SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 22, 2010

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 22, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-071.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 22, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) Mr. Elliott and Col Ilin chaired a meeting to discuss
proposed Agreed Statements on February 22. Elliott provided copies
of U.S.-proposed joint draft texts (JDT) on the First (Converted
B1-B Heavy Bombers),Second (U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs)
Converted from SSBNs),and Third (Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers
Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped for
Non-Nuclear Armaments) Agreed Statements. Following a quick review
of remaining issues in the three statements, there was a discussion
of the differences in heavy bomber counting rules between the
sides. The U.S. response to Russian questions on SLBM launcher
conversion or elimination procedures was also provided to the
Russian side but discussion was deferred to a future meeting. End
summary.




4. (U) Subject Summary: Second and Third Agreed Statements;
Counting Converted or Eliminated Heavy Bombers; Answers to Russian
Questions on SLBM Launcher CorE Procedures.



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SECOND AND THIRD AGREED STATEMENTS

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5. (S) Elliott gave the Russian side a consolidated U.S.-proposed
JDT of the First(Converted B1-B Heavy Bombers),Second (U.S.
Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs),and Third
(Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments),Agreed
Statements.




6. (S) On the third Agreed Statement (Joint Basing of Heavy
Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped
for Non-Nuclear Armaments),Ilin agreed to delete the
Russian-proposed paragraph 2 on the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC). He stated the only outstanding issue was the
number of heavy bombers inspected. Elliott concurred and stated

that there was no change in the U.S. position on the number of
bombers to be inspected.




7. (S) On the second Agreed Statement (U.S. Guided Missile
Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs),Ilin offered to delete
the Russian-proposed "of SLCM" in subparagraph 1(b). He also
accepted the U.S.-proposed language "either side" vice "the United
States of America" in paragraph 2, acknowledging that if either
side converted an SSBN into an SSGN the provisions of the agreed
statement would apply. Again, Ilin concluded that the only
remaining issue was the number of launchers to be inspected.
Elliott concurred and stated there was no change in the U.S.
position on the number of launchers to be inspected.



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COunting converted or eliminated heavy bombers

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8. (S) With regard to the first Agreed Statement (Converted B1-B
Heavy Bombers),Ilin agreed that the terms "use" and "apply" were
equivalent in the two languages and agreed that the English text
should read "use" vice "apply," with any further discussion of the
wording taking place during the conforming process. In
subparagraph 2(c),as in the second Agreed Statement, Ilin agreed
to use "either Party" vice "the United States of America" in
paragraph 4, acknowledging that if either side converted all heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments of a type into heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments, the provisions of the agreed
statement wwould apply. The only remaining bracket in the JDT was
Russian-proposed text in subparagraph 1(a) on the procedures for an
exhibition "to confirm the conversion of a heavy bomber." Ilin
stated that this idea needed to remain, although the language could
perhaps be reworked.




9. (S) Elliott explained the difference between the purpose of an
exhibition, which would demonstrate the distinguishing features,
and an inspection of the results of conversion, which would remove
a heavy bomber from accountability under Part II of the Protocol to
the treaty. Elliott stated he believed the two sides understood
one another on this issue, but perhaps the text could be clearer.
He agreed to rework this paragraph for the next meeting. Dr.
Warner and Ilin discussed the difficulties in referencing the Annex
on Inspection Activities in this paragraph, as none of the
procedures to conduct the heavy bomber exhibition had been written.




10. (S) The discussion of heavy bombers led to Russian comments on
the fourth Agreed Statement (Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at
the Conversion or Elimination Facility Located at Davis-Monthan Air
Force Base, Arizona). Adm (ret) Kuznetsov stated that Russia saw
two differing interpretations of the last sentence in this agreed
statement: "Such heavy bombers shall be considered deployed heavy
bombers until such time as they are converted into heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments or are eliminated." The Russian

interpretation was that all of a particular type of heavy bomber
would count under the treaty's central limits as heavy bombers
equipped with nuclear armaments until the last of the type was
eliminated or converted. At that time, all bombers of that type
would be removed from accountability under the central limits. The
U.S. side disagreed with this interpretation, asserting that each
individual heavy bomber would be removed from accountability as it
was individually converted or eliminated, in accordance with Part
III of the Protocol.




11. (S) Elliott pointed to agreed text in Part III: Conversion or
Elimination Procedures, Section I, paragraph 3, which used the
article "an" before ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber.
Elliott said this text clearly showed the intention to address the
bombers one at a time but noted that there was no indefinite
article in the Russian text that would equate to "a" or "an."
Warner commented that the sides obviously had a different import of
the wording, and there would need to be substantive discussion on
the issue. Kuznetsov stated that the issue of heavy bombers in
Article III, subparagraph 6(c) would be discussed at the Expanded
Ad Hoc meeting the next day.



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ANSWERS TO RUSSIAN QUESTIONS

ON SLBM LAUNCHER C OR E PROCEDURES

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12. (S) Elliott gave the Russian side the U.S. response to Russian
questions on SLBM launcher conversion or elimination procedures
which was also given to the Russian side by A/S Gottemoeller at a
Heads of Delegation meeting on February 20.



Begin text:



SFO-VIII

Paper of the U.S. Side

February 22, 2010



Response to Russian Delegation Questions

On

U.S. Plans to Convert Certain Launchers of Trident II SLBMs



The following responses to questions of the Russian Delegation are
provided to provide clarity for further discussions:

Q1: The purpose of conversion of individual launchers of Trident
II SLBM launchers.

A1: In order to comply with the central limits of 700 deployed
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers and 800 deployed and non-deployed
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, the United States will be required
to convert or eliminate approximately 80 deployed ICBM or SLBM
launchers, and heavy bombers. Should the United States elect to
convert a limited number of SLBM launchers on its existing Trident
II SSBNs, the tubes will most likely be configured to carry ballast
or be used for storage of miscellaneous equipment.



Q2: Total number of launchers scheduled for conversion.

A2: There are no plans to convert SLBM launchers. However, should
the United States elect to convert SLBM launchers, the number of
converted launchers could range from 2 to 4 SLBM launchers on each
of 14 Trident II SSBNs.



Q3: Time frame for conversion activities (beginning and end of the
activities).

A3: Given the United States has made no decision to convert SLBM
launchers, no reasonable estimate of the length of time required to
convert these launchers is possible. Several factors will
influence the duration of the conversion process, including the
intended use of such a launcher, the method of conversion, and
other major overhaul or refit activities planned for the Trident II
SSBNs.



Q4: Technological conversion characteristics, differences between
the conducted conversion of SSBNs into SSGNs and the forthcoming
conversions.

A4: Conversion of SLBM launchers would be accomplished in
accordance with Section I, paragraphs 3-6 and Section IV,
paragraphs 6 and 7 of Part Three of the Protocol. The principal
criterion shall be that the launcher is no longer capable of
employing an SLBM. Since the United States Government has not made
a decision to convert SLBM launchers, neither has the potential use
for such a converted launcher nor the method of conversion has been
determined. For this reason, no effective comparison to the past
conversion of the Trident I SSBNs can be made, other than to
confirm that the procedures selected would be consistent with the
criteria established in Part Three of the Protocol.



Q5: Functional differences and observable distinguishing features
of converted or non-converted launchers.

A5: Functionally, any converted SLBM launcher will no longer be
capable of employing an SLBM. Because no decision has been made to
convert SLBM launchers, no new function can be expressed with
certainty at this time. However, the most likely function would be
to carry ballast containers. Observation of the functional

differences and observable distinguishing features of the first
item of a type converted would be made during an exhibition as
specified in Section 1, paragraph 5 of Part Three of the Protocol.



Q6: Bases for SSBNs with converted launchers, broadening of the
functions of SSBNs.

A6: SSBNs with converted launchers formerly capable of employing
SLBMs will be based at the existing submarine bases located at
Silverdale, Washington and Kings Bay, Georgia. The U.S. side notes
that this question suggests the functions of SSBNs will be
broadened. The U.S. has no plans o broaden the function of its
SSBNs.



Q7: Counting procedures for converted launchers with the framework
of the Treaty:

A7: When an SLBM launcher is converted by rendering it incapable
of employing an SLBM in a manner that the other Party can confirm
the results of the conversion, such a converted strategic offensive
arm shall cease to be subject to the aggregate numbers provided for
in Article II of the Treaty and may be used for purposes not
inconsistent with the Treaty (see Section I, paragraph 3 of Part
Three of the Protocol).



Q8: Conversion verification measures.

A8: The results of conversion of strategic offensive arms subject
to the Treaty may be confirmed by inspection in accordance with
Articles [XI]1[X]2 and [XII]1[XI]2 of the Treaty (see Section I,
paragraph 6 of Part Three of the Protocol).



Q9: Inspection regime with regard to converted launchers after the
completion of the conversion process.

A9: The results of conversion of strategic offensive arms subject
to the Treaty may be confirmed in accordance with Articles
[XI]1[X]2 and [XII]1[XI]2 of the Treaty (see Section I, paragraph 6
of Part Three of the Protocol).



End text.




13. (S) The response was not discussed further but rather was
taken by the Russian side to study for future discussion.




14. (U) Documents provided:



- United States:

-- U.S.- Proposed Joint Draft Text, First Agreed Statement:
Converted Heavy B1-B Heavy Bombers, dated February 22, 2010;



-- U.S. Proposed Joint Draft Text, Second Agreed Statement:
U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs, dated
February 22, 2010;



-- U.S. Proposed Joint Draft Text, Third Agreed Statement:
Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments, dated February
22, 2010; and



-- U.S. Written Response to Russia's Questions on SLBM
Launcher Conversion and Elimination Procedures, dated February 22,

2010.




15. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Elliott

Mr. Albertson (RO)

Lt Col Goodman

Mr. Highsmith

LTC Litterini

Amb Ries

Mr. Trout

Dr. Warner

Mr. French (Interpreter)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

Mr. Koshelev

Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov

Mr. Zaitsev

Ms. Evarovskaya (Interpreter)




16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING