SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY

S E C R E T GENEVA 000249

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY
26, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 231 (SFO-GVA-VIII-088)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-093.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 26, 2010

Time: 10:00 P.M. - 12:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting chaired by Mr.
Siemon and General Poznikhir, the sides continued discussion of the
U.S.-proposed Draft Text ((Annex to the))1 Protocol ((Part Seven))2
- Telemetric Information, dated February 24, 2010 (Reftel). The
tone of the Russian side was more positive than at the previous
meeting; however, three major issues divided the sides. The sides
had a constructive review of the document that clarified the
other's position. End summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section I: General Provisions; Section
II: Access to Telemetric Information; and Section III: Guidance
for the Exchange of Telemetric Information.



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Section I: General Provisions

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5. (S) Poznikhir provided Russian-proposed text for paragraphs 1
through 3 of Section I: General Provisions, which, he said,
reflected the discussions held the previous day (Reftel). (Begin
comment. The three new paragraphs presented by the Russian side
contained no new text but was rather a combination and
re-arrangement of previously presented Russian text and did not
incorporate any text provided by the U.S. side. End comment). Mr.
Siemon indicated that he would provide an official U.S. translation
later that day.



Begin text:



U.S. Official Translation

February 26, 2010


SFO-VIII

CONFIDENTIAL

Releasable to the U.S. side

Document of the Russian side



February 26, 2010



Part Seven - Telemetric Information



Section I. General Provisions


1. The Parties shall exchange telemetric information on an
equal number of ICBM and SLBM launches, but on no more than five
ICBM and SLBM launches per calendar year.

Telemetric information shall be exchanged on ICBM and SLBM
launches that have been conducted in the previous calendar year.


2. The launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, on which telemetric
information is provided, shall be determined by the conducting
Party.

At the first annual session of the BCC, the Parties shall
discuss the issue of selection of ICBM and SLBM launches, conducted
in the previous year, on which telemetric information will be
exchanged in the current year, and shall come to a mutual decision
regarding the number of such launches.


3. Each Party shall provide telemetric information to the
other Party via diplomatic channels no later than (( )) days after
the decision, mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Section, has been
made.



End text.




6. (S) Mr. Dean reminded Poznikhir that the sides had not resolved
the issue of "launch" versus "flight test" and indicated that the
text should show both terms in brackets. Poznikhir acknowledged
the difference and noted that some of the Russian launches were for
peaceful purposes. Regarding paragraph 5 which addresses the
conditions and guidelines for the exchange of telemetric
information on the launches of ICBMs and SLBMs in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC),Siemon noted the U.S. side had two
fundamental disagreements with the Russian text. The first was
that the receiving Party had no role in the selection of the flight
tests on which telemetry would be exchanged. The second was the
idea that the exchange of telemetry could be suspended if the
issues were not resolved in the BCC. Poznikhir clarified the
Russian position. Telemetry would be exchanged on launches from
the previous calendar year. The Russian side would not provide a


schedule of planned launches for the current year. One of the
reasons for this was that these dates could be moved for several
reasons, including the status of the launch vehicle or the status
of the mission itself. Mr. Schevchenko and Poznikhir indicated
concern over the repercussions of a schedule that was not met.




7. (S) Poznikhir did not understand what impact provision of a
planned launch schedule could have on the selection of the launches
on which telemetry would be exchanged or the exchange itself.
Siemon noted that there were several places in the Protocol where
notifications in advance of current year events occurred. Agreed
conversion or elimination and notification procedures obligated a
Party to provide the current year's planned schedule of conversions
and eliminations. He understood the Russian concern over schedule
changes; however, the U.S. side realized that what a side planned
to do was not always what necessarily happened. The sides would
exchange planned launch schedules simply to give the other side
insight into what was planned for the current year. The U.S. side
did not consider this to be sensitive information.




8. (S) Siemon remarked that the exchange of schedules was about
extending the concept of transparency into the development and
deployment of a side's strategic forces. He could not understand
why the Russian side found it so difficult to provide a schedule of
planned launches given the idea of the new relationship between the
United States and Russia. Poznikhir stated the Protocol contained
a notification 24 hours in advance of a launch that made sharing of
the planned schedule unnecessary. He could not be convinced that
provision of this schedule would have an impact on implementation
of telemetry obligations or that it was important for the treaty.
Poznikhir also noted that Russia had laws that prevented it from
providing state secrets. Siemon reminded him that in both the
United States and Russia, a ratified treaty trumped domestic law.
Poznikhir suggested the sides leave the text bracketed but assured
Siemon nonetheless that the text would not be accepted. He also
recommended the text on suspension of telemetry exchange remain
bracketed since it was a fundamental difference in positions and
could be returned to at a later date. Before leaving the issue,
Siemon reminded Poznikhir that the sides had agreed during the
Admiral Mullen-General Makarov meetings in Moscow that if telemetry
exchange issues could not be resolved in the BCC, the exchanges
would continue and both sides clearly understood the agreement.




9. (S) Dean attempted to clarify Poznikhir's question regarding
whether paragraph 6 that referenced telemetry exchange in the year
the treaty entered into force was redundant. He gave examples that
supported the positions of each side; however, the text remained
bracketed. Poznikhir also noted that under the Russian proposal,
telemetry could not be exchanged for the last year of the treaty,
because the discussions regarding the exchange for the year would
have to take place after the treaty expired.



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Section II: Access to

Telemetric Information


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10. (S) Poznikhir agreed to the U.S. formulation "the telemetry
signal" in paragraph 1 that addressed measures to deny access to
information broadcast. He questioned what the United States meant
by the text in the last sentence that referenced providing the
means to obtain decrypted data when a Party encrypted telemetric
information. Siemon stated that the text was required for a
situation in which a side only conducted five flight tests and had
encrypted the telemetric information on one of the flight tests.
In this situation if the sides decided to exchange telemetry on
five launches, the side that encrypted the telemetry would be
required to provide the information necessary to decrypt the
encrypted telemetric information. Siemon noted that this was
provided as an option, not an obligation. Poznikhir stated that
this situation would not happen since the sides would "bank"
unencrypted launches on which telemetry would be exchanged to
ensure it had five to exchange. He asked the U.S. side to think
about the question of what equipment or codes would need to be
exchanged. The text remained bracketed.




11. (S) Poznikhir stated that the sides agreed on the text in
paragraph 2 regarding notification of the intent to use measures to
deny access to the telemetry signal for launches of ICBMs and SLBMs
on which telemetric information is not exchanged. Poznikhir asked
if paragraph 3 that addressed the notification of broadcast
frequencies and associated modulation methods 24 hours in advance
of a launch was also required for the launch of a prototype.
Siemon responded in the affirmative. Poznikhir said that the text
referring to prototypes was redundant because the Agreement between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, dated
May 31, 1988 covered prototypes. He said that he had no
fundamental objection to the concept of the paragraph. It had
worked under START, but he asked that the text remain in brackets
for now. He noted the use of both "launch" and "flight test" in
the U.S. language.



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Section III: Guidance for the

Exchange of Telemetric Exchange

--------------




12. (S) Poznikhir noted paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 contained a
fundamental difference in the positions of the sides regarding the
exchange of telemetry from the self-contained dispensing mechanism
(SCDM). He repeated the Russian position that SCDM telemetry
exchange was not necessary since the treaty did not include the
concept of warhead attribution for ICBMs or SLBMs; and the fact
that SCDM telemetry would not be exchanged because it could be used
to enhance missile defense systems. Poznikhir ask why the U.S.
side wanted to receive SCDM data.



13. (S) Siemon indicated the exchange of SCDM telemetry was one of
three fundamental differences in the sides' positions. The other
two were the role of the receiving Party in the selection of
launches on which telemetry would be exchanged and the concept for
the suspension of the exchange of telemetry in cases where issues
could not be resolved in the BCC. Poznikhir reminded Siemon that
the sides were discussing an agreed statement on the use of
telemetric information for building missile defense systems. He
asked the status of the agreed statement. Siemon noted that the
agreed statement was being discussed by Assistant Secretary
Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov and in a separate working
group. He indicated that Under Secretary Tauscher was in Geneva
and would discuss the relationship between strategic offensive
forces and missile defense. The Telemetry Working Group was not
the forum for those discussions. The sides agreed to leave the
text in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 bracketed.




14. (S) Poznikhir indicated that there was no disagreement on
paragraph 4 that addressed the right that a Party conducting a
launch would independently determine the method for recording
telemetric information on recording media. Regarding paragraph 5
that referenced the playback of the recording of the telemetric
information, the sides removed brackets containing "if requested"
in subparagraphs (d) and (e) that addressed acquiring playback
equipment and the provision of training respectively, but Poznikhir
suggested using "at the request of the other Party." The Russian
side continued to believe that the initial demonstrations of
playback equipment should include the equipment used in START to
remove any suspicion that a Party may have modified the equipment
after the demonstration required by the START Treaty. Siemon
believed that Parties should not be obligated to demonstrate the
equipment a second time; it would be an unnecessary expenditure of
time, money and effort. The sides agreed there was no fundamental
difference in the remaining brackets.




15. (S) The sides agreed that paragraph 6 regarding the procedures
to use in the situation where a Party received recording media that
contained poor quality or insufficient telemetric information was
similar to START and therefore, there was no disagreement on the
text.




16. (S) Poznikhir stated that the Russian side had taken the
concept in paragraph 6 and applied the same concept to interpretive
data in paragraph 7. Experience in START and discussions in the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission demonstrated the need
for the text. The Party conducting a launch should be obligated to
clarify any question regarding interpretive data that prevented the
other Party from converting the telemetric information back into
the format that had existed on the missile before broadcast. Dr.
Ringenberg stated that the U.S side was studying the text; however,
he believed that the right to discuss any issues regarding
telemetry within the Bilateral Consultative Commission would exist
in the new treaty as it had existed in START. The sides agreed to
continue work on the Protocol/Annex during the intersession so that
they would be prepared to continue discussions during the next
session.



17. (U) Documents provided:



- Russia



-- Russian-proposed text for paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Section I:
General Provisions of Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty -
Telemetric Information, dated February 26, 2010.




18. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Mr. Dean

Lt Col Goodman

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Ms. Pura

Dr. Ringenberg

Ms. Smith (Int)



RUSSIA



Gen Poznikhir

Ms. Fuzhenkova

Mr. Shevchenko

Mr. Voloskov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




19. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING