--------------




11. (S) Poznikhir's next question concerned the provision for
exchange of data on no more than five SLBM and ICBM launches. His
understanding had been that the exchange would be for five
launches, no more and no less. He asked whether this was to be a
mandatory requirement. After some discussion of the source of the
text Poznikhir was referring to, it was determined the text was a
January 23, 2010, U.S. summary of the January 22, 2010, small group
meeting in Moscow, which Poznikhir referred to as the U.S.
proposal. He pointed to a particular paragraph in the summary that
referred to a schedule of projected launches within the first 65
days of each calendar year. Ryzhkov asked how the proposed
approach would handle the issue of parity if one side conducted
five launches while the other party had conducted only three
launches. On what basis would the Parties exchange data? Siemon
replied that it was the same question he had for the Russian
delegation. The parity concept made it appear as if the exchange
would only occur for three flight tests. It also seemed as if the
Russian delegation had used the term parity in different ways - for
total numbers of flight tests on each side, for subtotals of ICBM
and SLBM flight tests, and for the categories and type of
telemetric data to be exchanged. Poznikhir replied parity could
also refer to quality of information and on which launches data
would be exchanged.




12. (S) Siemon stated that it was necessary to clarify on which
test launches exchanges would be made, the number of flight tests
involved, and how data would be exchanged. The United States
typically conducted about 5 flight tests each year while Russia
conducted 10 to 12 flight tests. If we exchanged flight schedules
at the beginning of each year, would we flip a coin at the
beginning of each year to determine on which ones we exchange data?
Ryzhkov asked what was meant by the flight test schedule to which
Siemon had referred. When Siemon said he understood that there
would be an exchange of flight schedules within the first 65 days
of each new year, Poznikhir replied that while the United States
might have such a schedule, Russia did not. He further stated that
the Russian industry did not work in such a way that it would


produce an annual schedule. Instead, he viewed the exchange taking
place in the first 65 days of each year to be a meeting for the
exchange of telemetry that the testing side had selected from the
previous year for exchange. Siemon responded that neither he nor
the other U.S. participant in the Moscow small group meeting had
understood the interpreter to say that provision applied to the
previous year.




13. (S) Shevchenko stated that in Russia, a portion of the ICBM
and SLBM launches were conducted by the Ministry of Defense and a
portion were conducted by the space agency. He asked whether the
terms launch, test launch, and flight test, as used by the United
States were equivalent. Siemon responded that he used the terms as
interchangeable, and that while the ballistic missile launch
notification agreement used the term "launch," the START provisions
referred to "test flights." Poznikhir stated that launches could
be performed to test new types, to test existing types, to
eliminate ICBMs or SLBMs, and to put payloads in the upper
atmosphere - all were considered to be launches. In Russia, there
was no distinction between launches for different purposes. When a
launch was performed for elimination, the same launch and control
system was used as for a test launch; there was no need to
distinguish between them and encryption could be used on any
launch. Siemon stated he understood the Russian viewpoint.




14. (S) Poznikhir's third question concerned how changes in the
data exchange agreement would be resolved in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC). For example, how would the
agreement be changed if one side suggested the other had used
information from a flight test for missile defense purposes? If it
was believed the data was used in a manner inconsistent with the
national security interests of one of the Parties, how would the
Parties resolve the disagreement? Siemon replied this had not been
a concern under START and that he did not understand why it would
become a concern under SFO. Poznikhir commented the annual review
of telemetry exchange proposed by the United States could lead to a
review of national security concerns by both Parties and an
opportunity to change the agreement accordingly. He clarified the
original Russian proposal had been for a review every 3 years while
the United States had proposed yearly reviews.




15. (S) Venevtsev gave the example of the United States concluding
that flight test data had been used to the effect of its national
security, bringing the issue for discussion to the BCC, and Russia
denying there had been any such detriment. During the discussions
in Moscow it had been stated that any changes in the nature of the
exchange would be based on mutual agreement, so how would the BCC
settle such an issue? Siemon opined that neither Party would
likely raise this issue in the BCC. If the Parties agreed on the
type and quantity of data to be exchanged, both Parties would have
to consider what data would actually be exchanged. Venevtsev
stated that if he understood correctly, each Party would identify
parameters that would not damage its national security. Siemon
commented that Russia was probably more concerned than the United
States but that the volume and scope of the exchange would be
agreed upon in the BCC. Venevtsev asked whether the U.S. position
was to structure the exchange in such a way as not to get into a
deadlock in the BCC.



16. (S) Siemon explained that the treaty would provide the basic
position on the exchange of data, the protocol would describe how
the exchange would work, the annex would provide the basic
technical details, and the BCC would resolve issues on topics such
as playback equipment, costs and spare parts. Agreement between
the Parties on Article 10 was close and in the small group meetings
in Moscow on January 22, 2010, additional text for the protocol was
discussed and agreed. Based on the Moscow discussions, Siemon had
expected during the current meeting a paper from Russia on what
would be included in the protocol. He had expected to receive text
reflecting the ten points that had been presented during the Moscow
meeting. Once the proposed Russian text was received, the United
States would be able to have discussion on the text in draft form
and decide what specifically should be in the protocol and in the
annex. After the Parties agreed on the substance, they could
identify what would be deferred to the BCC for further discussion.
The Presidents would sign the treaty and protocol. When the United
States submits the treaty and protocol to the Senate, the text of
the annex will be included. For the ratification process, both
documents will need to be clearly written. Poznikhir stated he
agreed completely that the treaty and protocol must answer all key
questions.



--------------

THE RUSSIAN VIEW TODAY

--------------




17. (S) Siemon stated the U.S. position had evolved in response to
what it believed the Russian position was as presented over the
course of several meetings. The text in the treaty, protocol, and
annex must reflect the views of both Parties - the United States
wanted to understand and reflect the Russian position.




18. (S) After a long break and extensive internal discussion,
Poznikhir laid out the Russian view of telemetry exchange. The
United States and Russia have agreed that the Parties would
exchange telemetry data on a parity basis on up to 5 launches each
year. In addition, the Russian Federation proposed that:



- The exchange of telemetric information would be carried out
within 65 days of the beginning of each calendar year for the
previous calendar year.



- The SLBM and ICBM launches for which telemetric information would
be determined by the Party conducting the launches.



- During the annual exchange of telemetric information, the Parties


would provide recording media and interpretive data for the chosen
flights.



- Recording media would be provided for all information broadcast
prior to the time when propulsion of the upper stage ends. Data
associated with the SCDM broadcast from within the reentry vehicle
will not be exchanged. Each Party will conduct for the other Party
an initial display of the recording media to be used and will
provide appropriate playback equipment to the other Party.



- The Party conducting the flight test can decide the method of
recording telemetric information by recorded media.



- During SLBM or ICBM launches, each Party can use whatever data
denial techniques or encapsulation that it chooses.



- The provision for exchange of data will be first exercised at the
beginning of the second full year after entry-into-force (EIF);
e.g., January 2012 for 2011 launches after a May 2010 EIF.



- On an annual basis, the Parties will reconsider the conditions
and procedures of the exchange in the BCC.




19. (S) Poznikhir said the next step was for both Parties to agree
and record the conceptual approach for the telemetry exchange in
the protocol and the details in the annex. Siemon asked Poznihir
to provide the Russian proposal in writing prior to the next
meeting. Poznikhir agreed.




20. (U) Documents exchanged: None.




21. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Ms. Pura (RO)

Ms. C. Smith (Int)



RUSSIA


Gen Poznikhir

Mr. Luchaninov

Mr. Malyugin

Mr. Pischulov

Col Ryzhkov

Mr. Shevchenko

Gen Venevtsev

Ms. Komshilova (Int)




22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS