(SFO-GVA-VIII): (U) Inspection Protocol Working Group

S E C R E T GENEVA 000195

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: (SFO-GVA-VIII): (U) Inspection Protocol Working Group
Meeting, February 16, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-055




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 16, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 17:15 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting,
chaired by Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the sides discussed the
U.S.-proposed Annex on Inspection Activities, Part Six, related to
the procedures for conducting Type-1 inspections. The sides agreed
to review the proposed text line-by-line; accepted several
paragraphs and agreed to re-write others for clarity. End summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: U.S.-proposed Annex on Inspection
Activities; Focusing on Part Six.



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U.S.-Proposed Annex on Inspection Activities

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5. (S) Warner stated the priority of the Inspection Protocol
Working Group (IPWG,) in order to complete selected parts of the
Annex on Inspection Activities prior to signature of the START
Follow-on Treaty, needed to be Part Six, related to the procedures
for the conduct of Type-1 inspections, and Part Seven, related to
the procedures for the conduct of both Type-1 and Type-2
inQctions. Part Four, procedures for the submission of site
diagrams, was also a priority but the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) Working Group, led by Mr. Trout and General Orlov, would be
responsible for drafting that part.




6. (S) Warner proposed to begin discussion of Part Six by focusing
on pre-inspection restrictions and the conduct of warhead
inspections. He noted the Annex on Inspection Activities was an
important "handbook of agreed procedures" to be used by inspectors.
While many of the procedures in the Annex would be the same as
those used in START, it was important for this working group to
verify the validity of the procedures, he said. Ilin concurred,
stating the priority should be placed on setting forth the
procedures for Type-1 and Type-2 inspections. Warner clarified
that Part Seven dealt largely with Type-2 inspections, but some
portions would apply to Type-1 inspections as well because it had
been agreed to inspect both deployed and non-deployed items during
Type-1 inspections. In order to ensure clarity, Ilin proposed
referencing in Part Six the provisions from Part Seven that were
applicable to Type-1 inspections. Warner agreed.



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focusing on part six

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7. (S) Ilin explained that current provisions in Part Six did not
contain procedures for inspecting structures that do not contain
mobile launchers of ICBMs and recommended those procedures be
added. Warner agreed to add them if they were missing. Ilin
stated that Part Six did not describe the actions of the inspecting
party if a non-declared item of inspection was discovered. Warner
countered that it was clear in the Protocol, but agreed to review
the matter. Ilin pointed out that Part Six did not include
guidance if objects other than warheads were discovered on an
inspected missile and recommended wording from START be included
with consideration being given to the presence of both nuclear and
non-nuclear warheads. Warner reminded Ilin that both nuclear-armed
and conventionally-armed warheads would be counted against the 1550
aggregate limit on warheads. Ilin continued that new provisions
for the inspection on SSGNs during Type-1 inspections had also not
been included. Warner stated the Second Agreed Statement on the
SSGNs was adequate to cover this situation since it outlined the
principle of using an empty tube inspection to inspect the
converted launchers. In any case, Warner noted, such an inspection
would be a Type-1 rather then a Type-2 inspection. Ilin replied
that the Agreed Statement did not specify the order of inspection
and reiterated the need for detailed instructions somewhere in the
Annex since this Annex provided guidance for execution of the
inspections.




8. (S) In paragraph 1, the sides agreed to change paragraph
1(a)(i) to the active voice and remove the words "launch
canisters." Ilin requested the phrase "closed vehicles" be placed
in brackets and the last portion of the paragraph be rewritten to
specify that covered objects large enough to contain items of
inspection should not be removed from the inspection site. Warner
agreed to the rewriting of the paragraph. Paragraph 1(a)(ii) was
agreed and changed to read: "Heavy bombers shall not leave the
inspection site."




9. (S) Ilin asked if the pre-inspection restrictions imposed by
paragraph 1(b) were in place prior to the declaration of the
launcher. Warner explained it was a two step process. First, the
restrictions were put in place on the whole base until completion
of the pre-inspection procedures which included the declaration of
the launchers or bombers for Type-1 inspection. Following
designation of the launcher or bombers for inspection, certain
pre-inspection restrictions on the remainder of the base would no
longer be in effect, but the pre-inspection restrictions on the
selected launchers or bombers would remain in effect until the
inspecting party arrived at the location of the designated
launchers or bombers. Both parties agreed to revise paragraph 1(b)
to better specify which pre-inspection restrictions were applicable
during each period of the inspection to eliminate confusion on the
matter.




10. (S) Ilin questioned whether the pre-inspection restrictions
(PIR) were applicable to SSGNs located at SSBN bases and Warner
reiterated that SSGN pre-inspection restrictions were covered in
the Second Agreed Statement. Ilin disagreed and requested a
reference in the Annex to the Second Agreed Statement on SSGNs.
Warner agreed to review the matter. Ilin demonstrated his
unfamiliarity with START inspection procedural concepts, raising
questions on test heavy bombers and "water trucks" which are
captured under PIRs. With reference to test heavy bombers, Ilin
questioned why test heavy bombers would be permitted to leave
during PIRs. Warner explained that these were not inspectable, but
Ilin countered that because the inspecting party had no way of


distinguishing a test bomber from a normal heavy bomber, the test
heavy bomber should be required to remain at the base. Warner
agreed.




11. (S) Ilin commented that it was not reasonable that a water
truck which was large enough to contain an item of inspection would
get captured under PIRs. He implied that it should be apparent to
an inspector that a missile could not be hidden in the back of a
water truck, and that the idea of having to inspect a water truck
undermined altogether the basis of trust in the treaty.




12. (U) Documents provided:



- United States



-- U.S.-proposed text for Part Six of the Annex to Part V of the
Protocol, dated February 15, 2010




13. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Dr. Warner

Mr. Ahlm (RO)

Mr. Albertson

Mr. Buttrick

MAJ Johnson

LTC Litterini(RO)

Mr. McConnell

Ms. Purcell

Mr. Rust

Mr. Smith

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

Col Petrov

Mr. Shevchenko

Ms. Vodopolova

Col Zaitsev

Ms. Shustiva (Int)



14. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING