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Created
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10GENEVA231
2010-02-28 17:20:00
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Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000231 

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXPQTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY
25, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 145 (SFO-GVA-VIII-072)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000231

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXPQTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY
25, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 145 (SFO-GVA-VIII-072)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-088.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 25, 2010

Time: 4:30 P.M. - 6:10 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



--------------

SUMMARY

--------------




3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr.
Siemon and General Poznikhir, the Russian side provided comments on
the U.S.-proposed draft text ((Annex to the))1 Protocol ((Part
Seven))2 - Telemetric Information, dated February 24, 2010. The
Russian side offered a generally negative review of paragraphs 1
through 4 of Section I: General Provisions. For the most part,
the Russian side emphasized the differences in the positions of the
sides and a lack of understanding of the U.S. approach. End
summary.




4. (U) Subject Summary: General Comments; and Section I: General
Provisions.



--------------

general comments

--------------




5. (S) Siemon had provided the U.S.-proposed draft text ((Annex to
the))1 Protocol ((Part Seven))2 - Telemetric Information, dated
February 24, 2010, to the Russian side the day before. The meeting
focused on the Russian delegation's reaction to this draft text.



Begin text:



SFO-VIII

Proposal of the U.S. Side

February 24, 2010


((Annex to the))1 Protocol ((Part Seven))2 - Telemetric Information



Section 1. General Provisions




1. The Parties shall exchange telemetric information on an equal
number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, but on no more than five

launches of ICBMs and SLBMs per calendar year.

(COMMENT: This text parallels paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
U.S.-proposed protocol text.)




2. The launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, on which telemetric information
is provided, shall be determined by the conducting Party ((in
consultation with the monitoring Party. At the annual BCC exchange
review meeting, the Parties shall discuss selection of launches on
which telemetric information would be exchanged to ensure that
parity is maintained))1.




3. Telemetric information shall be exchanged on ((five))1 ((the))2
launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted ((in the previous calendar
year))2 ((unless one of the Parties launches fewer than five ICBMs
and SLBMs in that year))1. The number of launches of ICBMs and
SLBMs, about which telemetric information is exchanged, shall be
((discussed))1 ((agreed upon))2 at the first ((annual))2 session of
the BCC of ((each))1 ((the current))2 year.




4. Each Party shall provide telemetric information to the other
Party via diplomatic channels no later than ((__))1((30))2 days
after a decision ((to exchange telemetry on a flight test))1
((regarding this issue))2 has been made((by the BCC))2.




5. The conditions and guideline for the exchange of telemetric
information on the launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be considered
within the framework of the BCC.

(COMMENT: This text parallels paragraph 3 of the U.S.-proposed
protocol text.)



((The Bilateral Consultative Commission shall meet within 65 days
after entry into force of the Treaty to discuss exchange of
telemetric information on flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs planned
for that year. Thereafter, the Bilateral Consultative Commission
shall meet within the first 65 days of each calendar year to
discuss exchange of telemetric information on flight tests of ICBMs
and SLBMs planned for that year, and to review the conditions and
methods of further telemetric information exchange on flight tests
of ICBMs and SLBMs.))1 In the event that one of the Parties raises
a question concerning the need to change the ((conditions and
methods of the exchange))1((quaQity and amount))2 of telemetric
information ((transferred))2, the exchange of telemetric


information shall be ((continued))1 ((suspended))2 until the
Parties reach an agreement on the given change.




6. ((The number of flight tests on which telemetric information
shall be exchanged in the remainder of the year in which the Treaty
enters into force will be determined on a proportional basis.))1
Telemetric information shall ((not))2 be exchanged during the
calendar year in which the Treaty expires ((on a proportional
basis))1.



Section II. Access to telemetric information




1. The Party conducting launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, on which
telemetric information is provided, shall not take any measures to
deny access to ((the telemetry signal))1 ((telemetric
information))2 broadcast, including ((encryption,))2 jamming,
encapsulation, and use of directional beaming. ((If encryption
methods are used, the means to obtain the decrypted data shall be
provided to the monitoring Party.))1




2. In relation to launches of ICBMs and SLBMs on which telemetric
information is not exchanged, each Party shall have the right to
use any method of denying access to telemetric information which
originates on board the missile and is broadcast. The Party
conducting the launch shall notify the other Party, in accordance
with Part Four of this Protocol, of the intention to take measures
to deny access to telemetric information.



((3. For each launch for which telemetric information is
exchanged, no less than 24 hours in advance of any flight test of
an ICBM or SLBM, including a prototype ICBM or SLBM, the Party
conducting the flight test shall notify the other Party of all
frequencies and associated modulation methods to be used to
broadcast telemetric information during the flight test.))1



Section III. Guideline for the exchange of telemetric information




1. In the exchange of telemetric information, the Parties shall
provide the recording media containing the recording of telemetric
information broadcast during the ((flight test))1 ((launch, until
the propulsion unit of the upper stage of ICBMs or SLBMs ceases to
function,))2 as well as the interpretive data for the telemetric
information provided, in accordance with the ((Section of the))1
Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol. ((The
interpretive data provided shall be that necessary to permit the
monitoring Party to extract independently the full representation
of each data element contained in the telemetric information
described in Paragraph 2 of this Section, including information to
decrypt the telemetric information if encrypted.))1



2. The Parties shall ((not))2 exchange ((all))1 telemetric
information ((originating from the stages and self-contained
dispensing mechanism, if so equipped, irrespective of broadcast or
recovery method))1 ((broadcast after the propulsion unit of the
upper stage of ICBMs or SLBMs ceases to function, as well as
telemetric information that originated in (a) re-entry vehicle(s)
or in other equipment, installed in the missile as payload))2.




3. During each launch of ICBMs or SLBMs, the Party conducting the
launch shall not broadcast telemetric information via a re-entry
vehicle pertaining to the function of stages ((and self-contained
dispensing mechanism, if so equipped))1 of ICBMs or SLBMs.




4. The Party conducting a launch shall independently determine the
method for recording telemetric information on recording media.




5. Each Party, in order to make it possible for the other Party to
play back the recording of the telemetric information provided,
shall:



Qa) use those types of modulation, methods, modes and formats
for recording, as well as methods for encoding telemetric
information on recording media that will enable the conversion of
the telemetric information to the form (format) originated on board
the missile before broadcast, using telemetry playback equipment
for which a demonstration has been conducted;



b) conduct an initial demonstration ((, unless otherwise
agreed or previously demonstrated))1 of the applicable recording
media and telemetry playback equipment to be used, in accordance
with the ((Section of the))1 Annex on Telemetric Information to
this Protocol;



c) conduct demonstrations of the recording media and (((or)))2
telemetry playback equipment that are different from those for
which a demonstration has been previously conducted, in accordance
with the ((Section of the))1 Annex on Telemetric Information to
this Protocol;



d) provide the other Party with the opportunity to acquire the
telemetry playback equipment and spare parts for such equipment,
((if requested))1 in accordance with the ((Section of the))1 Annex
on Telemetric Information to this Protocol;



e) provide timely training in the operation and maintenance
of the telemetry playback equipment to technical personnel of the
other Party, ((if requested))1 in accordance with the ((Section of
the))1 Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol;



6. If a Party that has received the media containing the recording
of telemetric information, determines that the media does not
contain the recording of the telemetric information in the amount
specified in paragraph 1 of Section III of this Part, or that the
quality of the telemetric information recorded on the media is
insufficient to convert it to the form (format) originated on board
the missile before broadcast, that Party shall provide notification
in accordance with Part Four of ((the))1 ((this))2 Protocol. No
later than 30 days after receiving such notification, the Party
that has provided the media containing the recording of the
telemetric information, shall provide notification in accordance
with Part Four of ((the))1 ((this))2 Protocol explaining the
reasons fQ the incompleteness or insufficient quality of the
recording of telemetric information, or shall provide via
diplomatic channels new media containing the recording of
telemetric information.



((7. If a Party that has received the interpretative data for the
telemetric information provided, determines that such data does not
meet the requirements set forth in the Annex on Telemetric
Information to this Protocol, or that the data received is
insufficient to convert the recorded telemetric information to the
form (format) originated on board the missile before broadcast,
that Party shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four
of this Protocol. No later than 30 days after receiving such
notification, the Party that has provided the interpretative data
for the telemetric information shall provide notification in
accordance with Part Four of this Protocol specifying the procedure
for using the interpretative data for telemetric information
previously provided, or shall provide via diplomatic channels the
revised interpretative data for telemetric information.))2



End text.




6. (S) Poznikhir stated the Russian side did not understand why
the U.S. side had rejected the Russian-proposed Protocol. The
Russian-proposed Protocol reflected the concept that obligations
should be contained in the Protocol and technical details to
implement the Treaty and Protocol should be contained in the
Annexes. The U.S.-proposed Annex repeated language from its
Protocol that Pozhikhir opined did not make sense, legally or
logically. He said the U.S. approach of using brief protocol
language would not speed up the work.




7. (S) As he had done in the previous meeting (Reftel),Siemon
explained that the U.S. approach reflected agreements made by the
Presidents during the January 27 phone call and the letter
exchanged by the Presidents. The U.S. approach reflected Treaty
and Protocol language that could be agreed rapidly to allow
signature. The three paragraphs of the U.S.-proposed ProtQol were
those agreed during the Admiral Mullen-General Makarov meetings in
Moscow. Guidance from Washington directed the delegation to
provide a simple, direct Protocol based on agreed language, which
it had done. The U.S. proposal for the Annex took the Protocols of



the two sides and merged them into one document that reflected the
positions of both within brackets. It was meant to be a work in
progress; the purpose was to stimulate discussion on similarities
and differences in positions and to resolve bracketed text.




8. (S) As an example, Siemon noted the U.S.Qroposed title of the
document that reflected both the Russian intent for a Protocol and
the U.S. intent for an Annex. He also noted paragraph 1 and the
first sentence of paragraph 5 of Section I: General Provisions,
where the U.S. side included the Russian-proposed text without
brackets. The U.S. side had instead included a comment at the end
of each to show that they were parallel to the U.S.-proposed
Protocol and also to indicate that discussion was necessary to
decide where the two paragraphs should go.




9. (S) Poznikhir stated that Siemon's explanation still did not
answer his question of why the U.S. side had chosen this approach
since the parts of the Protocol that addressed conversion or
elimination, notifications and inspection activities all used the
approach that placed obligations in the Protocol and details in the
Annex. Poznikhir stated that the Russian side would provide its
proposal for the Annexes the next day. If each side would
accommodate the other's positions an agreement could be reached
quickly. He recommended the U.S. side use the Russian-proposed
Annexes as a starting point for its proposed Annexes.



Q --------------

Section I: General Provisions

--------------




10. (S) Poznikhir questioned the use of "parity" in the text of
paragraph 2. How did this relate to the term "equal number" in
paragraph 1? Siemon said that parity meant more than one thing; it
reflected on which flights telemetry would be exchanged, as well as
the kinds of information that would be exchanged. The Russian side
had stated several times that its position was that telemetry would
be exchanged only on launches from the previous calendar year. The
conducting Party determined on which launches the telemetry would
be exchanged and the number exchanged would be discussed in the
annual reviews conducted in the Bilateral Consultative Commission
(BCC). This was the fundamental position of the Russian side and
it would not accept any other process.




11. (S) Siemon noted that it was the position of the U.S. side to
discuss in the BCC launches of the current year on which telemetry
would be exchanged. It was the U.S. view that the receiving Party
had a role in the decision on which launches telemetry would be
exchanged. Poznikhir dismissed the U.S. approach because it was
not possible for the Russian side to discuss future launches. A
schedule could change due to force majeure or technical issues. In
addition a schedule of this type contained sensitive information
that the Russian side would not release. He reemphasized the
fundamental Russian position that it was the sole right of the


conducting Party to determine on which launches telemetry would be
exchanged.




12. (S) Poznikhir moved to the discussion of paragraph 3 which he
believed conflicted with the obligations of both paragraph 1 of
this document and paragraph 1 of the U.S-proposed Protocol. The
U.S.-bracketed text in paragraph 3 obligated the sides to exchange
telemetric information on five launches of ICBMs and SLBMs
conducted in theQrevious calendar year unless one of the Parties
launches fewer than five ICBMs and SLBMs in that year. The
obligation appeared to conflict with the obligation in paragraph 1
in this document and with paragraph 1 of the U.S.-proposed Protocol
since both used the formulation "no more than 5 launches." The
Russian interpretation of "no more than five launches" meant that
if a Party conducted 8 launches in the previous year the sides
could decide in the BCC to exchange telemetry on 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5
launches; but no more than 5 launches. Poznikhir believed the
U.S.-proposed text in this example did not permit this decision but
mandated that telemetry be exchanged on 5 launches. A lengthy
discussion ensued in which Mr. Dean explained the legal consistency
between the paragraphs. This did nothing to convince Poznikhir to
change his view that the U.S. language was not internally
consistent.




13. (S) Regarding paragraph 4 that addressed the provision of
telemetric information through diplomatic channels, Siemon noted
the United States included brackets that indicated that the U.S.
side had not decided the number of days for when the exchange would
occur after the decision was made to exchange telemetry on a Qight
test.




14. (S) Poznikhir recommended the group conclude discussions for
the day and pick up with paragraph 5 of Section I at the meeting
the following day. Looking ahead to these discussions, Siemon
stated that the U.S. side disagreed with Russian text on the
suspension of telemetry exchange and on the lack of a role for the
receiving Party in the decision on which launches telemetry would
be exchanged.




15. (U) Documents provided: None.




16. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Mr. Connell

Mr. Dean


Lt Col Goodman

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Ms. Pura

Dr. Ringenberg

Ms. Smith (Int)



RUSSIA



Gen Poznikhir

Ms. Fuzhenkova

Col Ryzhkov

Mr. Shevchenko

Mr. Smirnov

Mr. Voloskov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING