SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY

S E C R E T GENEVA 000055

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY
9, 2010

REF: 10 CD GENEVA 31 (SFO-GVA-VIII-017)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-030.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 9, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:50 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr.
Siemon and General Poznikhir, the Russian side provided responses
to the U.S. questions on the Russian proposal dated February 2
(Reftel). The Russian side expressed the view that the Telemetry
Working Group was the appropriate forum to discuss the
Tauscher-Ryabkov telemetry questions. During the session, the
Russian side asked some questions of its own. They defended their
position that Parties be allowed to suspend telemetry exchange,
explaining there would be no treaty impact because telemetry was
not needed for treaty verification. The U.S side pushed back
saying that it was a mistake to think of the telemetry provision as
unimportant and stating clearly that the United States would never
accept a treaty provision that allowed one Party to unilaterally
walk away from an obligation. The Russian side again pushed the
issue of missile defense and its relationship with telemetry. They
stated the only reason that the United States wanted telemetry from
self-contained dispensing mechanisms was to support missile defense
development. Both sides agreed that the U.S. side would deliver a
proposal before scheduling the next meeting. End summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Questions One, Two and Three: Who Gets
to Choose Data?; Questions Four and Five: Why No Post-Boost Data?;
Questions Six and Seven: Dealing with Equipment and Recording;
Question Eight: Understanding When Encryption Would be Used;
Questions Nine and Ten: Clarifying "Processing and "Impeding;"
Questions Eleven, Twelve and Thirteen: Questions About
Interpretive Data Lead to a Russian Challenge on Telemetry Exchange
Suspension; and U.S. Proposal Format



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QUESTIONS ONE, TWO AND THREE: WHO GETS TO CHOOSE DATA?

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5. (S) Poznikhir thanked Siemon for providing written questions on
the Russian proposal of February 2. He indicated the Russian side


had time to study the questions and was prepared to provide
responses during the meeting. Poznikhir said that he would also
ask a few questions of his own during the meeting.



Begin text of U.S. questions on Russian proposal:



U.S. Questions on Russian Proposal of February 2, 2010



The following questions are keyed to specific paragraphs in the
paper "Basic approaches of the Russian side to the exchange of
telemetric information":



Paragraph 2




1. Is there a role for the receiving Party in determining which
launches will qualify for exchange of telemetric data?




2. Would telemetry for prototype missiles be exchanged, and under
what process?




3. What would prevent a Party from selecting five launches in such
a way as to minimize the useful information in the exchange?



Paragraph 3




4. Since this data was included in the START telemetric data
exchanges, why would an exchange of telemetric data for the SCDM or
post boost vehicle be excluded in this treaty?



Paragraph 4




5. Would reentry vehicle telemetry be excluded from the exchange?



Paragraph 5




6. Would it be sufficient to provide information for purchase of
commercially-available equipment after carrying out the initial
demonstration of recording media and playback equipment?



7. If a party continues to use the same type of recording media
and playback equipment used during START, would that equipment have
to be demonstrated and new equipment provided? Is there any new
equipment or techniques to be demonstrated for START Follow-On?



Paragraph 6




8. Would the telemetric information that is encrypted be provided
in an encrypted form with the keys necessary to decrypt it, or
would the information be decrypted prior to recording it for
release to the other Party?




9. What does the term "processing" mean? Is that term the same as
"playing back"?




10. What is meant by "shall not impede"?



Paragraph 7




11. Will the specifications to define telemetric data timing and
structure be provided along with the staging and separation
information included on the recording media?




12. If so, is the intent to provide interpretive data to determine
timing and structure, but not the specific information for
conversion of the data into physical values of parameters?




13. How does the "shall not impede" concept work in practice in
exchanging interpretive data. Why would the exchange of
interpretive data be limited?



Paragraph 8




14. Would data denial techniques be used on launches where
telemetric information is exchanged?



End text.




6. (S) Poznikhir noted the telemetry questions Under Secretary of


State for Arms Control and International Security Tauscher provided
Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov. Moscow had provided him a copy of
the questions and he believed it was more appropriate for the
questions to be discussed in the Telemetry Working Group rather
than at the political level. Siemon indicated that Ambassador
Antonov had raised the questions with Assistant Secretary
Gottemoeller; however, she had not seen the questions prior to
Antonov providing her a copy in Russian. Both Gottemoeller and
Siemon had noted that the senior U.S. leadership tracked START
Follow-on (SFO) issues and would continue to ask questions when
they wanted to clarify or understand specific aspects of the
emerging Russian position on issues of concern such as telemetry.
Poznikhir suggested he present the Russian responses to the
U.S.-provided questions.




7. (S) Paragraph 2. Question 1. Is there a role for the
receiving Party in determining which launches will qualify for
exchange of telemetric data?




8. (S) In response to question 1, Poznikhir stated on many
previous occasions the Russian side had indicated the Party which
conducted the launch had the exclusive right to determine on which
launches telemetric data would be exchanged. As the Russian side
had stated in December in Geneva, during the Moscow meetings, and
in the Russian proposals on the Basic Approaches to the Exchange of
Telemetric Information, dated February 2, (Reftel),the receiving
Party would not participate in the selection of telemetric data
exchanged; this was a fundamental position of the Russian side.
The Russian side saw no place for telemetry in the SFO treaty and
simply the act of exchanging data was a compromise by the Russian
side to move toward the U.S. position.




9. (S) Siemon stated that he wanted to understand how the sides
would make the process of exchange work; would the sides discuss
the details of the exchange when the sides met during the 65-day
period at the beginning of each calendar year? Poznikhir noted
that only the agreed number of launches conducted during the
previous year on which telemetric data would be exchanged would be
discussed during the 65-day period. The aggregate number was the
only item to be decided. He reiterated that a list of launches
planned for the upcoming year would not be exchanged. Poznikhir
remarked that additional details of the process could be addressed
when the sides discussed the Annex to the Protocol.




10. (S) Paragraph 2. Question 2. Would telemetry for prototype
missiles be exchanged, and under what process?




11. (S) In response to question 2, Poznikhir remarked that the
answer fell in line with the answer to question one; the conducting
Party had the exclusive right to determine on which launches
telemetric data would be exchanged. If the conducting Party
decided to provide telemetric data from a prototype launch, then it
was a windfall for the receiving Party. However, since neither
side had a prototype, he did not see this happening.



12. (S) Paragraph 2. Question 3. What would prevent a Party from
selecting five launches in such a way as to minimize the useful
information in the exchange?




13. (S) In response to question 3, Poznikhir asked what did the
U.S. side mean by "useful information," that is, useful for what?
Siemon responded that the reason the U.S. side wanted the exchange
of telemetry was for transparency, to permit each side to have an
idea of the process the other side used to develop and deploy new
ICBMs and SLBMs. The purpose of the exchange was not for
verification. The original U.S. proposal provided for the
unencrypted exchange of telemetric information and provided for a
number of exemptions to be exercised by the Party conducting the
launch. These exemptions allowed a Party the flexibility to
protect information it believed sensitive and determine what
information it would release. The concept of the exchange of
unencrypted telemetric data and a limited number of exemptions
provided a balance in the process for the conducting and receiving
Parties. When one side exclusively controlled the exchange
process, the balance was in question. Siemon indicated that the
first three questions were asked to determine whether the receiving
side had any influence on the choice of launches on which telemetry
would be exchanged. He now understood the Russian position that
exclusive control of the selection process was retained by the
testing Party.




14. (S) Poznikhir noted that the sides had discussed the idea of
parity during the previous meeting and stated that it was difficult
to have parity when one side continued developing its missile
defense system against the other. The Russian side was not placing
missile defense systems near U.S. borders. Poznikhir indicated he
had discussed the effect missile defense had on force structure
with Missile Defense Agency Director, Lt General O'Reilly during
his visit to Moscow when O'Reilly conducted a presentation on
missile defense near Russian boundaries. He asked O'Reilly whether
he would have concerns if Russia placed missile defense
interceptors near U.S. borders to which O'Reilly responded in the
affirmative. Poznikhir could not understand how an exchange of
telemetry as a transparency measure would help parity in a positive
manner. Transparency only appeared to permit one side to use the
information provided to build its missile defense capabilities.
Since Russia was not building a missile defense system,
transparency provided an advantage to the United States.




15. (S) Poznikhir stated that the exchange of telemetry from the
self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) would have the same net
result. There was no treaty verification need for this data and
the United States would use this information to enhance its missile
defense systems. Therefore, such information should be limited.
Once again there was no parity since Russia was not developing a
missile defense system.




16. (S) Siemon noted the issue of the relationship between missile
defense and strategic offensive arms (SOA) was being worked between
Gottemoeller and Antonov. The United States and Russia had


differing ideas on the relationship between missile defense and
SOAs. The United States was willing to acknowledge the
relationship in the treaty and there were on-going discussions on
statements addressing the issue. Other discussions on the specific
aspects of a missile defense relationship should be conducted in a
different venue, and separate discussions were on going.




17. (S) Poznikhir noted that a discussion between the two
Presidents had taken place where they had indicated further
transparency was needed for both offensive and defensive systems.
He believed that including the exchange of telemetry on test
launches of missile defense interceptors within the SFO treaty
would help fulfill the Presidential ideas on transparency.




18. (S) Siemon stressed these discussions would have to take place
in a different forum. The right place for the discussion was a
separate group which could focus strictly on this issue. Siemon
noted that some of the individuals from both sides had attended the
O'Reilly presentation. He believed the United States was being
very sincere and clear about plans the United States had for the
evolution of its missile defense system, but again, these
discussions should not occur in a forum for strategic nuclear arms
reductions. Poznikhir retorted that Russia was also being
open-minded and believed this treaty should reflect the
relationship between missile defense and SOAs.



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QUESTIONS FOUR AND FIVE: WHY NO POST-BOOST DATA?

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19. (S) Paragraph 3. Question 4. Since this data was included in
the START telemetric data exchanges, why would an exchange of
telemetric data for the SCDM or post boost vehicle be excluded in
this treaty?




20. (S) In response to question 4, Poznikhir asked Siemon to
explain why the United States needed the exchange of telemetry from
the SCDM; how would this information favor verification? Siemon
responded that the exchange of SCDM telemetry was not for the
purpose of verification. The exchange continued a process that had
worked for 15 years under START and carried it forward to the SFO
treaty as a transparency measure. Under START there were
provisions to allow a Party to exempt provision of telemetry under
certain circumstances concerning the encryption exemption for one
existing ICBM or SLBM type. Siemon noted that over the life of the
START Treaty neither Party had needed to exercise this exemption
option.




21. (S) Siemon noted that for 15 years the Parties had exchanged
interpretive data for the SCDM and the missile stages. The U.S.
position was that if this information was exchanged for 15 years


under a verification regime, then why would it not be continued as
a transparency regime in the SFO treaty. Poznikhir indicated that
this exchange had occurred under a regime that existed for a very
different reason than would exist for the SFO treaty. The exchange
under START was to allow the verification of warhead attribution.
Since the concept of warhead attribution for ICBMs and SLBMs will
not exist in the SFO treaty, there was no need to exchange data on
the SCDM. He noted that the current conditions were different,
that a different relationship existed and the sides needed to trust
each other to a certain extent.




22. (S) Mr. Shevchenko stated that since he was an expert on
telemetry he knew which parameters had been broadcast under START.
He realized different parameters were broadcast for prototype
launches and serial launches or flight tests of operational
systems. He also knew what parameters were needed for missile
defense purposes. This was one reason the Russian side would not
exchange telemetry data for SCDMs. He asked whether it was
possible for the United States to provide what parameters it
believed were needed or useful for the treaty. Poznikhir concluded
discussion on this question stating that the United States had
declared it would not accept provisions for the exchange of
telemetric data on missile defense interceptor launches, therefore,
Russia would not accept any provision for the exchange of
telemetric data on the SCDM.




23. (S) Paragraph 4. Question 5. Would reentry vehicle telemetry
be excluded from the exchange?




24. (S) Poznikhir stated "yes."



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QUESTIONS SIX AND SEVEN: DEALING WITH EQUIPMENT AND RECORDING

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25. (S) Paragraph 5. Question 6. Would it be sufficient to
provide information for purchase of commercially-available
equipment after carrying out the initial demonstration of recording
media and playback equipment?




26. (S) Siemon said question 6 represented an attempt to simplify
the complex equipment issues encountered during START. He asked
whether it would be sufficient to provide information for purchase
of commercially-available equipment after carrying out the initial
demonstration of recording media and playback equipment. Under
START the Party conducting the initial demonstration provided the
other Party the opportunity to purchase the demonstrated equipment.
The receiving Party paid for the equipment through cost settlement
procedures. Siemon offered that under the SFO treaty there were
two options for this process; accept the procedures as used under
START or a process in which the initial demonstration was conducted


and the conducting Party then provided information about where the
equipment could be commercially purchased. Poznikhir offered that
after the demonstration the Party conducting the demonstration
would need to provide the opportunity to purchase exactly the same
equipment as was demonstrated. In this manner, if problems were
encountered after the equipment was purchased, then the other Party
could go back to the providing Party for resolution.




27. (S) Paragraph 5. Question 7. If a Party continues to use the
same type of recording media and playback equipment used during
START, would that equipment have to be demonstrated and new
equipment provided? Is there any new equipment or techniques to be
demonstrated for SFO?




28. (S) In response to question 7, Poznikhir indicated that the
initial demonstration pertained to both equipment previously
demonstrated and purchased under START and any new playback
equipment that the Parties would introduce after entry into force
(EIF).



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QUESTION EIGHT: UNDERSTANDING WHEN ENCRYPTION WOULD BE USED

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29. (S) Paragraph 6. Question 8. Would the telemetric
information that is encrypted be provided in an encrypted form with
the keys necessary to decrypt it, or would the information be
decrypted prior to recording it for release to the other Party?




30. (S) Poznikhir asked Siemon to clarify the question. Siemon
stated the question was if the launching Party encrypted the data
and then decided that this launch would be one on which telemetry
was exchanged, how would the providing Party handle the exchange of
encrypted data? Poznikhir stated that there would not be
encryption on any of the five launches on which data would be
exchanged. A Party could encrypt on all other launches. Siemon
provided an example in which both Parties conducted five launches;
however, one Party encrypted on one of the launches. How would the
exchange of telemetry work? Poznikhir stated he understood the
question posed and would take it back to his delegation for study.




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QUESTIONS NINE AND TEN: CLARIFYING "PROCESSING" AND "IMPEDING"

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31. (S) Paragraph 6. Question 9. What does the term "processing"


mean? Is that term the same as "playing back?"




32. (S) Poznikhir stated the answer to question 9 was easy.
Processing was the capability to play back information as it had
existed onboard the flight test vehicle. Play back meant the
ability to play back data without it being impeded.




33. (S) Paragraph 6. Question 10. What is meant by "shall not
impede?"




34. (S) Poznikhir stated "shall not impede" meant that neither
Party would impede getting access to the data; in other words, no
encryption, encapsulation, jamming or use of narrow directional
beaming.



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QUESTIONS ELEVEN, TWELVE AND THIRTEEN: QUESTIONS ABOUT

INTERPRETIVE DATA LEAD TO A RUSSIAN CHALLENGE ON TELEMETRY

EXCHANGE SUSPSENSION

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35. (S) Paragraph 7. Question 11. Will the specifications to
define telemetric data timing and structure be provided along with
the staging and separation information included on the recording
media?




36. (S) The Russian response to question 11 provided insight to
questions 12 and 13.




37. (S) Paragraph 7. Question 12. If so, is the intent to
provide interpretive data to determine timing and structure, but
not the specific information for conversion of the data into
physical values of parameters?




38. (S) Paragraph 7. Question 13. How does the "shall not
impede" concept work in practice in exchanging interpretive data.
Why would the exchange of interpretive data be limited?




39. (S) Poznikhir asked Siemon to explain question 11. Siemon
stated the question dealt with interpretive data as used under
START. How much interpretive data would a Party provide and what
parts of the test launch would the interpretive data cover?
Poznikhir indicated that Russia would provide information on the


stages of the SLBM and ICBM, which would include methods of
encoding but would not include descriptions of parameters required
to identify separation times and separation commands and their
location within the telemetry frame. It would not provide
information related to the SCDM and the reentry vehicle release.
Responding to a question from Dr. Ringenberg, Poznikhir stated that
other than separation commands telemetry provided would be similar
to that provided under START. He asked what the U.S. position was
regarding what interpretive data was needed and should be included
in the telemetry protocol.




40. (S) Siemon asked Poznikhir about the question he took back to
his delegation referencing the U.S. legal concern over denial of a
treaty obligation to provide telemetry exchange during the first
year of the treaty and the first 65 days of the calendar year when
a Party chose to suspend exchange because a disagreement could not
be resolved in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Poznikhir
reiterated that the Russian side placed this provision in its
proposed text to enable a Party to suspend the exchange if it felt
the exchange threatened its national security.




41. (S) Siemon stated that it was hard to believe that two sides
could enter into a treaty with a provision where one side could
choose not to comply with its obligations. During the
Mullen-Makarov meeting, Admiral Winnefeld proposed a process in
which the terms of the exchange were revisited. Presidents Obama
and Medvedev met in Copenhagen and agreed that this should occur
annually. Siemon believed that it was difficult for those at the
working group level to change a decision made by the Presidents.




42. (S) Mr. Luchaninov questioned what impact a suspension of
telemetry exchange would have on the implementation of a treaty
based on verification since telemetry was not used for
verification. Mr. Dean stated that all treaties came with the
option for either side to withdraw if it felt its national security
was threatened. This withdrawal clause was not related to
verification but it was included in these treaties nonetheless.
There were many items included in treaties that were not related to
verification. If a Party determined an item was important it could
include it in the treaty.




43. (S) Luchaninov responded that almost all of the provisions in
the SFO treaty were related to reduction, control, and verification
of strategic arms. The only issue that did not conform to this was
telemetry. The U.S. side spoke of transparency as it applied to
telemetry, but at the same time, telemetry was not important to the
issues of reduction, control or verification. He restated his
question; if one side suspended the telemetry exchange, was it
envisioned that this side would suspend the main work of the
treaty? Dean believed Luchaninov was looking at the issue in the
wrong way. The U.S. perspective was that telemetry was an
important issue, like any other issue that was included in the
treaty. The United States would never draft a core obligation that
allowed one Party to unilaterally control compliance. It was a
mistake to characterize telemetry as a "nice to have" for
transparency and not as important as other treaty obligations.



44. (S) Siemon added that when the sides agreed to place a
provision in the treaty they were obligated to comply with that
provision. Provisions translated to obligations. If a Party could
not continue to honor its commitment to comply with an obligation,
it withdrew from the treaty. Poznikhir agreed that when a side
signed a treaty it was obligated to comply with the treaty
provisions. However, he believed that suspension of telemetry
exchange did not impact the obligation to comply with the other
parts of the treaty. Siemon disagreed with this statement. A
Party should not have the unilateral right not to comply with an
obligation of the treaty; a provision should not be in the treaty
that allowed one Party to unilaterally walk away from an
obligation. General Venevtsev used the long discussions in START's
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission as an example where
suspension would provide motivation to resolve a question within a
short time period.




45. (S) Poznikhir stated the right to suspend the exchange would
not be a unilateral right, but a right of both Parties. If either
Party suspended the exchange, the entire treaty would not collapse.
The Parties could agree to foster discussion and would have 11
months to solve the problem. A long time period for discussion was
not needed. If one Party were to use telemetry in a way that
endangered the other's national security, the telemetry exchange
would be suspended. This would be the case when one Party was
working on missile defense and the other was not.



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U.S. PROPOSAL FORMAT

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46. (S) Siemon acknowledged the concerns and said he would discuss
the Russian position and answers with colleagues back in
Washington. He stated he planned to prepare a draft proposal in
either of two ways: as an independent U.S. proposal or as a
proposal incorporating the Russian-proposed text with the text of
both sides bracketed. He asked which format the Russian side
preferred. Poznikhir responded that the format did not matter as
long the Russian main proposals were included. Siemon stated that
his preference would be to draft a merged document with brackets to
explain the sides' differences. He would attempt to produce a
first draft of the document without prejudice to either side's
position and the sides would discuss where to place the brackets at
the next meeting. Mr. LaPointe asked, given the START Telemetry
Protocol as a starting point, what other points within the new
protocol did the Russian side think should be put in the Protocol
and which should be put into the Annex? Poznikhir stated the U.S.
side could see that the Russian proposal included analogous items
from START Treaty language as well as from START's Telemetry
Protocol. Siemon stated he wanted to complete the text prior to
the next meeting to give the Russian side time to read and
understand it. He needed to coordinate any proposal with
Washington. With the current weather situation in Washington it
was not clear when this coordination would take place. He would
work out the schedule once guidance arrived.



47. (U) Documents provided: None.




48. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Mr. Ahlm

Lt Col Comeau

Mr. Dean

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Mr. LaPointe

Ms. Pura

Dr. Ringenberg

Ms. Smith (Int)



RUSSIA



Gen Poznikhir

Mr. Luchaninov

Mr. Malyugin

Mr. Shevchenko

Gen Venevtsev

Mr. Voloskov

Ms. Komshilova (Int)




49. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS