Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10GENEVA235
2010-02-28 17:23:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:
SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING,
how-toVZCZCXYZ0003 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #0235/01 0591723 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O R 281723Z FEB 10 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0651 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0399 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0469 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0473 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0469
S E C R E T GENEVA 000235
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 24, 2010
REF: MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007)
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
S E C R E T GENEVA 000235
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 24, 2010
REF: MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007)
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-076.
2. (U) Meeting Date: February 23, 2010
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting on
February 23, chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides
continued the discussion of the U.S.-proposed Section VII of Part
Five to the Protocol related to Type-2 inspections. It was very
clear that the sides were still far apart on the concept for Type-2
inspections at Conversion or Elimination (CorE) facilities. The
Russian side held to its position that at (CorE) facilities only
converted or eliminated items would be subject to inspection
whereas the U.S. view was that a Type-2 inspection at such
facilities must also include the right to confirm the accuracy of
data about systems declared to be located at such a facility. The
Russian side also made it clear that the now expired START site
diagram for the Votkinsk Elimination Facility would be reduced and
only the open viewing area where eliminated items are placed for
National Technical Means (NTM) viewing would be included and made
subject to inspection, thus negating the ability to inspect
non-deployed missiles being prepared for elimination in the large
building that used to be included on the site diagram. End Summary.
4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Reviewing the Bidding; Type-2 Inspections
are Still not Just About CorE; Confusion over Type-2 Inspections
for Conversion; Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Interceptors not Part
of Type-2 Inspections; and Still Far Apart on Full Type-2
Inspections.
--------------
REVIEWING THE BIDDING
--------------
5. (S) Warner began the meeting by reminding Ilin that Section VII
of Part Five to the Protocol dealt with all Type-2 inspections and
CorE inspections were a subset of Type-2 inspections. As a result,
the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text contained elements for both
confirming the accuracy of declared technical characteristics and
data specified for facilities on the numbers and types of items of
inspection as well as confirming that items had been converted or
eliminated in accordance with the provisions of Part Three of the
Protocol. He also noted that CorE inspections would count against
the annual quota for Type-2 inspections.
6. (S) Ilin acknowledged that CorE inspections would be Type-2
inspections and count against the quota. He noted that the Russian
side had reviewed the U.S.-proposed text and pointed out that there
was a need to include various elements from the agreed statement
related to the conversion of B-1 heavy bombers to a conventional
role as well as the agreed statement on SSGNs. He also emphasized
the need to include text related to the conversion of silo
launchers into launchers of anti-missile defense systems or
interceptors and pointed out that the U.S.-proposed text did not
fully take into account the Russian proposal.
-------------- ---
Type-2 inspections are still not just about core
-------------- ---
7. (S) Warner began a discussion of the first paragraph of the
text. The first part of the paragraph was related to the locations
where Type-2 inspections could be conducted as well the purpose of
such inspections which is to confirm the declared data in Part Two
of the Protocol. The U.S.-proposed text added the additional right
to confirm that items had been converted or eliminated if such
items were present at a facility. He explained that this
additional text was necessary to complete the picture for a full
Type-2 inspection at any appropriate facility.
8. (S) Ilin stated that the additional text was not needed and
that the Russian-proposed text included the idea that inspectors
could confirm the elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, as
well as mobile ICBM launchers. Warner acknowledged that was true
but the text needed to be expanded to include the conversion of
heavy bombers as stated in the U.S. approach. Ilin opined that if
that was the case, text from the agreed statement on the conversion
of B-1 heavy bombers should be included. Warner explained that the
concept of B-1 heavy bomber conversion was captured in paragraph 2
(a) of the U.S.-proposed text which dealt with inspections of
formerly declared facilities which was where such inspections would
be conducted but that the paragraph would need to be expanded to
include the "right to conduct inspections at eliminated air bases
to confirm that designated converted B-1 heavy bombers were
incapable of employing nuclear armaments as stated in the First
Agreed Statement."
9. (S) Ilin expressed concern about specifically mentioning B-1
bombers since he understood that the United States was interested
in converting B-52H heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments in the future and when that process began the
Protocol would have to be changed. Warner agreed that it might be
best just to refer to converted heavy bombers in general rather
than specifying the B-1. Ilin agreed with Warner in principle
stating that the Russian-proposed text could be combined to include
heavy bomber conversion. As a result of the discussion Ilin
bracketed CorE facilities in paragraph 1 as U.S.-proposed text to
clarify the Russian position that the confirmation of declared data
would not be allowed during CorE Type-2 inspections. Both sides
agreed to reformulate their versions of the text for future
discussion.
-------------- ---
CONFUSION OVER TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS FOR CONVERSION
-------------- ---
10. (S) Warner moved to paragraph 2(b) of the U.S.-proposed text
explaining that this was where the concept of conducting Type-2
inspections at ICBM bases and submarine bases to confirm the
elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs and the conversion of SLBM
launchers was found. He explained that the U.S. proposal also
included the idea that at such facilities during this Type-2
inspection no other items or portions of the facility would be
subject to inspection.
11. (S) Ilin incorrectly pointed out that a Type-2 inspection
should also be used to confirm that a converted SLBM launcher had
not been reconverted to allow it to launch an SLBM. Warner
carefully explained that the Type-2 inspection at a submarine base
was intended to confirm the initial conversion of the SLBM
launcher. If the Russian side thought it was necessary to allow
for confirmation that the SLBM launchers had not been reconverted
then that inspection should be added to a Type-1 inspection and
Section VI of the Protocol would need to be adjusted. Ilin agreed
in principle and acknowledged that Section VI would have to be
adjusted.
-------------- --
ABM INTERCEPTERS NOT PART OF TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS
-------------- --
12. (S) Warner turned to the Russian-proposed text which
referenced the inspection of silo launchers at ICBM bases that had
been converted to launch ABM interceptors. Beyond the fact that
the United States strongly disagreed that such silos would be
subject to inspection, he explained that these silos were not part
of an ICBM base but were contained within the Vandenberg Space
Launch Facility (SLF) and the entire facility was not subject to
any type of inspection. Ilin asked which of the launchers
containing ABM interceptors launched objects into space since this
was the purpose of a SLF. Warner repeated that the United States
was strongly opposed to the Russian position on this topic.
--------------
STILL FAR APART ON FULL TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS
--------------
13. (S) Warner shifted the focus of the meeting to the Russian
proposal not to allow the inspection of the entire CorE facility
during a Type-2 inspection in order to confirm the declared data
for the facility. He reemphasized the U.S. approach that a Type-2
inspection at a CorE facility would serve two purposes. First, to
confirm the data provided in Part Two of the Protocol and provided
during the pre-inspection briefing and second, to confirm the
conversion or elimination of items if they were present. Ilin
referred back to the Mullen-Makarov meetings in Moscow (Reftel)
stating that it was agreed that the focus of these inspections was
only to confirm the elimination of items. Warner reminded him that
even before the meetings in Moscow the sides had agreed that CorE
facilities would be subject to full Type-2 inspections and both
non-deployed items as well as eliminated items would be subject to
inspection. In the case of Votkinsk, for example, this would
include the inspection of both the building where missiles were
prepared for elimination as well as the open viewing area in front
of the building.
14. (S) Smirnov placed a piece of paper on the table which
depicted the now expired START site diagram of the Votkinsk CorE
facility. It clearly showed that the boundary of the inspection
site had been reduced and was now drawn around only the open
viewing area. He explained that the processing building would be
declared to be a portion of the Votkinsk Production Facility, which
is not subject to inspection under START Follow-on. Consequently,
the site diagram for the facility would be redrawn and would
contain only the open viewing area where the eliminated missiles
would be located. Ilin noted that no non-deployed items would be
inspected since the missile preparation building would not be
included on the site diagram. Both sides recognized that serious
disagreement still existed on this point.
15. (U) Documents provided: None
16. (U) Participants:
UNITED STATES
Dr. Warner
Mr. Albertson (RO)
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Maj Johnson
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gross (Int)
RUSSIA
Col Ilin
Col Izrazov
Mr. S. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Vodopolova
Ms. Shustiva (Int)
17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 24, 2010
REF: MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007)
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-076.
2. (U) Meeting Date: February 23, 2010
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting on
February 23, chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides
continued the discussion of the U.S.-proposed Section VII of Part
Five to the Protocol related to Type-2 inspections. It was very
clear that the sides were still far apart on the concept for Type-2
inspections at Conversion or Elimination (CorE) facilities. The
Russian side held to its position that at (CorE) facilities only
converted or eliminated items would be subject to inspection
whereas the U.S. view was that a Type-2 inspection at such
facilities must also include the right to confirm the accuracy of
data about systems declared to be located at such a facility. The
Russian side also made it clear that the now expired START site
diagram for the Votkinsk Elimination Facility would be reduced and
only the open viewing area where eliminated items are placed for
National Technical Means (NTM) viewing would be included and made
subject to inspection, thus negating the ability to inspect
non-deployed missiles being prepared for elimination in the large
building that used to be included on the site diagram. End Summary.
4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Reviewing the Bidding; Type-2 Inspections
are Still not Just About CorE; Confusion over Type-2 Inspections
for Conversion; Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Interceptors not Part
of Type-2 Inspections; and Still Far Apart on Full Type-2
Inspections.
--------------
REVIEWING THE BIDDING
--------------
5. (S) Warner began the meeting by reminding Ilin that Section VII
of Part Five to the Protocol dealt with all Type-2 inspections and
CorE inspections were a subset of Type-2 inspections. As a result,
the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text contained elements for both
confirming the accuracy of declared technical characteristics and
data specified for facilities on the numbers and types of items of
inspection as well as confirming that items had been converted or
eliminated in accordance with the provisions of Part Three of the
Protocol. He also noted that CorE inspections would count against
the annual quota for Type-2 inspections.
6. (S) Ilin acknowledged that CorE inspections would be Type-2
inspections and count against the quota. He noted that the Russian
side had reviewed the U.S.-proposed text and pointed out that there
was a need to include various elements from the agreed statement
related to the conversion of B-1 heavy bombers to a conventional
role as well as the agreed statement on SSGNs. He also emphasized
the need to include text related to the conversion of silo
launchers into launchers of anti-missile defense systems or
interceptors and pointed out that the U.S.-proposed text did not
fully take into account the Russian proposal.
-------------- ---
Type-2 inspections are still not just about core
-------------- ---
7. (S) Warner began a discussion of the first paragraph of the
text. The first part of the paragraph was related to the locations
where Type-2 inspections could be conducted as well the purpose of
such inspections which is to confirm the declared data in Part Two
of the Protocol. The U.S.-proposed text added the additional right
to confirm that items had been converted or eliminated if such
items were present at a facility. He explained that this
additional text was necessary to complete the picture for a full
Type-2 inspection at any appropriate facility.
8. (S) Ilin stated that the additional text was not needed and
that the Russian-proposed text included the idea that inspectors
could confirm the elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, as
well as mobile ICBM launchers. Warner acknowledged that was true
but the text needed to be expanded to include the conversion of
heavy bombers as stated in the U.S. approach. Ilin opined that if
that was the case, text from the agreed statement on the conversion
of B-1 heavy bombers should be included. Warner explained that the
concept of B-1 heavy bomber conversion was captured in paragraph 2
(a) of the U.S.-proposed text which dealt with inspections of
formerly declared facilities which was where such inspections would
be conducted but that the paragraph would need to be expanded to
include the "right to conduct inspections at eliminated air bases
to confirm that designated converted B-1 heavy bombers were
incapable of employing nuclear armaments as stated in the First
Agreed Statement."
9. (S) Ilin expressed concern about specifically mentioning B-1
bombers since he understood that the United States was interested
in converting B-52H heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments in the future and when that process began the
Protocol would have to be changed. Warner agreed that it might be
best just to refer to converted heavy bombers in general rather
than specifying the B-1. Ilin agreed with Warner in principle
stating that the Russian-proposed text could be combined to include
heavy bomber conversion. As a result of the discussion Ilin
bracketed CorE facilities in paragraph 1 as U.S.-proposed text to
clarify the Russian position that the confirmation of declared data
would not be allowed during CorE Type-2 inspections. Both sides
agreed to reformulate their versions of the text for future
discussion.
-------------- ---
CONFUSION OVER TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS FOR CONVERSION
-------------- ---
10. (S) Warner moved to paragraph 2(b) of the U.S.-proposed text
explaining that this was where the concept of conducting Type-2
inspections at ICBM bases and submarine bases to confirm the
elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs and the conversion of SLBM
launchers was found. He explained that the U.S. proposal also
included the idea that at such facilities during this Type-2
inspection no other items or portions of the facility would be
subject to inspection.
11. (S) Ilin incorrectly pointed out that a Type-2 inspection
should also be used to confirm that a converted SLBM launcher had
not been reconverted to allow it to launch an SLBM. Warner
carefully explained that the Type-2 inspection at a submarine base
was intended to confirm the initial conversion of the SLBM
launcher. If the Russian side thought it was necessary to allow
for confirmation that the SLBM launchers had not been reconverted
then that inspection should be added to a Type-1 inspection and
Section VI of the Protocol would need to be adjusted. Ilin agreed
in principle and acknowledged that Section VI would have to be
adjusted.
-------------- --
ABM INTERCEPTERS NOT PART OF TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS
-------------- --
12. (S) Warner turned to the Russian-proposed text which
referenced the inspection of silo launchers at ICBM bases that had
been converted to launch ABM interceptors. Beyond the fact that
the United States strongly disagreed that such silos would be
subject to inspection, he explained that these silos were not part
of an ICBM base but were contained within the Vandenberg Space
Launch Facility (SLF) and the entire facility was not subject to
any type of inspection. Ilin asked which of the launchers
containing ABM interceptors launched objects into space since this
was the purpose of a SLF. Warner repeated that the United States
was strongly opposed to the Russian position on this topic.
--------------
STILL FAR APART ON FULL TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS
--------------
13. (S) Warner shifted the focus of the meeting to the Russian
proposal not to allow the inspection of the entire CorE facility
during a Type-2 inspection in order to confirm the declared data
for the facility. He reemphasized the U.S. approach that a Type-2
inspection at a CorE facility would serve two purposes. First, to
confirm the data provided in Part Two of the Protocol and provided
during the pre-inspection briefing and second, to confirm the
conversion or elimination of items if they were present. Ilin
referred back to the Mullen-Makarov meetings in Moscow (Reftel)
stating that it was agreed that the focus of these inspections was
only to confirm the elimination of items. Warner reminded him that
even before the meetings in Moscow the sides had agreed that CorE
facilities would be subject to full Type-2 inspections and both
non-deployed items as well as eliminated items would be subject to
inspection. In the case of Votkinsk, for example, this would
include the inspection of both the building where missiles were
prepared for elimination as well as the open viewing area in front
of the building.
14. (S) Smirnov placed a piece of paper on the table which
depicted the now expired START site diagram of the Votkinsk CorE
facility. It clearly showed that the boundary of the inspection
site had been reduced and was now drawn around only the open
viewing area. He explained that the processing building would be
declared to be a portion of the Votkinsk Production Facility, which
is not subject to inspection under START Follow-on. Consequently,
the site diagram for the facility would be redrawn and would
contain only the open viewing area where the eliminated missiles
would be located. Ilin noted that no non-deployed items would be
inspected since the missile preparation building would not be
included on the site diagram. Both sides recognized that serious
disagreement still existed on this point.
15. (U) Documents provided: None
16. (U) Participants:
UNITED STATES
Dr. Warner
Mr. Albertson (RO)
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Maj Johnson
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gross (Int)
RUSSIA
Col Ilin
Col Izrazov
Mr. S. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Vodopolova
Ms. Shustiva (Int)
17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING