SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
MEETING, FEBRUARY 5, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 87 (SFO-GVA-VIII-028); 10 GENEVA 97 (SFO-GVA-VIII-021)
10 GENEVA 135 (SFO-GVA-VIII-027)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-029.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 9, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) During a meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding Working
Group (MOUWG) the U.S. and Russian chairs, Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov,
discussed the outcome of the Expanded Ad Hoc discussion (Ref A)
earlier that morning regarding non-deployed heavy bombers. Orlov
stressed the sensitivity and importance of the relationship between
missile defense and telemetry. Turning to database issues, Trout
and Orlov reviewed details, once again, of the initial data
exchange for the treaty to ensure each understood the decision made
during the previous meeting (Ref B). Bracketed text in Part II was
reviewed by the sides. End summary.




4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Follow Up on Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers;
Agreed Statements; Unpleasant News on BMD and Telemetry; and
Database Issues.



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FOLLOW UP ON NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS

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5. (S) Orlov asked Trout his general view of the outcome of the
Expanded Ad Hoc meeting that morning (Ref A). Trout stated he
thought little progress was made. Orlov remarked he thought
progress was made in understanding each other's positions. He
added, however, that he thought having a separate limit for test
heavy bombers was redundant and not logical since there was an
overall non-deployed limit. Trout argued that the test heavy
bomber sublimit was necessary because test heavy bombers were not
inspectable, unlike other heavy bombers. He continued, that, from
a pure accountability perspective, the United States would probably
agree that you would not need a separate limit for test heavy
bombers; the non-inspectability aspect is what created this special
need for a sublimit.



6. (S) Orlov asked whether the United States differentiated
between long-term maintenance and long-term repair. Orlov stated
that for Russia these were two different concepts. Repair was
associated with a long-term cycle, perhaps 1-3 years, and was done
at a production facility. Maintenance, however, was done at a
different facility and only involved a short period of time. Trout
noted that for the United States short-term maintenance was done at
the air base while long-term maintenance was done at the production
or repair facilities. Orlov asked whether the United States
intended to define "long-term." Trout replied that the United
States had not decided on this issue but perhaps if this definition
was deemed necessary it could be included, to which Orlov stated
immediately that he believed this was a bad idea, as it was
unreasonable to establish timelines for bombers visiting repair and
maintenance facilities.




7. (S) Responding to Trout's question regarding when a heavy
bomber would change categories from "deployed" to "non-deployed,"
Orlov answered that the category would immediately change upon
arrival at the appropriate facility. Orlov asked what would happen
if a deployed heavy bomber flew to another airbase. Trout replied
that this was allowed; it was called a visit, and the status of the
heavy bomber ("deployed") would not change.




8. (S) Continuing on the notification theme, Trout noted that
notifications would be very simple if a heavy bomber immediately
changed status when it moved from facility to facility. Orlov and
Trout both agreed that Section V, Heavy Bombers, would have to be
reworked to incorporate non-deployed heavy bombers.



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AGREED STATEMENTS

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9. (S) Orlov changed topics to ask more about the coastlines and
waters diagram in relation to the discussion that took place in the
Agreed Statements Working Group earlier that day (Ref C). Orlov
expressed his concern that the United States, by using this
terminology, was trying to further limit the area that was
inspectable during a Type-1 inspection. Trout replied that this
language was consistent with an SSBN Type-1 inspection and was well
understood by both Parties in START. Furthermore, Trout added that
SSGNs, when located at submarine bases, were generally very near
the piers of SSBNs and would definitely be well within the 5 km arc
as required in the coastlines and waters diagram. LT Lobner added
that in practice, SSGNs are frequently at the same pier as SSBNs if
moored at a submarine base.




10. (S) Orlov asked whether the United States had a chance to look


at any of the new agreed statements delivered by Russia earlier
that day. Trout responded in the negative. Orlov addressed the
rapid reload agreed statement, stating that he was constantly
trying to explain to his colleagues what he believed was the U.S.
concern on this topic. He explained, as he understood the U.S.
concern, the United States thought that Russia was hiding mobile
missiles in the field, burying them so they could not be seen. In
the event that actual use was required, mobile launchers would go
from "buried spot" to "buried spot" reloading, launching, and then
moving to the next place. Orlov personally noted that he thought
the real rapid reload item was nuclear ALCMs stored on rotary
launchers at airbases. But, he continued, this was a personal view
only.



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UNPLEASANT NEWS ON BMD AND TELEMETRY

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11. (S) In a much more somber tone, Orlov explained that he had
some more unpleasant news. He commented that the United States has
repeatedly said that its ballistic missile defense (BMD)
capabilities were not directed at Russia. Why then, he continued,
do you need telemetry? He lamented that these related issues, BMD
and telemetry, were going to be addressed in the near future, and
most likely would result in a more heated debate.




12. (S) Trout thanked him for his candor and commented that
telemetry had been an important element for nuclear arms treaties
for over 15 years. He pointed out that prior to exchanging
telemetry each Party was prone to overestimating the other Party's
missile capabilities which led to each Party building missiles in
greater numbers, that were of greater capability, and that cost
significantly more in order to compensate for what was in reality a
fictitious missile. Furthermore he continued, while the United
States understood that Russia would be the only Party developing
new missiles during the next 10 years, it may not be the case in
the decade after that when the positions might be reversed and
Russia would be very interested in telemetry. Trout argued that if
telemetry were not exchanged in this treaty it was unlikely there
would be an exchange of telemetry in a follow-on treaty.




13. (S) Trout asked how U.S. limited BMD assets would impact
Russian strategic deterrence. Orlov conceded that at this moment
it did not. However, he continued, what about in 10 years? He
argued that it was very likely that U.S. technology, BMD
capability, and number of assets would grow and improve.
Oobviously Russia would continue to develop better technology to
counter BMD capabilities, but once there were significant numbers
of BMD assets the strategic balance could shift.



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DATABASE ISSUES

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14. (S) Trout and Orlov turned to Section I of the database.
Orlov delivered new text for paragraphs 2 and 3. Trout asked to go
over, in detail, what data would be included in Sections III, IV,
and V during the initial exchange based upon the agreement made at
the last meeting (Ref B). After using various categories in these
sections as examples, Trout and Orlov confirmed they both had the
same idea on what specific data would be exchanged. Regarding the
new text, Trout stated the United States would analyze it with the
help of their legal staff.




15. (S) Moving to Section II, Mr. Pischulov noted that the Russian
side had accepted placing the third 800 limit in paragraph 1 but
had bracketed the phrase "equipped for nuclear armaments." Lobner
replied that he understood this position as it was discussed in
both the Expanded Ad Hoc meeting (Ref A) and in the last MOUWG
meeting (Ref B). He added that the issue would be resolved once
both sides had agreed on the definition of non-deployed heavy
bombers.



Q. (S) Continuing in Section II, Pischulov asked that a new
category, "non-deployed heavy bombers," be added to paragraph 2,
stating that it was a logical place for this category. Lobner
asked why the Russian side considered this logical as the category
was really contained both as an aggregate in paragraph 1 (the 800
limit) and as its own category at the beginning of Section V.
Furthermore, he continued, the categories in paragraph 2 are unique
to the remainder of the document as they did not appear anywhere
else as a combined aggregate, with the exception of test heavy
bombers, as this category had a sublimit. After further discussion
it was agreed that paragraph 2 should be deleted.




17. (S) Orlov brought up the topic of coordinates for ICBM bases
for mobile launchers of ICBMs, asking whether the United States had
changed its position on requiring this data, along with the size of
the ICBM base and the size of the basing area. Trout replied that
the U.S. position had not changed, nor did he have any new guidance
on this topic. He repeated the offer made in the last MOUWG
meeting (Ref B) that if Russia was willing to provide the boundary
coordinates for the ICBM base, the United States would drop the
size requirements. Orlov acknowledged he understood the offer but
reiterated the Russian response was that it was unacceptable.




18. (S) Addressing Section III, Trout asked that the word
"(Returned)" be added for the category of Non-deployed Mobile
Launchers of ICBMs under the Production Facility for Mobile
Launchers of ICBMs. Orlov agreed.




19. (S) Orlov turned to the category "warheads on deployed ICBMs"


that was listed in the basing area. He argued that this was a
unique category as it asked Russia to declare the number of
warheads for each launcher regiment. He pointed out information of
this nature would be provided at pre-inspection, as well as the
individual warhead data by missile. Trout said he would think
about this issue.




20. (S) Pischulov asked if there was any change to bracketed
language in Section VI regarding the nomenclature for launchers at
space launch facilities. Trout replied there was not.




21. (S) In Section VII, Pischulov engaged Lobner in a discussion
over the term "version" versus "variant." Specifically, Pischulov
argued that "variant" was the correct term when referring to mobile
launchers because the nomenclature of the "types" declared was the
same as missiles. Lobner pointed out that this issue was confusing
because the Russian side, in practice under START, referred to the
name of mobile launchers using the same nomenclature as its
missiles. However, he continued, in reality they were actually
referring to an item and any versions of that item. Trout added
that for some time there were two versions of the launcher for
RS-12M, versions A and B, which were different due to the location
of the cab. Trout added, however, that he believed one of these
versions no longer existed.




22. (S) Lobner pointed out that the definition for "version" had
been agreed upon at the end of the last session in December, and
read aloud the agreed definition. Pischulov and Orlov both stated
they were unaware that this definition had been agreed, and that
they would consult their Definitions Working Group members to
understand this issue.




23. (S) With respect to Section VIII, Lobner informed Orlov that
he had spoken with the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG)
about the issue of what technical characteristics should be
included in the section. Lobner recommended, based on the
recommendations of the IPWG, that the discussion on this be put on
hold until the IPWG was able to discuss the Annex that would deal
with heavy bomber inspections. At that time, he continued, both
sides would have a better understanding of what characteristics
were required in Section VIII to support inspections. Orlov
agreed.




24. (S) Trout raised the question of bases overlapping since no
coordinates would be provided and no size requirement would exist.
Orlov assured Trout bases would not "walk away," and that the
United States was very aware of where Russia's bases were located
and their approximate size under START. Additionally, no bases
overlapped in START and not that much would change in this treaty,
he argued. He added that he viewed this as a U.S. "control issue,"
in that the United States wanted to control the movements of
Russian mobile launchers by confining them to certain locations.



25. (S) Trout and Orlov agreed to discuss the new Russian-proposed
text for Section I during the next meeting.




26. (S) Documents provided:



- Russia:



-- Section I, General Provisions, paragraphs 1 through 5.




27. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Trout

LT Lobner (RO)

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA



Gen Orlov

Mr. Pischulov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)




28. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING