SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP

S E C R E T GENEVA 000247

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
MEETING, FEBRUARY 25, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 245 (SFO-GVA-VIII-086)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-086.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 25, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:15 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) During a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group
meeting held at the Russian Mission on February 25, the two sides
discussed Part Four to the Annex on Inspection Activities,
specifically, the provisions and requirements for site diagrams and
references to Part Two of the Protocol. End summary.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: The First Data Exchange; Problematic Data
Categories; The Chicken or the Egg; and Brass Tacks.



--------------

THE FIRST DATA EXCHANGE

--------------




5. (S) The meeting began with Gen Orlov briefly discussing two
issues with Part Two that had been raised recently in his
delegation. The first issue concerned an apparent textual problem
regarding the release of geographic coordinates, and the second
issue concerned how the initial data exchange would occur.




6. (S) Regarding the first issue, Col Pischulov pointed out that
45 days after signature of the treaty, the Parties would exchange
site diagrams that included geographic coordinates, as required by
paragraph 3 of Section I of Part Two of the Protocol. However, in
paragraph 2, the text specifically stated that geographic
coordinates would not be exchanged in the initial exchange of data.





7. (S) Orlov offered two solutions. The first solution would be
to change the text in paragraph 2 to modify subparagraph (a) by
specifying that geographic coordinates for silo launchers would not
be provided, thus allowing the Parties to exchange geographic
coordinates for facilities. The second solution, which he said was
his personal preference, was to change the requirements of


paragraph 3 by changing the timeline for the exchange of site
diagrams from the currently-agreed 45 days after signature to 45
days after entry into force (EIF).




8. (S) Trout stated immediately that the first option was much
more reasonable than the second option. He also noted that should
Russia formally change their position on the date of exchange for
site diagrams to after EIF, this would represent a significant
walking back from the agreed position. Trout suggested another
solution would be to include all geographic coordinates in the
initial exchange since the data will be the same data that was
already exchanged during START. This was possible because neither
Party had built new silos and the exchange would be secret, since
neither Party could make such information public. He suggested
that the words "geographic coordinates" could be expunged from Part
Two of the Protocol, so that no circular references would have to
be made.




9. (S) Orlov appeared to be struggling to understand, and again
suggested that site diagrams be exchanged 45 days after EIF. Trout
said this would be a bad idea, and reminded Orlov that in the Fall,
both Parties had agreed to exchange site diagrams at signature.
Orlov envisioned a situation in which the U.S. Senate ratified the
treaty, but the Federation Council did not. In this possible
scenario, site diagrams would have been exchanged for a treaty
which would never enter into force. When questioned by Trout,
Orlov stated that none of this discussion was official, but rather
his own opinion about what should be exchanged and when.




10. (S) Trout reiterated that the timeline for the site diagram
exchange was agreed, but that the U.S. side would examine the
Russian side's concern with the provisions in paragraph 2 and how
they would affect the requirement to exchange site diagrams in
paragraph 3.




11. (S) Turning to the second issue regarding the method of
exchange of the initial exchange of data, Col Petrov asked Trout
how he envisioned the first data exchange occurring, specifically
asking if a new notification should be introduced. Trout explained
that the answer to that question depended on the requirements
written into the text for provisional application of the treaty.
If certain notifications were provisionally applied, then Petrov's
solution could work. Another solution, Trout suggested, was that
the text in paragraph 2 be modified to specifically state how the
exchange would take place, such as via diplomatic channels. Both
sides agreed to look harder at this issue and think of a good
solution.



--------------

PROBLEMATIC DATA CATEGORIES

--------------



12. (S) Trout moved onto the category of ICBM Loading Facilities
in Part Two, Section III. Orlov admitted to Trout that he was
confounded by the handling of some categories of data required in
Part Two of the Protocol, including ICBM Loading Facilities. He
noted that Russia had none, neither did the United States. Trout
said he failed to understand why this category was included, and
that if neither party was going to have such facilities, the
category should be deleted. Orlov commented on the possibility
that such a facility could exist sometime during the life of the
treaty. Therefore, it seemed there should be a category to
accommodate it.




13. (S) Turning to Section V, Trout sought to clarify a
conversation of earlier that day regarding "based" versus "located"
with reference to heavy bombers. Orlov stated that in his opinion,
where a bomber was "located" was all that mattered for treaty
purposes. He asked Trout whether the data for a non-deployed heavy
bomber should be included in the data for a repair facility where
it was located, or in the data for its assigned base for counting
purposes.




14. (S) Trout stated that the definitions of deployed heavy
bomber, non-deployed heavy bomber, and test heavy bomber had all
been agreed between the sides that very morning. Trout then read
the agreed definitions to Orlov and explained the significance of
"located" versus "based." Trout convinced Orlov that "based" was
an important treaty provision, and that each heavy bomber or test
heavy bomber had a dual nature in regard to its actual location and
its home base. Orlov again voiced his dissatisfaction at some of
the definitions and understandings the sides had reached, saying
these made no sense to him.



--------------

THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG

--------------




15. (S) For the second consecutive day, the sides discussed the
nuanced nature of Part Two of the Protocol. Trout stated that as
Part Two was the Categories for the Database Pertaining to
Strategic Offensive Arms, it had no data. Therefore, it could not
be used as a reference within the treaty to identify where the data
exchanged was located. Orlov complained that the United States
requested Part Two of the Protocol first be called "the Database,"
then called "Categories of Data for the Database," but either way,
he agreed in concept that Part Two could not be used as a reference
elsewhere in the treaty if the reference was to "data listed in".
Petrov also acknowledged this issue, and stated that the Russian
legal team was working on it. He recommended that the sides leave
references to Part Two in brackets until a logical solution could
be agreed. Trout agreed to allow the lawyers to conform the
reference in a manner that suited both Parties.


--------------

BRASS TACKS

--------------




16. (S) Orlov then asked Trout if he would continue leading the
MOU Working Group until the entire "third tier" was completed.
(Begin comment: Annexes are often referred to as the third tier.
End comment.) Trout said he would be in Geneva leading the working
group at least until the treaty was signed. Orlov pressed Trout
about his plans after treaty signature. Trout stated those plans
had not yet been developed.




17. Orlov then deferred to Petrov to work with Trout and LT
Lobner, clearing several brackets in paragraphs 2(c) through 2 (j).
While some brackets remained, Trout promised to examine these
issues with his staff and respond quickly in order to clear as many
brackets prior to the break as possible.




18. (S) The major bracketed issue remaining after the discussion
was the Russian side's proposal to exclude language that stated
that all structures would be depicted within the inspection site
that "are intended for, and are large enough to be used for, items
declared at that facility shall be shown within the boundary of
that facility, except those structures the entrances of which are
not large enough to permit passage of such items." Both sides
acknowledged the bracketed text and noted a significant conceptual
difference; however, the sides deferred discussion of the topic to
another meeting.




19. (S) The salient issues remaining for discussion included
codifying language to describe which buildings must be depicted on
site diagrams, mechanisms and processes for making changes to site
diagrams, and the role of the Bilateral Consultative Commission
(BCC) in the approval of changed site diagrams.




20. (U) Documents provided: None.




21. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Trout

LTC Litterini (RO)

LT Lobner


Mr. French(Int)



RUSSIA



Gen Orlov

Col Petrov

Col Pischulov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING