SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT, FEBRUARY 27, 2010

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT, FEBRUARY 27, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-099.




2. (U) The text at paragraph 3 is the joint draft text of the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms dated February 27, 2010.




3. (S) Begin text:



SFO-VIII

Joint Draft Text

February 27, 2010



TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS



The United States of America and the Russian Federation,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,



Believing that global challenges and threats require new approaches
to interaction across the whole range of their strategic relations,



Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship based on
mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation,



Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment
with this new relationship, and endeavoring to reduce further the
role and importance of nuclear weapons,



Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July
1, 1968, and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing
humanity from the nuclear threat,



Expressing strong support for on-going global efforts in
non-proliferation,



Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus to, the
step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while
maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, and

with a view to expanding this process in the future, including to a
multilateral approach,



Guided by the principle of indivisible security and convinced that
measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive
arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will
enhance predictability and stability, and thus the security of both
Parties,



Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between
strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms and that this
interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear
arms are reduced,



Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on
strategic stability,



Taking into account the positive effect on the world situation of
the significant, verifiable reduction in nuclear arsenals at the
turn of the 21st century,



Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the
obligations under this Treaty, adapted, simplified, and made less
costly in comparison to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31,
1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,



Recognizing that the START Treaty has been implemented by the
Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian
Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, and that the
reduction levels envisaged by the START Treaty were achieved,



Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of Belarus,
the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to nuclear disarmament and
to strengthening international peace and security as
non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968,



Welcoming the implementation of the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive
Reductions of May 24, 2002,



Have agreed as follows:

Article I




1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms
in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and shall carry
out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its
Protocol.




2. Definitions of terms used in this Treaty and its Protocol are
provided in Part One of the Protocol.



Article II




1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers,
SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM
warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years
after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate
numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty,
do not exceed:



(a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed
heavy bombers;



(b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed
SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;



(c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers,
deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed
heavy bombers.




2. Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself the
composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.



Article III




1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit
provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article II of this Treaty:



(a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one.



(b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one.

(c) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.




2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit
provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II of this Treaty:



(a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be the
number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on
deployed SLBMs.



(b) One nuclear warhead shall be counted for each deployed
heavy bomber.




3. For purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided
for in subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of this Treaty:



(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one.



(b) Each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as
one.



(c) Each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one.



(d) Each non-deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as
one.



(e) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.



(f) Each non-deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.




4. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and
SLBMs:



(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a
particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that
type.

(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an
assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an
ICBM or SLBM of that type.



(c) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled
missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be
considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.



(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an
ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an
ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an ICBM or SLBM has been
launched from it, or until an ICBM or SLBM has been removed from it
for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to
contain an ICBM or SLBM if it contains a training model of a
missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for
ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from
launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type.




5. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be
subject to this Treaty as follows:



(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;



(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a
production facility;



(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when the silo door is first
installed and closed;



(d) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;



(e) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that
launcher is installed is first launched;



(f) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when its
airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in
which components of such a heavy bomber are assembled to produce
complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of
the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are
converted to such heavy bomber airframes.




6. ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers
shall cease to be subject to this Treaty in accordance with Parts

Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ICBMs or SLBMs of
an existing type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty if all
ICBM or SLBM launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type have been
eliminated or converted in accordance with Part Three of the
Protocol to this Treaty.




7. For the purposes of this Treaty:



(a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely
to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the
Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which
the provisions of this Treaty apply.



(b) Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear
armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for
non-nuclear armaments.



(c) Heavy bombers of the same type shall cease to be subject
to this Treaty ((or to the limitations thereof))2 when the last
heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of that type is
eliminated or converted((, as appropriate,))2 to a heavy bomber
equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance with Part Three of
the Protocol to this Treaty.




8. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:



(a) Existing types of ICBMs are:



(i) for the United States of America, the Minuteman II,
Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper;



(ii) for the Russian Federation, the RS-12M, RS-12M2,
RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24.



(b) Existing types of SLBMs are:



(i) for the Russian Federation, the RSM-50, RSM-52,
RSM-54, and RSM-56;



(ii) for the United States of America, the Trident II.

(c) Existing types of heavy bombers are:



(i) for the United States of America, the B-52G, B-52H,
B-1B, and B-2A;



(ii) for the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160.



(d) Existing types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers are:



(i) for the Russian Federation, ICBM launchers RS-12M,
RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, RS-24; SLBM launchers RSM-50, RSM-52,
RSM-54, and RSM-56;



(ii) for the United States of America, ICBM launchers
Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper; the SLBM launchers
Trident II.



Article IV




1. Each Party shall locate:



(a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases;



(b) deployed launchers of SLBMs only on ballistic missile
submarines.




2. Each Party shall base deployed heavy bombers only at air bases.




3. Each Party shall locate:



(a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases,
production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, repair facilities,
storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, training
facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities. Mobile
launchers of prototype ICBMs shall not be located at maintenance
facilities of ICBM bases;



(b) non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at ICBM
bases, submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities,

((maintenance facilities of ICBM bases,))1 repair facilities for
ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion
or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, training facilities,
test ranges, space launch facilities, and production facilities.
Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located
at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases.




4. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs as well as
non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each
Party shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities
to no more than 30 days.




5. Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test
ranges.




6. Training launchers may be located only at ICBM bases, training
facilities, and test ranges. The number of silo training launchers
located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not
exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.




7. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no
more than ten.




8. Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy bomber
flight test centers. Non-deployed heavy bombers other than test
heavy bombers shall be located only at repair facilities or
production facilities for heavy bombers.




9. Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing of
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by the
Parties.




10. Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at eliminated
facilities except during their movement through such facilities and
during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities.




11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be
based outside the national territory of each Party. The
obligations provided for in this paragraph shall not affect the
Parties' rights in accordance with generally recognized principles
and rules of international law relating to the passage of
submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of
submarines to ports of third States. Heavy bombers may be
temporarily located outside the national territory, notification of
which shall be provided in accordance with Part Four of the
Protocol to this Treaty.

Article V




1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and
replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.




2. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive
arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the
question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the
Bilateral Consultative Commission.



((3. Each Party undertakes not to convert and not to use ICBM
launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense
interceptors therein. Each Party further undertakes not to convert
and not to use launchers of missile defense interceptors for
placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not
apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of
this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors
therein.))3



Article VI




1. Conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from
accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities shall be
carried out in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this
Treaty.




2. Notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other
means of removal from accountability shall be provided in
accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this
Treaty.




3. Verification of conversion or elimination in accordance with
this Treaty shall be carried out by:



(a) national technical means of verification in accordance
with Article X of this Treaty; and



(b) inspection activities as provided for in Article XI of
this Treaty.



Article VII


1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty
shall be created in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the
Protocol to this Treaty. Categories for this database shall be
included in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty.




2. Each Party shall notify the other Party about changes in data
and shall provide other notifications in a manner provided for in
Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.




3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in
order to provide and receive notifications unless otherwise
provided for in this Treaty.




4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary
basis, in addition to the notifications specified in paragraph 2 of
this Article, if it deems this necessary to ensure confidence in
the fulfillment of obligations assumed under this Treaty.




5. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of
the Bilateral Consultative Commission on releasing to the public
data and information obtained during the implementation of this
Treaty. The Parties shall have the right to release to the public
such data and information following agreement thereon within the
framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Each Party
shall have the right to release to the public data related to their
respective strategic offensive arms.




6. Geographic coordinates relating to data provided in Part Two of
the Protocol to this Treaty, unique identifiers, site diagrams of
facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty, as well
as coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant
to this Treaty shall not be released to the public unless otherwise
agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.




7. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the aggregate
number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy
bombers; the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy
bombers; and the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM
launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, as well as
deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, may be released to the
public by the Parties.



Article VIII



In those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its
actions may lead to ambiguous situations, that Party shall take
measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty

and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability concerning
the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Such
measures may include, among other things, providing information in
advance on activities of that Party associated with deployment or
increased readiness of strategic offensive arms, to preclude the
possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party.
This information shall be provided through diplomatic or other
channels.



((Article IX



By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on
((flight tests))1 ((launches))2 of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be
exchanged on a parity basis. The Parties shall agree on the amount
of exchange of such telemetric information.))3



Article X




1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes:



(a) to use national technical means of verification at its
disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized
principles of international law;



(b) not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with this
Article; and



(c) not to use concealment measures that impede verification,
by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty.




2. The obligation not to use concealment measures includes the
obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that
result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the
association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during
testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not
apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use
of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.



Article XI




1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on
strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring

verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each
Party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in
accordance with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this
Treaty.




2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at ICBM
bases, submarine bases, and air bases. The purpose of such
inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on
the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic
offensive arms subject to this Treaty; the number of warheads
located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the number of
nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers. Such
inspections shall hereinafter be referred to as Type One
inspections.




3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at
facilities identified as facilities subject to inspection in Part
Two of the Protocol to this Treaty except for the facilities
specified in paragraph 2 of this Article. The purpose of such
inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on
the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of non-deployed
strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and to confirm that
strategic offensive arms have been converted or eliminated.



In addition, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections
at formerly declared facilities, which are listed in Part Two of
the Protocol to this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are
not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.



The inspections provided for in this paragraph shall hereinafter be
referred to as Type Two inspections.




4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to
participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party. The
purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate distinguishing
features and to confirm technical characteristics of new types, to
demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each
type of strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty.



Article XII



To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of
this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral
Consultative Commission, procedures for the operation of which are
set forth in Part Six of the Protocol to this Treaty, to:



(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the
obligations assumed;

(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to
improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and



(c) resolve questions related to the applicability of
provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm.



Article XIII



To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each
Party shall not assume any international obligations or
undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties
undertake not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this
Treaty to third parties. The Parties shall hold consultations in
accordance with Article XII of this Treaty in order to resolve any
ambiguities that may arise in this regard. This provision shall
not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in
the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of
signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.



Article XIV




1. This Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part
thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the
constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter
into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of
ratification.




2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless
superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and
limitation of strategic offensive arms. If either Party raises the
issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly
consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty,
it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless
it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a
subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic
offensive arms.




3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have
the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty
have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of
its decision to the other Party. Such notice shall contain a
statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards
as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This Treaty shall
terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party
of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice specifies a later
date.


4. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall
supersede the Treaty between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24,
2002, which shall terminate as of that date.



Article XV




1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed
amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures
governing entry into force of this Treaty.




2. If it becomes necessary to make changes in the Protocol to this
Treaty that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under
this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Bilateral Consultative
Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to
the procedure for making amendments that is set forth in paragraph
1 of this Article.



Article XVI



This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.



Done at (location and date),in two originals, each in the English
and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.



FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:



FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:



(( ))1 Proposed by the United States

(( ))2 Proposed by the Russian Federation

(( ))3 For Discussion by the Heads of Delegation



End text.




4. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING