SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) WORKING

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) WORKING
GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 18, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-063.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 18, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) During a meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
Working Group (WG),the U.S. and Russian sides exchanged Joint
Draft Texts (JDT) of Part Two of the Protocol (Database) and
discussed the Russian proposal for the Annex on Inspection
Activities (Part Four, Procedures for Site Diagrams). There was
general agreement that the sides were fairly close to agreement
conceptually on Site Diagrams, and the Russian side presented a
logical restructuring of the document. The sides discussed the
need for an agreed procedure for bringing Russian mobile launchers
of ICBMs into deployed status, the existence of training ICBM silos
in the new treaty, and requirements for photographs of new missile
systems. The Russian side stood firm on its desire for unique
identifiers (UIDs) for all heavy bombers, and it proposed converted
B1Bs be listed as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments in
Part II of the Protocol until the U.S. exhibition of distinguishing
features. End summary.




4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Lots of Paper Exchanged; Getting into the
Details; Mostly in Agreement; The Most Painful Part; Questions on
Other Issues; and Just When We Thought We Were Done.



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LOTS OF PAPER EXCHANGED

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5. (S) Gen Orlov presented the U.S. side with the Russian-proposed
JDT of Part Two of the Protocol (Database),and noted that most of
the remaining brackets related to mobile launchers. He said it was
up to the U.S. side to remove them. He also presented the Russian
proposal for the Annex on Inspection Activities (Part Four,
Procedures for Site Diagrams). Mr. Trout presented the Russian
side with the U.S.-proposed JDT of Part Two of the Protocol
(Database).




6. (S) The Russian side had reviewed the U.S. proposal for the


text on site diagrams dated February 9, 2010 and Orlov believed 80
percent of the document could be agreed to at the meeting. He was
concerned by a comment made by Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller
that it took 18 months to agree on the last five percent of issues
in START, but he noted he was optimistic that the sides could come
to agreement on any outstanding issues soon.



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GETTING INTO THE DETAILS

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7. (S) Orlov asked Col Petrov to explain the format and content of
the Russian proposal on site diagrams which the U.S. side had just
received. Petrov said that first, the Russian side believed that
the beginning of the document should indicate what is really being
asked for, so they reordered the document to have the U.S.-proposed
paragraph 2 at the beginning (site diagrams...shall be provided).
Petrov asked why the U.S. proposal required that all facilities
located within the ICBM base for silo launchers or mobile launchers
be depicted. The Russian side objected to the U.S.-proposed text
in the ICBM base section (defining the boundaries of the ICBM base
and the requirements for each simplified site diagram of the ICBM
base that were duplicated elsewhere). Trout said the U.S. side
would take these issues under consideration.




8. (S) On the issue of submarine base diagrams, Petrov said that
the major roads connecting the storage facility for non-deployed
SLBMs to the coastline should be depicted on a simplified site
diagram.




9. (S) Petrov said the Russian proposal had a new section to
address all other facilities beyond ICBM, submarine and air
bases. This was generally reflected in paragraph 3 of the U.S.
proposal. Trout said the U.S. side would review the
Russian-proposed text and would soon be prepared to discuss it.



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MOSTLY IN AGREEMENT

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10. (S) Petrov then turned to the first part of the U.S.-proposed
text, related to establishing requirements for site diagrams. He
said the two sides were in general agreement for most of the
section, but minor differences remained in subparagraphs (h) and
(j). They would not be hard to resolve, however, as the definition
of an item of inspection had been conformed and the two sides
would soon discuss the U.S.-proposed wording regarding depiction of
large structures on the site diagram. Petrov also said that the
Russian side mostly agreed with the U.S.-proposed paragraph 4


(newly declared facilities).



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THE MOST PAINFUL PART

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11. (S) Orlov said the sides had now arrived at what would be the
most painful, but the most interesting part of the meeting, the
discussion of changes to site diagrams. Petrov talked about not
violating the rights of inspectors to access everything within site
boundaries during an inspection. The concern was with changes to
the boundaries prior to an inspection. Trout reminded the Russian
side of START procedures that had worked for many years and noted
that the U.S. would likely be agreeable to a similar proposal.
There was general agreement that if there were changes to
structures at facilities within boundaries, the revised site
diagram would be provided to the inspectors at the Pre-Inspection
Review. If either side wanted to exclude a structure within the
boundary, that issue would be handled within the framework of the
Bilateral Consultative Commission. If the boundary of a facility
were to increase in size, a notice would have to be sent to the
other Party within a set timeframe which would be determined by the
Notifications Working Group.




12. (S) Trout indicated that the Russian proposal for a 30-day
period before such diagrams would have to be provided could become
a problem. National Technical Means (NTM) might see items of
inspection in the expanded area and then the observing Party would
raise a complaint with the other Party. He noted that a
notification only 72 hours after the change in the site boundary
would decrease the chances of this occurring. He also indicated
that this shorter timeframe would help inspection teams prepare
with the most accurate information available.



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QUESTIONS ON OTHER ISSUES

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13. (S) Trout noted that the two sides were conceptually close on
site diagrams, and it made sense to reorder the document as
suggested by the Russian side. He stated the U.S. side would study
the Russian-proposed text and create a JDT over the next few days.

14. (S) Trout questioned the inclusion of ICBM loading facilities
as a category of data in Part Two and noted that they were deleted
from the database categories in the Fall, but the Russian side
subsequently asked for them to be added back in. Trout said the
U.S. side started to look at the issue in Article IV of where
deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs could be located and that it
appeared they could only be located at ICBM bases. The moment an
ICBM was loaded onto a previously non-deployed mobile launcher of
ICBMs, which in the Russian model could occur at an ICBM loading


facility, it became deployed. Orlov noted the concern and said the
Russian side needed to look further at the issue. Petrov talked
through the situation where a submarine with non-deployed SLBM
launchers arrived at a loading facility at the same time
non-deployed SLBMs arrived for loading, and how notifications would
be handled for the non-deployed SLBMs, non-deployed SLBM launchers,
and the newly deployed SLBM launchers and SLBMs. This was a
regular, well-understood occurrence that was accommodated by the
treaty. He indicated that a similar arrangement needed to be
worked out for mobile launchers of ICBMs to facilitate allowed
operations.




15. (S) Petrov started to ask about size criteria for facilities,
and LT Lobner addressed the issue of reference cylinders. These
issues had been discussed briefly in the MOU Working Group in
November, 2009 but it was decided that they would be addressed by
the Inspection Protocol Working Group. Once inspection criteria
were agreed, the appropriate text would be placed in Part Two of
the Protocol (Database).




16. (S) Trout raised the issue of three engineering ICBM silos at
Hill Air Force Base and plans to maintain a training ICBM silo at
each U.S. ICBM base. Petrov acknowledged the plan to count them as
training silos, just like in START. Petrov noted that the silos
would be on site diagrams but would not be inspectable.




17. (S) Petrov asked about new treaty requirements for exchange of
photographs, expressing that the Russian side wanted to establish
the requirement as soon as possible so it could plan ahead for the
right equipment. Trout said the U.S. side understood the concern
and would review the equipment and procedures for acquiring
photographs. He said that subject could be discussed after
completing the issue of site diagrams.



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JUST WHEN WE THOUGHT WE WERE DONE

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18. (S) Mr. Pischulov read through the U.S-proposed JDT of Part
Two of the Protocol (Database) during the meeting, and he brought
an issue to Orlovs attention. Pischulov noted that when he met
with Lobner on February 17, he thought there was agreement on the
use of unique identifiers (UIDs) on heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments. In reading the U.S. proposal, he did not
find a requirement for UIDs for heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments, similar to the requirement for UIDs for
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Trout said the U.S.
side was still considering its position on the issue. He proceeded
to explain that upon entry into force, all but one B-1B bomber
would likely have been converted so that the heavy bombers would be
incapable of employing nuclear armaments. The sole remaining B-1B
capable of employing nuclear armaments would have been kept in that
condition solely for the purpose of a distinguishing features


exhibition. Once all the B-1Bs were converted, they would no
longer be subject to the treaty, and the associated data would not
have to be recorded in the database. Pischulov said the Russian
side was trying to look ahead for the duration of the treaty, and
he asked if the U.S. might consider converting some B-52Hs.




19. (S) Orlov said that until the B-1B distinguishing features
exhibition occurred, of course all the B-1Bs would have to be
recorded in the database as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments, regardless of their true status. Trout asked Orlov to
clarify what he meant, and Orlov reiterated the Russian position.
Trout asked if the United States conducted an exhibition prior to
entry into force, would the heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments be removed from the treaty provisions. Orlov said they
could be removed, but that position could change. Orlov reiterated
the Russian position that all heavy bombers should have UIDs.




20. (S) Documents provided:



- UNITED STATES:



-- U.S. proposal for Joint Draft Text of Part Two of the Protocol
(Database),dated February 18, 2010



- RUSSIA:



-- Russian proposal for Annex on Inspection Activities (Part Four,
Procedures for Site Diagrams),dated February 18, 2010



-- Russian proposal for Joint Draft Text of Part Two of the
Protocol (Database),dated February 18, 2010




21. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Trout

Mr. Brown

Mr. Evans (RO)

LT Lobner

LT Sicks


Mr. French (Int)



RUSSIA



Gen. Orlov

Mr. Ivanov

COL Petrov

Mr. Pischulov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING