Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10GENEVA45
2010-02-17 09:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission Geneva
Cable title:
GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON GEORGIA: ROUND IX
how-toVZCZCXYZ0014 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #0045/01 0480940 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O R 170940Z FEB 10 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0082 INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0016 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0001 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0001 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0001
C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000045
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/17
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM GG RS
SUBJECT: GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON GEORGIA: ROUND IX
CLASSIFIED BY: Peter F. Mulrean, Counselor, State, RMA; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000045
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/17
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM GG RS
SUBJECT: GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON GEORGIA: ROUND IX
CLASSIFIED BY: Peter F. Mulrean, Counselor, State, RMA; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia continued to clamor for "bilateral" non-use of force
agreements with Georgia. The Georgians continued to insist Russia
be part of such agreements and to link them with international
security arrangements. While the Abkhazia IPRM continued to
function, the South Ossetians linked resumption of their IPRM to
new information from the Georgians about missing persons. The
Russians, accusing the Georgians of remilitarization, stood behind
the South Ossetians, but privately undertook to try and resuscitate
the IPRM. In an aside with the U.S., the Russians rejected any
increased international presence in the breakaway regions, but did
not reject possibly creating a bigger role for the IPRMs. The
second working group was unable to make progress on water or gas
projects, but agreed to meet one day before the next round of
Geneva Discussions (planned for March 30) for an experts'
presentation on IDP-related issues. END SUMMARY.
--------------
NON-USE-OF-FORCE
--------------
2. (SBU) The South Ossetians and Abkhaz continued to insist they
faced an ongoing threat from Georgia and therefore needed
"bilateral" non-use-of-force (NUF) agreements with Tbilisi.
Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria countered that such
an agreement makes no sense without further elucidation of
international security arrangements, which neither the de facto
authorities nor the Russians were willing to consider. Bokeria
also noted that Georgia continued to face a threat from Russia,
which has passed a law authorizing the government to take measures
to protect Russian citizens overseas. EU Co-Chair Pierre Morel
stressed that non-use of force means nothing without meaningful
implementing measures, noting that the Tagliavini report also
called for an increased international presence.
3. (SBU) EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Kaidanow echoed Morel's
sentiments, and pointed out that the Co-Chairs' proposal on
"interim steps," which contained a modest enhancement of the
international presence on the ground, would be a good beginning.
DAS Kaidanow also noted that the August 12 cease-fire signed by
Russian President Medvedev and Georgian President Saakashvili had
included NUF, and urged the Russians to comply with the other five
elements of the cease-fire agreement.
4. (SBU) The Russians rejected the co-chairs' approach, with
Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin stating categorically that
Russia cannot accept an increased international presence. He
threatened that any insistence on such a presence could "disrupt
the Geneva process." Morel reacted strongly to Karasin's position,
pointing out that the working assumption of the discussions at
Geneva VI, VII and VIII has been to combine the idea of a NUF
agreement with international security arrangements. He objected
that Russia's sudden rejection of this connection threatened to
undermine all the work that has been done over the last three
rounds. With a show of emotion, Morel said the co-chairs would not
allow themselves to become "quiet managers of the status quo."
5. (C) In a private conversation with DAS Kaidanow, Karasin
claimed that "his lawyers" would never agree to an international
presence in Georgia outside the already agreed Incident Prevention
and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs). Kaidanow encouraged him to
explore further with Morel the possibility of enhancing the IPRMs
to accommodate a more robust international role and mandate, a
suggestion that he claimed to be willing to consider. She made the
same suggestion to Morel, who had expressed reluctance earlier to
expand the role of the IPRMs at the possible "expense" of the
Geneva-based dialogue.
6. (SBU) The Russians did acknowledge that Georgia has status
issues with the territories that will preclude signing an agreement
with the de facto authorities. As an alternative to a formal
treaty, Karasin suggested that all three consider making unilateral
declarations to the United Nations on non-use-of-force. The
Georgians said they might consider the proposal if Russia would be
part of the arrangement.
--------------
INCIDENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS
--------------
7. (SBU) Although all participants agreed the Abkhazia IPRM had
continued to work reasonably well, the South Ossetians continued to
argue that they would not restart their IPRM (suspended since
October 2009) without first getting more information from the
Georgians on the residual issue of the three missing persons that
they have been concerned with for some time. Morel suggested a way
forward by separating out the missing persons issue and addressing
it through the International Red Cross and Crescent (ICRC),as well
as through ongoing discussion with Council of Europe representative
Thomas Hammarberg. The South Ossetians were willing to accept
these additional efforts to work on the missing persons cases, but
steadfastly refused to return to the IPRM until the cases were
resolved.
8. (SBU) Morel also tried to address the South Ossetians' concerns
about the procedural elements of the IPRM. He proposed a new
arrangement for setting the agenda and moderating the meetings,
which he called the "Fourth Variant," based on the South Ossetians'
own ideas. He then suggested that those parties who participate in
the South Ossetia IPRM hold a side meeting to discuss this
proposal. The South Ossetians and Russians refused to attend the
side meeting, so the Georgians, EUMM and OSCE were unable to take
any action on the proposal.
9. (C) DAS Kaidanow privately (and pointedly) noted to Karasin on
the margins that the resumption of the South Ossetian IPRM was the
sina qua non for any further discussion on "non-use-of-force" or
other security arrangements. Karasin undertook to try and
encourage the South Ossetians to moderate their view.
--------------
MISSING PERSONS
--------------
10. (SBU) The Georgians relayed privately that the ICRC had
convened a meeting among the South Ossetians, Georgians, and
Russians under their auspices in Geneva January 27 to discuss
forming a commission to look at the missing persons issue,
including the three individuals of concern to the South Ossetians.
Everyone reportedly concurred this would be a good idea, but there
was no real agreement on venue. South Ossetia objected to Ergneti,
on the administrative boundary line, and suggested Geneva. ICRC
said this made little sense, especially since meetings often need
to take place on short notice. The Georgians expressed the fear
that the South Ossetians might object to IPRM meetings in Ergneti
in the future, though this was not immediately apparent. [Note:
The ICRC subsequently informed us that all parties have now agreed
to meet periodically in Geneva. End note.]
11. (SBU) During the discussions, Morel expressed the hope that
the involvement of the ICRC and the Council of Europe in the
investigation of individual cases would not only help make progress
on those cases, but allow the South Ossetians to return to the
IPRM. Representative of the South Ossetian "president" Boris
Chochiyev replied in the negative, saying that he had little hope
that these additional efforts would make much difference. He also
noted that South Ossetia had concerns about cases dating to before
the war, seeming to imply that resolution of the cases under
discussion might not be enough, but he did not go into detail.
--------------
REMILITARIZATION ACCUSATIONS
--------------
12. (SBU) European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Chief of
Mission Hansjoerg Haber gave a detailed assessment of developments
on the ground. Countering Russian General Kulakhmetov's explicit
allegations of Georgian troop movements and redeployments aimed at
threatening the two separatist regions, Haber noted that the
Georgians are living up to their unilateral transparency
commitments under MOUs with the Ministries of Defense and Internal
Affairs, and that EUMM's own assessment is that Georgian
deployments are of a fundamentally defensive nature. He also noted
that it is Russia that has not complied with its cease-fire
commitments, in particular in the regions of the Upper Kodori
Valley, Perevi and the Akhalgori Valley. Haber also listed a
number of hotspots along the administrative boundaries of both
regions on which the EUMM keeps a careful eye.
13. (C) Haber later related privately that, in a side conversation
with Karasin and Kulakhmetov, the Russians requested a copy of
Haber's presentation. Haber got the impression that Karasin did
not have a very clear picture of the situation on the ground, and
that in general the MFA did not get regular information from the
Russian agencies (the military and the FSB) with primary presence
in the regions.
--------------
GEORGIAN ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY
--------------
14. (SBU) The Russians acknowledged receipt of the engagement
strategy, which the Georgians had passed to them on the margins of
the session, but did not comment extensively on its contents.
Karasin was careful not to reject it out of hand, but was
disparaging about Georgians' intentions in drafting such a
document. Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Bokeria noted that
Geneva was not the proper forum to discuss the strategy, and
stressed that its goal was to reach out to the people in the
regions in a non-politicized way.
-------------- --------------
WORKING GROUP TWO STILL STALLED, INFORMATIONAL MEETINGS TO BEGIN
-------------- --------------
15. (SBU) The second group focused its morning session on one
paragraph of the "Agreed Undertakings" draft circulated by the
Co-Chairs, but were unable to make any progress. The South
Ossetians reintroduced concepts that had been debated and rejected
in previous rounds, with the Russians playing a more openly
unhelpful role. The tone of conversation became more negative and
personal than in previous rounds.
16. (SBU) The OSCE remained cautiously hopeful that gas might be
secured for Aklhalgori. While Georgia appeared to be cooperative,
the South Ossetians insisted they would only consider the
possibility of discussing proposed water projects to feed
irrigation systems in undisputed Georgia after Georgia turns on the
gas. In a discussion of potential action items, the U.S. suggested
the Co-Chairs hold informational meetings with experts to explain
how issues related to the return of internally displaced persons
(databases, go-and-see visits, etc) had been addressed in other
situations. All parties agreed that such a meeting will take place
in a half-day session before the next round of the Geneva
Discussions March 30.
17. (C) COMMENT. This was the least productive round in recent
memory, with regression on both the NUF agreement/international
security arrangements (Russia's categorical rejection of the
latter) and the IPRM (South Ossetia's refusal to participate),and
no progress on Working Group II's Agreed Undertakings. Many
participants expressly questioned the continued utility of Geneva.
The South Ossetian reference to detention cases from before the
August 2008 war, which have not been raised before, raises the
specter that, even if we resolve one of their concerns, they will
always find another. Russia's outright rejection of international
security arrangements, which have been a key part of the co-chairs'
efforts to cobble together a compromise, also raises questions
about their commitment to finding a workable and durable way
forward. Unless we can, in the runup to March 30, somehow lay the
groundwork for a more productive session -- at the very least get
the South Ossetians to return to the IPRM -- the process is in
jeopardy.
GRIFFITHS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/17
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM GG RS
SUBJECT: GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON GEORGIA: ROUND IX
CLASSIFIED BY: Peter F. Mulrean, Counselor, State, RMA; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia continued to clamor for "bilateral" non-use of force
agreements with Georgia. The Georgians continued to insist Russia
be part of such agreements and to link them with international
security arrangements. While the Abkhazia IPRM continued to
function, the South Ossetians linked resumption of their IPRM to
new information from the Georgians about missing persons. The
Russians, accusing the Georgians of remilitarization, stood behind
the South Ossetians, but privately undertook to try and resuscitate
the IPRM. In an aside with the U.S., the Russians rejected any
increased international presence in the breakaway regions, but did
not reject possibly creating a bigger role for the IPRMs. The
second working group was unable to make progress on water or gas
projects, but agreed to meet one day before the next round of
Geneva Discussions (planned for March 30) for an experts'
presentation on IDP-related issues. END SUMMARY.
--------------
NON-USE-OF-FORCE
--------------
2. (SBU) The South Ossetians and Abkhaz continued to insist they
faced an ongoing threat from Georgia and therefore needed
"bilateral" non-use-of-force (NUF) agreements with Tbilisi.
Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria countered that such
an agreement makes no sense without further elucidation of
international security arrangements, which neither the de facto
authorities nor the Russians were willing to consider. Bokeria
also noted that Georgia continued to face a threat from Russia,
which has passed a law authorizing the government to take measures
to protect Russian citizens overseas. EU Co-Chair Pierre Morel
stressed that non-use of force means nothing without meaningful
implementing measures, noting that the Tagliavini report also
called for an increased international presence.
3. (SBU) EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Kaidanow echoed Morel's
sentiments, and pointed out that the Co-Chairs' proposal on
"interim steps," which contained a modest enhancement of the
international presence on the ground, would be a good beginning.
DAS Kaidanow also noted that the August 12 cease-fire signed by
Russian President Medvedev and Georgian President Saakashvili had
included NUF, and urged the Russians to comply with the other five
elements of the cease-fire agreement.
4. (SBU) The Russians rejected the co-chairs' approach, with
Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin stating categorically that
Russia cannot accept an increased international presence. He
threatened that any insistence on such a presence could "disrupt
the Geneva process." Morel reacted strongly to Karasin's position,
pointing out that the working assumption of the discussions at
Geneva VI, VII and VIII has been to combine the idea of a NUF
agreement with international security arrangements. He objected
that Russia's sudden rejection of this connection threatened to
undermine all the work that has been done over the last three
rounds. With a show of emotion, Morel said the co-chairs would not
allow themselves to become "quiet managers of the status quo."
5. (C) In a private conversation with DAS Kaidanow, Karasin
claimed that "his lawyers" would never agree to an international
presence in Georgia outside the already agreed Incident Prevention
and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs). Kaidanow encouraged him to
explore further with Morel the possibility of enhancing the IPRMs
to accommodate a more robust international role and mandate, a
suggestion that he claimed to be willing to consider. She made the
same suggestion to Morel, who had expressed reluctance earlier to
expand the role of the IPRMs at the possible "expense" of the
Geneva-based dialogue.
6. (SBU) The Russians did acknowledge that Georgia has status
issues with the territories that will preclude signing an agreement
with the de facto authorities. As an alternative to a formal
treaty, Karasin suggested that all three consider making unilateral
declarations to the United Nations on non-use-of-force. The
Georgians said they might consider the proposal if Russia would be
part of the arrangement.
--------------
INCIDENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS
--------------
7. (SBU) Although all participants agreed the Abkhazia IPRM had
continued to work reasonably well, the South Ossetians continued to
argue that they would not restart their IPRM (suspended since
October 2009) without first getting more information from the
Georgians on the residual issue of the three missing persons that
they have been concerned with for some time. Morel suggested a way
forward by separating out the missing persons issue and addressing
it through the International Red Cross and Crescent (ICRC),as well
as through ongoing discussion with Council of Europe representative
Thomas Hammarberg. The South Ossetians were willing to accept
these additional efforts to work on the missing persons cases, but
steadfastly refused to return to the IPRM until the cases were
resolved.
8. (SBU) Morel also tried to address the South Ossetians' concerns
about the procedural elements of the IPRM. He proposed a new
arrangement for setting the agenda and moderating the meetings,
which he called the "Fourth Variant," based on the South Ossetians'
own ideas. He then suggested that those parties who participate in
the South Ossetia IPRM hold a side meeting to discuss this
proposal. The South Ossetians and Russians refused to attend the
side meeting, so the Georgians, EUMM and OSCE were unable to take
any action on the proposal.
9. (C) DAS Kaidanow privately (and pointedly) noted to Karasin on
the margins that the resumption of the South Ossetian IPRM was the
sina qua non for any further discussion on "non-use-of-force" or
other security arrangements. Karasin undertook to try and
encourage the South Ossetians to moderate their view.
--------------
MISSING PERSONS
--------------
10. (SBU) The Georgians relayed privately that the ICRC had
convened a meeting among the South Ossetians, Georgians, and
Russians under their auspices in Geneva January 27 to discuss
forming a commission to look at the missing persons issue,
including the three individuals of concern to the South Ossetians.
Everyone reportedly concurred this would be a good idea, but there
was no real agreement on venue. South Ossetia objected to Ergneti,
on the administrative boundary line, and suggested Geneva. ICRC
said this made little sense, especially since meetings often need
to take place on short notice. The Georgians expressed the fear
that the South Ossetians might object to IPRM meetings in Ergneti
in the future, though this was not immediately apparent. [Note:
The ICRC subsequently informed us that all parties have now agreed
to meet periodically in Geneva. End note.]
11. (SBU) During the discussions, Morel expressed the hope that
the involvement of the ICRC and the Council of Europe in the
investigation of individual cases would not only help make progress
on those cases, but allow the South Ossetians to return to the
IPRM. Representative of the South Ossetian "president" Boris
Chochiyev replied in the negative, saying that he had little hope
that these additional efforts would make much difference. He also
noted that South Ossetia had concerns about cases dating to before
the war, seeming to imply that resolution of the cases under
discussion might not be enough, but he did not go into detail.
--------------
REMILITARIZATION ACCUSATIONS
--------------
12. (SBU) European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Chief of
Mission Hansjoerg Haber gave a detailed assessment of developments
on the ground. Countering Russian General Kulakhmetov's explicit
allegations of Georgian troop movements and redeployments aimed at
threatening the two separatist regions, Haber noted that the
Georgians are living up to their unilateral transparency
commitments under MOUs with the Ministries of Defense and Internal
Affairs, and that EUMM's own assessment is that Georgian
deployments are of a fundamentally defensive nature. He also noted
that it is Russia that has not complied with its cease-fire
commitments, in particular in the regions of the Upper Kodori
Valley, Perevi and the Akhalgori Valley. Haber also listed a
number of hotspots along the administrative boundaries of both
regions on which the EUMM keeps a careful eye.
13. (C) Haber later related privately that, in a side conversation
with Karasin and Kulakhmetov, the Russians requested a copy of
Haber's presentation. Haber got the impression that Karasin did
not have a very clear picture of the situation on the ground, and
that in general the MFA did not get regular information from the
Russian agencies (the military and the FSB) with primary presence
in the regions.
--------------
GEORGIAN ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY
--------------
14. (SBU) The Russians acknowledged receipt of the engagement
strategy, which the Georgians had passed to them on the margins of
the session, but did not comment extensively on its contents.
Karasin was careful not to reject it out of hand, but was
disparaging about Georgians' intentions in drafting such a
document. Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Bokeria noted that
Geneva was not the proper forum to discuss the strategy, and
stressed that its goal was to reach out to the people in the
regions in a non-politicized way.
-------------- --------------
WORKING GROUP TWO STILL STALLED, INFORMATIONAL MEETINGS TO BEGIN
-------------- --------------
15. (SBU) The second group focused its morning session on one
paragraph of the "Agreed Undertakings" draft circulated by the
Co-Chairs, but were unable to make any progress. The South
Ossetians reintroduced concepts that had been debated and rejected
in previous rounds, with the Russians playing a more openly
unhelpful role. The tone of conversation became more negative and
personal than in previous rounds.
16. (SBU) The OSCE remained cautiously hopeful that gas might be
secured for Aklhalgori. While Georgia appeared to be cooperative,
the South Ossetians insisted they would only consider the
possibility of discussing proposed water projects to feed
irrigation systems in undisputed Georgia after Georgia turns on the
gas. In a discussion of potential action items, the U.S. suggested
the Co-Chairs hold informational meetings with experts to explain
how issues related to the return of internally displaced persons
(databases, go-and-see visits, etc) had been addressed in other
situations. All parties agreed that such a meeting will take place
in a half-day session before the next round of the Geneva
Discussions March 30.
17. (C) COMMENT. This was the least productive round in recent
memory, with regression on both the NUF agreement/international
security arrangements (Russia's categorical rejection of the
latter) and the IPRM (South Ossetia's refusal to participate),and
no progress on Working Group II's Agreed Undertakings. Many
participants expressly questioned the continued utility of Geneva.
The South Ossetian reference to detention cases from before the
August 2008 war, which have not been raised before, raises the
specter that, even if we resolve one of their concerns, they will
always find another. Russia's outright rejection of international
security arrangements, which have been a key part of the co-chairs'
efforts to cobble together a compromise, also raises questions
about their commitment to finding a workable and durable way
forward. Unless we can, in the runup to March 30, somehow lay the
groundwork for a more productive session -- at the very least get
the South Ossetians to return to the IPRM -- the process is in
jeopardy.
GRIFFITHS