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10GENEVA61
2010-02-18 14:03:00
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SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000061

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-005.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 1, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group met
with their Russian counterparts as a small group at the Russian
Mission on February 1 to establish a way forward during the new
session. The two sides worked through the entire Database and
agreed on a substantial number of bracketed areas. Remaining areas
of disagreement included: exchange of site diagrams; treatment of
mobile ICBMs and their launchers; retaining data on heavy bomber
recognition features; and use of the term "version" to refer to
mobile launchers of ICBMs. End summary.




4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Implementing Moscow Decisions; Sections I
and II; Discussion of Mobiles; and Sections IV Through V.



--------------

IMPLEMENTING MOSCOW DECISIONS

--------------




5. (S) General Orlov noted that although many issues had been
resolved in Moscow, the "particularly thorny problem" of the
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic
defenses remained. Mr. Trout noted the problem of unique
identifiers (UIDs) and a discussion of options for emplacing UIDs
ensued. Orlov commented that the UID concession was a very
difficult one for Russia and emphasized that such acceptance was
directly linked to the United States agreeing to drop any special
focus on mobile systems. Trout replied that the United States was
willing to drop its proposed Article VI on mobiles if the Russian

side agreed to UIDs, notification of the departure of a missile
from a production facility, and several other points. Trout and
Orlov agreed to defer the issue to the Treaty Text and Definitions
Working Group (TTDWG).



--------------


SECTIONS I AND II

--------------




6. (S) Turning to Section I of Part Two, Trout signaled, without
committing, a U.S. inclination to move toward the Russian
preference to be more explicit that geographic coordinates and
aggregate data would not be exchanged 45 days after signature. The
chairmen agreed that UID information would not be exchanged until
entry-into-force (EIF).




7. (S) The chairmen then turned to site diagrams. Orlov agreed to
U.S.-proposed language in various places that included "coastlines
and waters diagrams." Regarding submission and discussion of site
diagrams, Orlov explained that the Russian position was that new
diagrams submitted 45 days after signature would not have to be
agreed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). Trout
pointed out that this was the U.S. position as well and explained
that site diagrams exchanged 45 days after signature would be used
to facilitate ratification by supporting arguments on the
effectiveness of the inspection regime. It was the U.S. view,
however, that any changes to the boundary of a site diagram after
EIF would have to be submitted to the BCC for agreement. Orlov
asked what would happen if one Party were to withhold its consent
to such a change. Trout replied that there was ample precedent for
such a process under START. He said many new site diagrams were
agreed to in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),
though some were not. The site diagrams that were not agreed were
ones that decreased the boundary of inspection sites by excluding
areas that one Party believed potentially could contain items of
inspection. Orlov stated that he had a better understanding of the
U.S. position regarding changes to site diagrams after EIF and the
requirement for such changes to be approved in the BCC and he
agreed to discuss the issue further with his delegation.




8. (S) The chairmen considered the possibility of forming a
spinoff subgroup to the MOU Working Group in which site diagrams
would be discussed further. Orlov mentioned that the Russian side
had its new site diagrams ready and that Colonel Ryzhkov was in
charge of preparing the documents. Orlov stated that they would be
ready for exchange immediately after signature. Trout asked if the
diagrams would be available before signature. Orlov demurred and
said he would need to consult with Russian Head of Delegation,
Ambassador Antonov.




9. (S) The sides agreed to several minor changes in Section I.
Orlov proposed to change the Russian text on the date for the
exchange of photographs from "the inspection activities begin" to
"60 days." Trout made the point that photographs needed to be
exchanged far enough ahead of the first inspection in order to
assist the inspectors. After some discussion, Trout agreed to
consult internally regarding setting 45 days after EIF as opposed
to the current U.S. position of 30 days.



10. (S) Turning to Section II, Trout asked how the Russian side
proposed incorporating numbers of heavy bombers under the aggregate
deployed and non-deployed limit agreed to in Moscow. Neither side
expressed a firm opinion as to how to integrate heavy bombers and
the discussion concluded with an agreement to consult with the
respective delegations.




11. (S) The sides also agreed to follow the determination of the
TTDWG regarding the placement of the data for the recently agreed
third limit in the Database. Specifically, if the limit was placed
in Article II, Central Limits, the data would be declared in
Paragraph 1 of Section II. If the limit was placed in another
article, the data would be declared in Paragraph 2 of Section II.



--------------

DISCUSSION OF MOBILES

--------------




12. (S) Trout raised the question of Russia providing four
boundary geographic coordinates for its mobile ICBM bases. Orlov
made very clear that Russia would not agree to provide anything
other than a single geographic point for its mobile ICBM bases and
for their deployment areas. Pressed by Trout that this would imply
that bases could be the size of Russia itself, Orlov agreed that
this was a logical inference but did not change his position.
Orlov explained that while he personally perceived the logic of the
U.S. position on verification of mobiles, the decision to exclude
any special provisions had been a political one. He stated that
President Medvedev had taken this line with the delegation and with
President Obama. Orlov also reminded Trout that the Russian
minutes of the Presidents' discussion reflected that the Russian
concession on UIDs was linked to U.S. agreement to fall off special
verification provisions for mobile systems. Orlov advised that the
United States had two options: to either accept the Russian
position or, to develop its own mobile ICBMs.



--------------

SECTIONS III THROUGH V

--------------




13. (S) Trout agreed to remove the category of number of warheads
for each launcher at a deployed ICBM and SLBM base. Orlov agreed
to drop Russia's brackets on all U.S. text on UIDs for ICBM and
SLBM missiles. They further agreed to drop the term "returned"
with reference to non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at production
facilities. The chairmen also discussed the naming convention for
submarines, and provisionally agreed to exchange the names of the
boats. Orlov stated that he would need to discuss this further
with his delegation.



14. (S) For Section V, the chairmen discussed UIDs for heavy
bombers, and provisionally agreed to use tail numbers. The United
States also agreed to the Russian-proposed inclusion of a category
for "nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers" under
each airbase.



--------------

SECTIONS VI THROUGH IX

--------------




15. (S) Orlov raised the issue of the nomenclature for launchers
located at space launch facilities in Section VI. Trout stated
that this language was linked to soft site launchers and needed to
be discussed in the Definitions Subgroup before it could be
resolved in the Database. The chairmen agreed to defer the issue
until later.




16. (S) Discussion of retaining the term "version" ensued with
respect to Section VII. LT Lobner explained that this was a
definitions issue, since the word "version" referred to different
types of launchers, while "variant" applied to missiles. Orlov
agreed to consider the issue further.




17. (S) With regard to Section VIII, Trout asked why Russia needed
to retain START-type recognition features for heavy bombers when we
were not using maximum warhead capability for heavy bombers. Orlov
agreed to review the issue with his delegation and discuss the
issue in a subsequent meeting.




18. (S) The sides agreed to drop Section IX on Heavy Bomber
Nuclear Armaments Technical Data since both sides agreed that heavy
bombers would have a warhead attribution number of one irrespective
of the number or type of nuclear armaments aboard such heavy
bombers.




19. (S) Orlov proposed deleting the portion of Paragraph 2 of
Section X on nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, and including the
category on non-nuclear ALCMs. Trout said he would provide an
answer to the proposal later.




20. Documents provided: None.




21. (U) Participants:


UNITED STATES



Mr. Trout

Mr. Colby (RO)

LT Lobner

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA



Gen Orlov

Col Pischulov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS