Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10GENEVA163
2010-02-26 18:24:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

SFO-GVA-VIII: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-006 (SSBN SCRAPPING),

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
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O R 261824Z FEB 10
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000163 

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CIA FOR WINPAC
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SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-006 (SSBN SCRAPPING),
FEBRUARY 26, 2010

REF: STATE 14963; 10 GENEVA 143 (SFO-GVA-VIII-065)
10 GENEVA 147 (SFO-GVA-VIII-037); 10 GENEVA 107 (SFO-GVA-VIII-035)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000163

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-006 (SSBN SCRAPPING),
FEBRUARY 26, 2010

REF: STATE 14963; 10 GENEVA 143 (SFO-GVA-VIII-065)
10 GENEVA 147 (SFO-GVA-VIII-037); 10 GENEVA 107 (SFO-GVA-VIII-035)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-097 - REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE.



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SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED

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2. (S) Guidance received on January 30 (Ref A) directed the
delegation to continue to press for Russian Federation agreement on
Paragraph 4 of Section IV of Part III of the Protocol requiring
submarines awaiting scrapping to remain visible to national
technical means (NTM) of verification, following SLBM launcher
elimination. Multiple negotiation sessions have been used to press
for agreement (Refs B, C and D). No progress has been made on this
issue and the Russian Federation is showing signs of using this
issue as a basis for reopening other sections of Part III of the
Protocol for re-negotiation. Background and analysis are in
paragraphs 3-8. Recommendation is in paragraph 9. Guidance
requested is in paragraph 10. End summary.



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BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

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3. (S) On December 18, 2009, the delegation negotiated a three
element trade within Part III of the Protocol to clear all
remaining brackets. The trade included: U.S. side dropping the
requirement for the cutting and inspection of launch canisters;
Russian side acceptance of a standard 30-day window for inspections
and a 60-day window for verification by NTM; and, Russian side
acceptance of scrapping submarines following elimination of the
SLBM launchers contained on the submarine. Following interagency
review in late December 2009 the U.S. side inserted bracketed
language in Paragraph 4 which would require submarines awaiting

scrapping to remain visible to NTM of verification.




4. (S) Guidance received on January 30 (Ref A) directed the
delegation to continue to press for Russian Federation agreement on
Paragraph 4 of Section IV of Part III of the Protocol regarding
final submarine destruction by scrapping following launcher
elimination. Bracketed U.S. language states "The submarine shall
remain visible to national technical means of verification until
final scrapping has been completed and notification has been
provided." Multiple negotiation sessions have been used to press
for agreement (Refs B, C and D).



5. (S) The Russian Federation continues to assert that once the
SLBM launchers are eliminated, what remains of the submarine is not
an accountable item and is not subject to the treaty. In
accordance with guidance, the delegation has continued to assert
that, under START, it was the common practice Q the Russian
Federation to maintain the submarines in a place visible to NTM
while waiting final scrapping (Ref A). The Russian delegation
acknowledged this fact; however, they continue to assert that these
submarines with their launch tubes removed are not subject to the
treaty; therefore, no additional restrictions are required (i.e.,
remaining visible to NTM) are not required (Refs B and C).




6. (S) Agreed text in Paragraph 4 stipulates that, after the SLBM
launchers have been eliminated, the submarine may be moved to
another declared facility for final destruction by scrapping.
Notification of this movement will be provided. The submarine must
remain at this facility until its final destruction is completed.
Notification of final scrapping must be provided. This requirement
was inserted into the Protocol by the U.S. side to increase
confidence that the SLBM launcher elimination process has not been
reversed.




7. (S) Similarly, the requirement that the submarine undergoing
scrapping remain visible to NTM until final destruction by
scrapping is completed was intended to ensure the elimination
process was not reversed. Upon further consideration, the
delegation believes the movement restriction imposed in Paragraph 4
(the fact that the submarine can not leave the declared facility to
which it has been moved for scrapping) provides the assurance
mechanism needed to maintain confidence the SLBM launcher
elimination process has not been reversed. Should a submarine with
eliminated SLBM launchers that is undergoing scrapping be placed
inside a building or completely under cover, the United States
would have the right to bring this faQto the attention of the
Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) an ambiguity by asserting
that the subQrine appears to have left the declared facility in
violQion of Paragraph 4 of Part III of the Protocol. The Russian
Federation would then be faced with resolving the ambiguity. This
mechanism, which is designed to clarify such ambiguities, should
help reestablish confidence that the submarine had not been
refitted to become part of a clandestine force. Additionally, if
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funds are used to scrap the
submarines, which has been the case for the past 10 years, the U.S.
side will have the opportunity to correlate trusted agent reports
from the CTR contractors to see whether the submarine had been
fully scrapped.




8. (S) On February 22, 2010, the Russian Federation suggested that
the entire Conversion or Elimination portion (Part III) of the
Protocol may need to be reopened for negotiation because the U.S.
side hadQded the requirement for maintaining the opportunity for
constant observation of any SSBN with its launchers removed by NTM
in Paragraph 4, Section IV, which represents, in their view, a
serious breach of the agreement reached on December 18, 2009. The
Russian suggestion to reopen Part III specifically referred to the
possibility of re-negotiating the conversion of individual SLBM


launchers, which has been raised recently by the Russian Federation
(Ref B) and which the U.S. side wants to avoid.



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RECOMENDATION

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9. (S) Based on the movement restrictions that prohibit the
submarine from leaving a declared facility; notification
requirements regarding the arrival of the submarine at the declared
facility and completion of final scrapping of the submarine; the
established procedures of the Russian Federation that involve
displaying submarines awaiting scrapping; and extensive negotiation
time spent on this topic, the delegation recommends dropping the
requirement that submarines awaiting final scrapping remain visible
to NTM of verification until scrapping is complete.



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GUIDANCE REQUESTEDQ
--------------




10. (S) Delegation requests that WQington approve the
delegation's recommendation to drop the requirement that submarines
awaiting final destruction by scrapping be visible to NTM of
verification until the process of scrapping is complete.




11. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING